Farm Europe and Eat Europe express deep concerns regarding the recent proposal outlined in the Commission Staff Working Document published on February 4th, 2025, in preparation for the revision of Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan.

In a letter to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, we emphasized our commitment to supporting policies that promote healthier lifestyles, balanced diets, and sustainable agricultural practices. 

We recognize the urgent need for effective action against cancer and non-communicable diseases (NCDs) across Europe. However, we firmly oppose measures that could undermine the efforts of European producers and their role in providing high-quality, sustainable food.

Our primary concern focuses on the treatment of the wine sector as equivalent to all alcoholic beverages, which fails to recognize key distinctions in terms of consumption patterns, product composition, and the scientifically supported health benefits of moderate wine consumption.

Wine is not only an agricultural product but also a symbol of European culture, tradition, and identity. The wine sector, deeply intertwined with the work of millions of farmers across the EU, faces unique challenges — especially given the ongoing trade tensions affecting the sector. 

The proposal’s potential inclusion of misleading health warnings and unjustified taxation on wine would further harm a sector already struggling with geopolitical challenges.

Furthermore, the staff document of the European Commission neglects the growing concern over the rising consumption of ultra-processed products, which is a highly pressing issue to public health.

We call on the European Commission to shift its attention to these ultra-processed foods and rethink the proposed measures on wine.

We urge the European Commission to reconsider the approach and to engage in meaningful dialogue to protect both public health and the agricultural heritage of Europe.

Farm Europe and Eat Europe remain firm on their commitment to defend the European wine sector and its vital role in Europe’s economy, culture, and agricultural identity.

The Commission has reached a revised EU-Mercosur Agreement in December 2024, which presents some changes regarding the previous 2019 Agreement.

The Paris Agreement on Climate Change is now included. It will allow the suspension of the agreement if a country leaves the Paris Agreement and also if it stops being a party “in good faith”.

But what are the obligations of developing countries, like those in the Mercosur, under the Paris Agreement?

• Adaptation planning: developing countries must engage in adaptation planning processes and implement actions to build resilience to climate change. This includes: assessing climate change impacts and vulnerability; formulating prioritized actions; monitoring, evaluating, and learning from adaptation plans and actions.
• Developing countries must also prepare, communicate, and maintain Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), which are their post-2020 climate actions. NDCs include actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and build resilience to climate change. 
• Developing countries must regularly report on their emissions and progress in implementing their NDCs. 

None of these obligations comprises any specific or quantified targets. In addition to that, the Paris Agreement does not provide for any sanctions in case of non-respect. There are no GHG reduction commitments to respect, or any other quantified commitments.

Therefore, if Mercosur countries do not walk out of the Paris Agreement or stop preparing NDCs, there are no foreseeable consequences of its inclusion in the EU-Mercosur Agreement. 

A new Annex to the Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) Chapter has been negotiated, which will have the same legally binding nature as the TSD Chapter itself. A key feature of the Annex are new commitments on deforestation: “Each Party reaffirms its relevant international commitments and shall implement measures, in accordance with its national laws and regulations, to prevent further deforestation and enhance efforts to stabilize or increase forest cover from 2030”. But the Annex also states: “They further acknowledge that their policies must take into account the social and economic challenges of developing countries and their contribution to global food security”. “They also stress the need for enhanced support and investment to achieve these objectives, including through financial resources, technology transfer, capacity-building, and other mechanisms foreseen in this Agreement”.

From the above text it is far from clear whether, if a party like Brazil does not achieve stopping deforestation from 2030, whilst having implemented measures to that effect, that party infringes the Agreement. Moreover, could not that party claim that she did not receive enhanced support from the EU, including financial support, to reach those objectives?

The precise nature of the commitment to stop deforestation from 2030, whether it is actually effective, is far from clear. In addition, a reference is added to the EU regulation on deforestation (EUDR), undelining that “the EU recognises that this Agreement and actions taken to implement commitments thereunder shall be favourably considered, among other criteria, in the risk classification of countries“. This point must not justify lowering the EUDR risk category of Brazil or other Mercosur countries because of the Agreement, neither biais in the fact basis assessment expected by the European Commission when classifying risks . 

On the Tariff liberalisation schedule there are a few changes on trade concessions and safeguards for cars, but what strikes the most are the additional concessions on agriculture to the benefit of Paraguay: an additional quota of 1500 tonnes of pork, and an additional quota of 50 000 tonnes of biodiesel.

On export duties for raw materials and on Government procurement there are a few changes and concessions.

But there is a new and potentially more significant rebalancing mechanism in the Agreement. If a party considers that a measure of the other party nullifies or substantially impairs its benefits under the agreement, it can ask a panel to rule on this question. The rebalancing mechanism concerns trade effects of measures that the complainant could not have expected when the deal was closed. This new rebalancing mechanism could for instance concern the application of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) by the EU. As the CBAM taxes would only be applied from 2026, it looks likely that the Mercosur countries could bring the EU to a bilateral dispute panel with a view to withdrawing concessions under the EU-Mercosur Agreement, or asking for compensation, in the event the CBAM taxes their exports.

To summarize, the 2024 modifications to the EU-Mercosur Agreement seems to trade mostly declaratory commitments from Mercosur on climate change and deforestation, for the possibility for Mercosur to seek rebalancing concessions if the EU applies new measures with trade effects like the CBAM; and adds some concessions on agriculture (pork, biodiesel) in favour of Mercosur.

The EU seems to have paid a price to conclude the deal, as it was visibly the most adamant and demanding party in the negotiations.

The EU urgently needs a strategy on plant-based proteins. However this work must aim at increasing EU strategic autonomy, not at shaping shortcuts or lazy narratives designed to favour specific interests against the EU animal sector. Both type of proteins are complementary and needed.

Today, the EU Agri-fish Council is debating protein strategies. It is widely acknowledged that the EU faces a significant shortfall in plant protein production, and this must be addressed to meet both food and feed needs, while also enhancing the EU’s strategic autonomy.

However, the document presented by Germany and Denmark is vague on the proposed new concept of “green protein”. Rather than EU’s strategic autonomy ambition, this concept seems more aligned with the alternative protein agenda. This agenda, often promoted by some NGOs and global companies, advocates for synthetic proteins as a primary solution.

In this context, the agricultural discussion is once again confronted with misleading concepts trying to oppose and divide the sector at a time where complementarity must be fostered. In the tabled document, the “green protein” term is used as a marketing tool, based on unscientific and unsubstantiated claims.

Fact-Checking the Claim:

1.  The Increase in European Plant Production: Over the past three decades, the rise in European plant production has been largely driven by the development of the biofuel industry. In the EU, there is a complementary relationship between food and biofuel production, with more than 13 million tons of high quality protein co-produced by the EU biofuel industry valorising EU feedstocks, increasing EU protein supply chain, in addition to reducing transport emissions.

2.  Animal Protein Consumption: Contrary to claims made in the Strategic Dialogue report, animal protein consumption in the European Union has remained stable, not declining. According to the latest EU Agricultural Outlook, meat consumption is projected to slightly increase in 2024, reaching 66.8 kg per capita. When accounting for food waste, this figure aligns with both EU and WHO international health recommendations.

Therefore, the European Union must go beyond lazy communication narratives related to “alternative proteins” in Europe promoting instead the right of consumers to make informed choices between vegetal and animal protein sources and to understand fully the processes behind each products, including the potential use of GMOs, hormones, antibiotics, growth factors, level of processing and energy impacts. The proposed definition as “alternative sources of protein to soy or conventional animal products,” present the concept as a magic wand without any tangible assessment on their capacity to reduce land-use, emissions and be more respectful to nature and the environment.

Policymakers should follow in the footsteps of the future EU Commissioner for Agriculture and Food, Christophe Hansen, who underlined during the hearing in the European Parliament that “it’s tricky to impose top-down who has to eat what… meat products are part of a balanced diet”. Both vegetal and animal proteins are complementary and must be promoted.