Month: November 2024

BioMonitor4CAP: New tools to monitor the Agro-Biodiversity

Posted on - Posted by Farm Europe

Since 2022, Farm Europe has been actively participating in the BioMonitor4CAP project, funded by the Horizon Europe research and innovation program, together with twenty-two partner organisations (ecologists, agronomists, data scientists etc.) from ten European countries and Peru.

Monitoring the status of agro-biodiversity is essential for effective management of agro-ecosystems and for appropriate and effective implementation of strategies and policies to maintain biodiversity in order to avoid unsustainable agricultural practices that are one of the main factors affecting habitat and species diversity in EU agricultural landscapes. 

The BioMonitor4CAP project aims to develop simple and advanced agro-biodiversity monitoring and surveillance systems to support and implement outcome-oriented policies in European agricultural landscapes. 

BIODIVERSITY INDICATORS

Monitoring biodiversity involves four main areas: remote sensing, soils, insects and birds.

FIELD RESEARCH : NEW MONITORING TECHNOLOGIES

Traditionally, biodiversity assessments have relied on field surveys, which can be time-consuming, labour-intensive, and limited in their geographical coverage. In recent years, Remote Sensor-based technologies have emerged as a valuable tool for biodiversity monitoring, offering the ability to collect large-scale data at frequent intervals. The BioMonitor4CAP project will collect biodiversity data in multiple and new complementary ways. The classical in-situ and ex-situ surveys (field observations and measurements) will be combined with new methods: eDNA sampling, optical methods, acoustic sensors, drone-based systems, and satellite earth observation.

FACILITATING THE ADOPTION OF BIODIVERSITY MONITORING AND GOOD FARMING PRACTICES

Identifying stakeholder groups and how they perceive agrobiodiversity is essential for the effective development of agrobiodiversity policy measures that promote positive agrobiodiversity decision-making.

  1. Farmers’ agrobiodiversity perceptions and their motivations to adopt management practices set out by the agricultural policies have been studied. Farmers recognize how their management practices and agri-environmental programs are connected to biodiversity and how biodiversity positively benefits farming. However, conservation activities, farm management, and closely related agricultural policies often conflict with farmers’ management decisions. Preliminary literature review results suggest key considerations for designing agrobiodiversity-enhancing policy measures :
  • Theoretical and practical agrobiodiversity education for farmers: educational activities increase stakeholders’ understanding and motivation towards agrobiodiversity;
  • Rewarding farmers for monitoring and enhancing agrobiodiversity: various measures to improve adoption of the extent and development of novel agrobiodiversity-preserving farming practices; 
  • Supporting cooperation between farmers and other stakeholders in the agricultural value chain: encouraging and increasing information flows, shared goals and management practices for improving agrobiodiversity throughout the agricultural value chain;
  1. Consumers’ food preferences indirectly influence farmers’ production decisions. Consumer perceptions and their food choices may have significant influence on agrobiodiversity conservation. Citizens appreciate the intrinsic values of agrobiodiversity, which contrasts with farmers’ perception that emphasises its instrumental values. For citizens, agrobiodiversity is mainly associated with aesthetic values by those who prefer restored and traditional landscapes. Preliminary literature review results suggest key considerations for designing agrobiodiversity-enhancing policy measures:
  • Agrobiodiversity information on food products for consumers: informing about the agrobiodiversity impacts of the products and farmers’ agrobiodiversity-enhancing measures increases awareness;
  • Ensuring far-reaching agrobiodiversity research funding and dissemination activities: increasing awareness of agrobiodiversity among lesser-studied stakeholders such as companies’ representatives, authorities, children and students to emphasise the importance of agrobiodiversity in future food production.

AGRI Council: The misleading concept of “green proteins”

Posted on - Posted by Farm Europe

The EU urgently needs a strategy on plant-based proteins. However this work must aim at increasing EU strategic autonomy, not at shaping shortcuts or lazy narratives designed to favour specific interests against the EU animal sector. Both type of proteins are complementary and needed.

Today, the EU Agri-fish Council is debating protein strategies. It is widely acknowledged that the EU faces a significant shortfall in plant protein production, and this must be addressed to meet both food and feed needs, while also enhancing the EU’s strategic autonomy.

However, the document presented by Germany and Denmark is vague on the proposed new concept of “green protein”. Rather than EU’s strategic autonomy ambition, this concept seems more aligned with the alternative protein agenda. This agenda, often promoted by some NGOs and global companies, advocates for synthetic proteins as a primary solution.

In this context, the agricultural discussion is once again confronted with misleading concepts trying to oppose and divide the sector at a time where complementarity must be fostered. In the tabled document, the “green protein” term is used as a marketing tool, based on unscientific and unsubstantiated claims.

Fact-Checking the Claim:

1.  The Increase in European Plant Production: Over the past three decades, the rise in European plant production has been largely driven by the development of the biofuel industry. In the EU, there is a complementary relationship between food and biofuel production, with more than 13 million tons of high quality protein co-produced by the EU biofuel industry valorising EU feedstocks, increasing EU protein supply chain, in addition to reducing transport emissions.

2.  Animal Protein Consumption: Contrary to claims made in the Strategic Dialogue report, animal protein consumption in the European Union has remained stable, not declining. According to the latest EU Agricultural Outlook, meat consumption is projected to slightly increase in 2024, reaching 66.8 kg per capita. When accounting for food waste, this figure aligns with both EU and WHO international health recommendations.

Therefore, the European Union must go beyond lazy communication narratives related to “alternative proteins” in Europe promoting instead the right of consumers to make informed choices between vegetal and animal protein sources and to understand fully the processes behind each products, including the potential use of GMOs, hormones, antibiotics, growth factors, level of processing and energy impacts. The proposed definition as “alternative sources of protein to soy or conventional animal products,” present the concept as a magic wand without any tangible assessment on their capacity to reduce land-use, emissions and be more respectful to nature and the environment.

Policymakers should follow in the footsteps of the future EU Commissioner for Agriculture and Food, Christophe Hansen, who underlined during the hearing in the European Parliament that “it’s tricky to impose top-down who has to eat what… meat products are part of a balanced diet”. Both vegetal and animal proteins are complementary and must be promoted.

FOOD IS COMING FROM FARMERS, NOT FROM LABs!

Posted on - Posted by Farm Europe

It is not acceptable that misleading narratives are leading the debate around the sustainable livestock sector, influencing European Commission and policy makers. 

Farm Europe and Eat Europe are grateful to have been invited to take part this week to the workshop organised by DG Grow of the European Commission on fermented dairy products, or – differently said – lab grown dairy products. It has been quite illuminating!

A workshop that is deemed to be based on science and facts should not start with misleading assumptions –- describing cows like “a bioreactor 10 times less effective”. Such allegation – that was the leitmotiv for all panellists – clearly shows that evidence-based approach and rigorous impact assessments are not at the core of the food system they promote. 

Such approach deliberately left unanswered and not debated questions that all EU consumers are asking. How the societal and environmental role of the use of genetical modified organism (GMOs) is considered? How is effectiveness measured? How the energy use is being calculated? Compared to which model of livestock production? On what basis synthetic or lab-grown dairy product can be presented as having a “better taste” or as a “better ingredient”? What is the assessment about the consumers’ acceptance in having chemical food in their plates?

Farmers and food producers should be given the possibility to address such concerns in a balanced debate and take a strong position. As underlined by Farm Europe and Eat Europe – notably during the debate – fermentation is just one of the lab processes at stake, but the debate shall be holistic, considering also ethical and environmental aspects, and the consequences for the competitiveness of the EU agri-food sector, avoiding simple statements not based on unanimous science.

When it comes to the role and the impact of the livestock sector the debate should be based as well on science and real figures, that must take into consideration not only the emissions of the livestock sector, that no one denies are impactful – even though in a decreasing trend in the last decades – but also the positive externalities of the livestock production circle as well as the differences between emissions and their effects on the environment (- CO2 remains in the atmosphere 300-1,000 years, after 100 years all the CO2 emitted at time zero will still be in the atmosphere, while the original emission of methane (CH4) will already have disappeared 11.2 ± 1.3 years after emission) – as well as the positive externalities of the livestock production circle).

The 80% of water “consumed” in the production cycle of a cow go back to the field with a better quality in terms of organic matter, contributing to make our soils healthier. What about water and polluted waters resulting from a bioreactor process?

Manure and by products produced by a cow are transformed in a positive and virtuous bioeconomy model as energy (biogas, biomethane), or as organic fertilizer (digestate, Renure), just to give some examples. 

Bioreactors would need to use a lot of energy that is assumed to come from renewable sources, whereas we know that even renewable energy is limited, unless we do not want to make our agricultural land fit only for solar panel production. Photosynthesis is the only free energy, and it is the very base of EU livestock production. 

Finally, let’s not forget the risks for rural areas to be abandoned reducing the competitiveness of the livestock sector for the sake of few highly capitalistic companies ambitioning to concentrate on their hands food production. Who will die first? Farmers located in remote areas: are we ready to accept all the related risks linked to possible soil erosion, hydrogeological instability, or desertification?

On the legislative framework, as already reminded in a letter we sent to the European Commission, and backing the calls from the EU Agricultural Council and the European Parliament, there is a need to assess if the “novel food” Regulation as it stands is fit for purpose, asking to consider future modifications that take into consideration the need to align some aspects of the evaluation of food produced in laboratories with the evaluation procedures of medicines, in particular the request to include pre-clinical and clinical studies to be used as criteria for assessing the safety of lab-grown products, to take duly into consideration the regulations on GMOs and to address ethical issues. 

Deforestation: Farm Europe welcomes a simplification for EU farmers, keeping the level of ambition untouched

Posted on - Posted by Farm Europe

The European Parliament made a positive step forward in its vote on imported deforestation (EUDR-2023/1115). This position will remove unnecessary red tapes for EU farmers, while securing the level of ambition in the fight against deforestation. 

The perimeter of the regulation covering operators and traders is unchanged. The delay is  limited to one year, necessary to finalise the implementing acts of this regulation which is cornerstone for trade reciprocity, sustainability, and fair value chains for agriculture and food products.

MEPs approved the amendments introducing a new “no risk” category for countries, which comes in addition to the existing “low,” “standard,” and “high” risk categories for deforestation. Countries designated as “no risk”— defined as those with stable or growing forested areas—would face notably reduced compliance requirements. 

The current version of the text was agreed upon by the Parliament with 371 votes in favour, 240 votes against  and 30 abstentions. It is now crucial for the Council of the European Union to join the Parliament’s approach as soon as possible, and for the Commission to fully complete the implementation of the regulation, including the platform providing an “early warning system” to assist the competent authorities, operators, traders and other relevant stakeholders, as established by Recital 31. 

The Commission is also expected to complete a country benchmarking framework by June 30, 2025.

Regulation on imported deforestation (EUDR): reducing red tape on EU farmers while keeping the overall ambition is possible!

Posted on - Posted by Farm Europe

The regulation on deforestation (2023/1115) is a cornerstone for trade reciprocity, sustainability, and fair value chains for agriculture and food products. A postponement of one year is now unavoidable considering the late presentation of the implementing rules, but any further delay should be avoided.

In order to comply with WTO requirements and guarantee a fair treatment for all operators worldwide, the regulation on deforestation has been designed to cover the entire planet, regardless of the level of deforestation risk in the countries covered. 

A simplified due diligence procedure has been set up to avoid placing a disproportionate burden on operators producing and marketing raw materials from countries with a low risk of deforestation. 

However, as highlighted in previous analysis by Farm Europe, this simplified due diligence procedure only allows a partial derogation from the administrative requirements and data collection, placing unreasonable burdens on operators for low or zero deforestation risks. 

Simplification yes, dismantling no.

Therefore, the amendments proposals seeking to create a “no risk” category goes in the right direction. But any further modifications would change the nature and be a blow to the level of ambition of the regulation. In particular, to secure a robust regulation, the responsibility of important global operators should not be diluted. 

Corrections should be limited to the parts of the text that threaten its own credibility, namely the ultimate risk of having a new standard that would weigh more heavily on EU farmers and food producers, faced with a fussy and disproportionate implementation of the regulation, than on global actors. 

These changes should be made quickly, taking into account the need to limit as much as possible the delay in the implementation of this important regulation, to avoid destabilizing European value chains and threatening their fragile economic equilibrium.  

A full implementation from the European Commission needed. 

In the meantime, the implementation of Recital 31 of the regulation which calls upon the European Commission to build a platform providing an “early warning system” to assist the competent authorities, operators, traders and other relevant stakeholders must be fully put into practice, which is not the case until now. 

This plateform has been added by the co-legislator to the Commission’s initial proposal to provide “continuous monitoring and early notification of possible deforestation or forest degradation activities”, and to be operational as soon as possible. It is be a building block for an easy, uniformed and simplified implementation of the regulation by third countries, and in particular for developing countries that should be set up. 

A TRUMP PRESIDENCY CAN HAVE A BIG IMPACT ON AGRICULTURE AND ON THE GREEN DEAL

Posted on - Posted by Joao Pacheco

The upcoming second Trump Presidency can have dramatic consequences on EU agriculture, trough trade and policy impacts.

What comes immediately to our minds is the increased risk of trade frictions or even trade wars, which could one way or the other impact upon EU agriculture.

This note discusses the different scenarii as far as trade problems are concerned, but goes further and highlights another major likely impact – on the EU Green Deal. 

In discussing what could happen we will not dig in the discussion on the advantages or disadvantages of higher tariffs, which although being of real importance would merit a specific and deep economic analysis, well beyond the more focused purpose of this note.

TRADE

On the trade front Trump has quite consistently talked about raising US import tariffs. He has also consistently singled out China has a major target for US tariff hikes. 

It would not be anything new as in his first Presidency he took the charge against China and raised multiple tariffs against steel or aluminium imports, which, as is well remembered, impacted the EU and lead to difficult negotiations after a round of trade retaliatory measures.

What could a second Trump Presidency bring anew?

There are several possible scenarii:

  1. The US could raise its tariffs across the board, bringing its average weighted tariff of little more than 2% to 10 or 20%. On China, the US would likely raise its tariffs even further, the figure of 60% has been put forward. 

The difficulty with this scenario is that it would impact every country in the world, including the US, most likely trigger retaliatory measure by the countries affected, and leave very little margin for negotiation.

The US would get increased protection for some of its sensitive sectors, but loose export markets and increase import (and input) costs even for sectors where the new Administration is not seeking to reshore its industrial basis.

The EU would most certainly retaliate, increasing tariffs and thus reducing US imports.

Our agriculture exports to the US would be reduced. Although we might replace the US in some third countries markets that would have also increased tariffs on US imports, the final balance would be negative for our interests as we currently enjoy a large trade surplus with the US.

Trump could also have difficulties in passing this across-the-board tariff hike in Congress. Whereas for specific tariffs he might have the power to act, it is unlikely that power could be extended to such a comprehensive measure.

I would thus rank this option as not very likely.

  1. The US could raise its tariffs mainly against China and a few other products and countries, targeting those areas where higher tariffs would be more effective to bring industry back to the US and protect sensitive sectors. Or the US could demand reciprocity on some specific products, i.e that third countries apply the same tariffs than the US.

The EU could be impacted on cars, steel, and other industrial products, and also directly on agriculture as Trump has been vocal against the EU for restricting US food exports. That would inevitably trigger retaliation against US imports. 

From there, three alternatives are possible: that both sides stay with mutual targeted higher tariffs; that the retaliation triggers counter-retaliation and a trade war; that some form of negotiated settlement is found. 

The outlook for EU agriculture exports to the US would depend on which products would be targeted by US higher tariffs. That is very difficult to predict, but the prospect is real.

This scenario could be more appealing to the new Administration. It would enable her to exert pressure and settle for a better negotiated deal.

In both scenarii the impact of much higher tariffs on Chinese exports to the US would be felt also in the EU. China would be left with more goods to export at even lower prices to the EU (and to the rest of the world). The EU would most likely feel compelled to protect herself, and could even do it under the framework of an agreement with the US. China would however not watch idle while its exports were being targeted. Thus, EU agriculture exports could easily be on China’s list of retaliation.

Also, in both scenarii the WTO would be even further sidelined to the point of practical oblivion. Recourse to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism would not be a viable option to deter the new US Administration.

GREEN DEAL

The trade problems discussed above would result on the initiative of the US to break its WTO commitments and unilaterally impose tariffs on others with no valid internationally accepted legal arguments. The WTO exception to allow members to retain otherwise WTO-inconsistent measures — such as discriminatory tariffs or import quotas or bans — on grounds of national security, cannot justify every measure, and even less an across-the board tariff hike.

Turning now to the EU Green Deal. 

EU ETS (Emission Trading Scheme) is a mechanism that restricts and prices carbon emissions within the EU creating a market for emissions allowances. CBAM (Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism) levels the carbon cost playing field for imported goods, by applying a differential tax at the border. 

As it stands the applicability of the Green Deal, without devastating consequences for our economies, depends upon the implementation of the CBAM. Without a CBAM the industries that are subject to mandatory emission reductions and real biting ETS would face a double-edged shock – higher production costs and more competition from imports. That would be a recipe for disaster, which would most likely be politically (and socially) unacceptable. 

The CBAM is already being deployed but the implementation of actual border taxes is scheduled to start from 2026, when the free distribution of ETS certificates comes to an end.

Thus in 2026 the EU would start taxing imports of cement, electricity, fertilisers, iron and steel, and aluminium hydrogen, and some precursors and downstream products made from cement, iron and steel, and aluminium, when their emissions are higher than what is accepted within the EU.

Contrary to what would happen if (when) the US raises tariffs unilaterally, now it would be the EU doing it.

The new US Administration would most likely retaliate. Even if some Republicans are willing to impose carbon taxes on imports, which would mostly concern China, they would never accept that US exports be taxed for that reason.

Our legal ground to apply a CBAM under WTO rules has not been tested. The EU knows it is in shaky ground, and it is understood that it would privilege securing its ground through agreements with countries concerned. That could prove difficult, if not unlikely, but notwithstanding the US would not seat down to accept an EU CBAM, nor would the US wait for a WTO panel decision to react. 

What is more, the US would probably be followed by other major economies, like India and China. Even the UK would be in a difficult position, as agreeing with the EU and implementing their own CBAM would put them at a crossroads with the US.

The result would be that either the EU goes ahead with the Green Deal and accepts that a large share of its industries is put in dire straits due to higher production costs and lower exports, with all the economic, social, and political consequences, or the EU pauses the application of core elements of the Green Deal, starting by the ETS and the CBAM.

The former is highly unlikely, as it would cause reduced welfare and jobs. If now, at an earlier stage of implementation of the Green Deal, political and social opposition is mounting as the costs are becoming clearer, as those costs would sharply increase if the EU stays the course of implementation of the Green Deal, what would the reaction look like? Politicians and public have now an acute awareness of the consequences, and I would expect the Green Deal key measures to be paused and the EU back to the drawing board on the best way forward.

Although only the EU’s industry is directly concerned by the ETS and the sharp reductions in emissions, agriculture would also be on the spot as fertilizers are concerned, not to mention likely trade retaliation.

In addition to that, the pause of the implementation of core elements of the Green Deal would open wide the door to a broader re-evaluation on how the EU should tackle climate change, on which measures should be implemented without jeopardizing the EU economic and social fabric. 

That is of utmost importance to EU’s agriculture. The issue is not that climate change is real and impactful. The issue is how best we should address this challenge. The issue is to tackle climate change without reducing our welfare and our strategic autonomy.

To conclude, a Trump Administration surely brings a higher risk of trade spats, but also the opportunity to rethink how we deal with climate change in the EU.

It brings on the one hand the negative prospect of reduced trade opportunities, but on the other hand it opens the possibility of re-tooling the Green Deal to fight climate change without reducing our well-being, shifting to a technological and incentive-based approach. 

EU/Mercosur: the agriculture section, incompatible with EU political coherence

Posted on - Posted by Farm Europe

While the pressure on EU negotiators to close the Mercosur deal is increasing due to the perfect storm affecting EU carmakers flooded by Chinese producers, this agreement remains antagonistic to EU agriculture interests and would offset most — if not all — EU producers’ efforts on the difficult path of climate transition.
It would not only undermine major EU agricultural value chains, but also, as it stands, the policy coherence and the alignment of EU policies, as requested in different recent reports. A dedicated fund would be far from enough to compensate for its economic impacts considering the firepower of the Mercosur agribusiness sector, not mentioning the detrimental effects on the Amazon, the planet’s lungs.
Therefore, Farm Europe regrets yesterday’s renewed commitment of Commissioner Šefčovič to move forward in the talks with Mercosur and considers that the conditions are not met for including agriculture in this deal. Free trade agreements can offer important opportunities for the EU economy, but only if and when the principles of reciprocity are duly taken into account, in particular for EU agriculture. Those conditions are not meet and far from being achieved in the Mercosur negotiations.

Deforestation

  • The European Union has seen a reduction of more than 10 million hectares in its agricultural area over the last three decades (equivalent to two-thirds of Poland’s agricultural area). Forests in the EU have increased by 12 million hectares.
  • Meanwhile, Brazil lost 90Mha of forests. And the EU has become the second-largest importer of tropical deforestation and associated emissions (16% of tropical deforestation linked to international trade). Over the last 30 years, EU imports are estimated to have caused more than 11 million hectares of deforestation.

Pesticides

  • The use of hazardous pesticides has declined by more than 25% in the EU in less than 10 years.
  • In the Mercosur area, the increase in areas cultivated with soy, maize, and cane has led to a significant increase in the use of pesticides. In Brazil alone, the volume of pesticides sold quadrupled from 2000 to 2020. But it is not just about quantity: 27% of the products used in Brazil in 2020 were banned in the EU. Chlorothalonil, a fungicide, was banned in the EU since 2019, and an insecticide like Novaluron was banned in 2012. These are just some examples.

Hormones

  • Since the 1980s, the European Union established a ban on using growth-hormones in cattle ; this ban has been reinforced several times in the ‘90s and in 2006 with the exclusion of antibiotics used a growth promoters. 
  • In a recently published audit report on controls on residues of active substances, pesticides and contaminants in animal and animal products, the European Commission recognized the need to suspend imports of bovines from Brazil due to the lack of guarantees on hormone use. Keeping in mind that even if the imports from the Mercosur area of meat where production involves growth hormones for cattle are forbidden, this constraint is partly overcome through the use of certain antibiotics as growth promoters.

Therefore, rather than opening wide the doors of the European Union to the agricultural giants of Latin America, at a time of difficult challenges for EU producers, it is a matter of urgency:

  • To be credible in the fight against deforestation with a simple and solid implementation of the EU regulation on deforestation for standards and high-risk countries, while avoiding administrative burdens for low or zero-risk countries, particularly for EU producers ;
  • To protect our agriculture against unfair competition, not only when it comes to consumer safety, but also in terms of EU environmental standards, with full reciprocity on production norms ;
  • And, of course, to shape a new vision for EU agriculture and food, matching a real ambition for the “Made in Europe”. 

Christophe Hansen’s hearing: beyond the strategic dialogue ?

Posted on - Posted by Farm Europe

November 4th will be a defining moment for the future of the European agricultural policy, during the European Parliament’s hearing of the designated Commissioner Christophe Hansen. Will he be able to chart his own political course or will he strictly follow in the footsteps of the strategic dialogue? This is the main question that MEPs will ask themselves at the end of the hearing to determine if a strong commissioner is taking the helm of European agriculture in this period of turmoil.

The commissioner candidate knows the intricacies of the European Parliament and its political dynamics perfectly. He has had the opportunity to work in Parliament as a parliamentary assistant at the beginning of his career, and then as a Member of the European Parliament. He has been heavily involved in trade issues – Brexit in particular – and deforestation, for which he was the rapporteur.

Members of the European Parliament’s Committee on Agriculture will be tasked with assessing the candidate’s competence for the assigned portfolio, as well as his adherence to Union values and his communication skills. The Commissioner has already had the opportunity to provide initial policy orientations in his responses to the written questions sent to him by the MEPs.

The hearing will begin with a 15-minute opening statement, followed by questions from all political groups, with the candidate having twice as much time for his or her reply as the time given for the question.

During the hearing, undoubtedly, many topics will be addressed — the future of the CAP, and direct payments in particular ; the challenge of Ukraine’s accession for European agriculture ; the candidate’s approach to reforming the food value chain, combating unfair trading practices and improving farmers’ income ; as well as his stance on trade, particularly when it comes to the on going talks with Mercosur.

Beyond these important topics, it is clear that the question of the strategic dialogue and the follow-up to this exercise, in which Parliament was not involved, will capture the MEPs’ attention. The Commissioner-designate will have the difficult task of following in the footsteps of the European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, who has placed the implementation of the strategic dialogue at the heart of her mission letter, while at the same time distancing himself from the specific recommendations of this report to assert his autonomy and his own political identity, essential for acquiring his stature as a European commissioner.

It is primarily in this exercise of balance and subtle dosage that his performance will be evaluated and will allow him to gather the political support he needs, not only to win the approval of the rapporteurs representing 2/3 of the committee’s votes, but also to begin his mandate and build his own strategic vision for the next five years in agriculture.

This political capacity will be all the more important and necessary as the majority that supported Ursula von der Leyen for a second term at the head of the European Commission will not be sufficient to obtain confirmation at the first hearing. If he intends to be confirmed without going through a second hearing and a majority vote, the Commissioner-designate will need to convince beyond the EPP, S&D, Renew, and Greens groups, as these only provide him with 31 votes out of the 33 necessary. He will therefore also need the support of the ECR group.