EU/Mercosur: the agriculture section, incompatible with EU political coherence

While the pressure on EU negotiators to close the Mercosur deal is increasing due to the perfect storm affecting EU carmakers flooded by Chinese producers, this agreement remains antagonistic to EU agriculture interests and would offset most — if not all — EU producers’ efforts on the difficult path of climate transition.
It would not only undermine major EU agricultural value chains, but also, as it stands, the policy coherence and the alignment of EU policies, as requested in different recent reports. A dedicated fund would be far from enough to compensate for its economic impacts considering the firepower of the Mercosur agribusiness sector, not mentioning the detrimental effects on the Amazon, the planet’s lungs.
Therefore, Farm Europe regrets yesterday’s renewed commitment of Commissioner Šefčovič to move forward in the talks with Mercosur and considers that the conditions are not met for including agriculture in this deal. Free trade agreements can offer important opportunities for the EU economy, but only if and when the principles of reciprocity are duly taken into account, in particular for EU agriculture. Those conditions are not meet and far from being achieved in the Mercosur negotiations.

Deforestation

  • The European Union has seen a reduction of more than 10 million hectares in its agricultural area over the last three decades (equivalent to two-thirds of Poland’s agricultural area). Forests in the EU have increased by 12 million hectares.
  • Meanwhile, Brazil lost 90Mha of forests. And the EU has become the second-largest importer of tropical deforestation and associated emissions (16% of tropical deforestation linked to international trade). Over the last 30 years, EU imports are estimated to have caused more than 11 million hectares of deforestation.

Pesticides

  • The use of hazardous pesticides has declined by more than 25% in the EU in less than 10 years.
  • In the Mercosur area, the increase in areas cultivated with soy, maize, and cane has led to a significant increase in the use of pesticides. In Brazil alone, the volume of pesticides sold quadrupled from 2000 to 2020. But it is not just about quantity: 27% of the products used in Brazil in 2020 were banned in the EU. Chlorothalonil, a fungicide, was banned in the EU since 2019, and an insecticide like Novaluron was banned in 2012. These are just some examples.

Hormones

  • Since the 1980s, the European Union established a ban on using growth-hormones in cattle ; this ban has been reinforced several times in the ‘90s and in 2006 with the exclusion of antibiotics used a growth promoters. 
  • In a recently published audit report on controls on residues of active substances, pesticides and contaminants in animal and animal products, the European Commission recognized the need to suspend imports of bovines from Brazil due to the lack of guarantees on hormone use. Keeping in mind that even if the imports from the Mercosur area of meat where production involves growth hormones for cattle are forbidden, this constraint is partly overcome through the use of certain antibiotics as growth promoters.

Therefore, rather than opening wide the doors of the European Union to the agricultural giants of Latin America, at a time of difficult challenges for EU producers, it is a matter of urgency:

  • To be credible in the fight against deforestation with a simple and solid implementation of the EU regulation on deforestation for standards and high-risk countries, while avoiding administrative burdens for low or zero-risk countries, particularly for EU producers ;
  • To protect our agriculture against unfair competition, not only when it comes to consumer safety, but also in terms of EU environmental standards, with full reciprocity on production norms ;
  • And, of course, to shape a new vision for EU agriculture and food, matching a real ambition for the “Made in Europe”. 

Mercosur: EU farmers would be exposed to more unfair competition

The draft Protocol proposed by the European Commission doesn’t provide answer to the actual environment and climate concerns on the Mercosur deal, and much less in attempting to establish a level playing field for EU farmers. Vague political declarations seem to be what’s on the table. Will they suffice to convince the European Parliament and the Council?

The European Commission is known to be seeking an additional Protocol with Mercosur that would accommodate the European Parliament and Council concerns on the lack of strong environmental and climate provisions in the deal. Without further assurances the political process of ratifying the deal was actually frozen.

A leaked draft of that Protocol, labelled “EU-Mercosur Joint Instrument”, sheds light on the approach being followed by the Commission.

The draft consists on a recollection of previous international commitments of all parties; it lists a set of general good intentions with regard to the environment and to fighting climate change; it sets a single new non-binding target on the reduction of deforestation (-50% by 2025), without any proper independent verification process; and, last but not least, it lacks any enforcement mechanisms whatsoever.

What would be the real value of this Protocol? What is the added value in recalling international commitments? To which extent, if any, would that add to the existing commitments? What are general good intentions worth, without targets, and without any enforcement provisions? Even on the well-known problem of deforestation, what does the draft Protocol add to the provisions of the recently adopted EU Regulation on imported deforestation? Does an aspirational, non-binding target assuage widespread concerns on the preservation of the Amazon? If there are no enforcement mechanisms, to which extent are the good intentions and declarations more than empty words?

It is crucial however to put the current on-going negotiations on the additional Protocol in the right context.

The negotiated EU-Mercosur deal between the Commission and the Mercosur countries was already seen as too weak on environmental and climate protection. Since then the Commission has embarked in a set of proposals – the Green Deal – that are piling up new restrictions and obligations on EU farmers: the SUR proposal to reduce by 50% the use of chemical pesticides; the IED, Directive on industrial emissions, encompassing a large part of the EU livestock production; the proposals on mandatory reductions on chemical fertilisers, and on setting aside land for biodiversity; the additional efforts asked to the agricultural sector to reduce GHG emissions.

Does the draft Protocol address any of the new environmental and climate measures proposed? Does it attempt to set-up real “mirror clauses” on imports from Mercosur? 

We see none of it. The application of the deal would thus lead to increased unfair competition for EU farmers. They would face higher costs, lower profitability, as a result of the Commission Green Deal proposals, that their Mercosur competitors would not. The situation today is worse for the EU agriculture sector than when the negotiation was finalised in 2019, but the draft Protocol bluntly ignores that fact.

Inevitably, if that were to be the case, imports from the Mercosur would further increase with regard to earlier forecasts. EU agriculture production would decrease, and EU consumption would be satisfied by more imports produced under much lower environmental and climate standards. EU farmers would be worse-off with no world climate benefit.

This draft Protocol doesn’t provide answer to the actual environment and climate concerns on the deal, and much less in attempting to establish a level playing field for EU farmers. Vague political declarations seem to be what’s on the table. 

Will they suffice to convince the European Parliament and the Council?