Regulation on imported deforestation (EUDR): reducing red tape on EU farmers while keeping the overall ambition is possible!

The regulation on deforestation (2023/1115) is a cornerstone for trade reciprocity, sustainability, and fair value chains for agriculture and food products. A postponement of one year is now unavoidable considering the late presentation of the implementing rules, but any further delay should be avoided.

In order to comply with WTO requirements and guarantee a fair treatment for all operators worldwide, the regulation on deforestation has been designed to cover the entire planet, regardless of the level of deforestation risk in the countries covered. 

A simplified due diligence procedure has been set up to avoid placing a disproportionate burden on operators producing and marketing raw materials from countries with a low risk of deforestation. 

However, as highlighted in previous analysis by Farm Europe, this simplified due diligence procedure only allows a partial derogation from the administrative requirements and data collection, placing unreasonable burdens on operators for low or zero deforestation risks. 

Simplification yes, dismantling no.

Therefore, the amendments proposals seeking to create a “no risk” category goes in the right direction. But any further modifications would change the nature and be a blow to the level of ambition of the regulation. In particular, to secure a robust regulation, the responsibility of important global operators should not be diluted. 

Corrections should be limited to the parts of the text that threaten its own credibility, namely the ultimate risk of having a new standard that would weigh more heavily on EU farmers and food producers, faced with a fussy and disproportionate implementation of the regulation, than on global actors. 

These changes should be made quickly, taking into account the need to limit as much as possible the delay in the implementation of this important regulation, to avoid destabilizing European value chains and threatening their fragile economic equilibrium.  

A full implementation from the European Commission needed. 

In the meantime, the implementation of Recital 31 of the regulation which calls upon the European Commission to build a platform providing an “early warning system” to assist the competent authorities, operators, traders and other relevant stakeholders must be fully put into practice, which is not the case until now. 

This plateform has been added by the co-legislator to the Commission’s initial proposal to provide “continuous monitoring and early notification of possible deforestation or forest degradation activities”, and to be operational as soon as possible. It is be a building block for an easy, uniformed and simplified implementation of the regulation by third countries, and in particular for developing countries that should be set up. 

EU/Mercosur: the agriculture section, incompatible with EU political coherence

While the pressure on EU negotiators to close the Mercosur deal is increasing due to the perfect storm affecting EU carmakers flooded by Chinese producers, this agreement remains antagonistic to EU agriculture interests and would offset most — if not all — EU producers’ efforts on the difficult path of climate transition.
It would not only undermine major EU agricultural value chains, but also, as it stands, the policy coherence and the alignment of EU policies, as requested in different recent reports. A dedicated fund would be far from enough to compensate for its economic impacts considering the firepower of the Mercosur agribusiness sector, not mentioning the detrimental effects on the Amazon, the planet’s lungs.
Therefore, Farm Europe regrets yesterday’s renewed commitment of Commissioner Šefčovič to move forward in the talks with Mercosur and considers that the conditions are not met for including agriculture in this deal. Free trade agreements can offer important opportunities for the EU economy, but only if and when the principles of reciprocity are duly taken into account, in particular for EU agriculture. Those conditions are not meet and far from being achieved in the Mercosur negotiations.

Deforestation

  • The European Union has seen a reduction of more than 10 million hectares in its agricultural area over the last three decades (equivalent to two-thirds of Poland’s agricultural area). Forests in the EU have increased by 12 million hectares.
  • Meanwhile, Brazil lost 90Mha of forests. And the EU has become the second-largest importer of tropical deforestation and associated emissions (16% of tropical deforestation linked to international trade). Over the last 30 years, EU imports are estimated to have caused more than 11 million hectares of deforestation.

Pesticides

  • The use of hazardous pesticides has declined by more than 25% in the EU in less than 10 years.
  • In the Mercosur area, the increase in areas cultivated with soy, maize, and cane has led to a significant increase in the use of pesticides. In Brazil alone, the volume of pesticides sold quadrupled from 2000 to 2020. But it is not just about quantity: 27% of the products used in Brazil in 2020 were banned in the EU. Chlorothalonil, a fungicide, was banned in the EU since 2019, and an insecticide like Novaluron was banned in 2012. These are just some examples.

Hormones

  • Since the 1980s, the European Union established a ban on using growth-hormones in cattle ; this ban has been reinforced several times in the ‘90s and in 2006 with the exclusion of antibiotics used a growth promoters. 
  • In a recently published audit report on controls on residues of active substances, pesticides and contaminants in animal and animal products, the European Commission recognized the need to suspend imports of bovines from Brazil due to the lack of guarantees on hormone use. Keeping in mind that even if the imports from the Mercosur area of meat where production involves growth hormones for cattle are forbidden, this constraint is partly overcome through the use of certain antibiotics as growth promoters.

Therefore, rather than opening wide the doors of the European Union to the agricultural giants of Latin America, at a time of difficult challenges for EU producers, it is a matter of urgency:

  • To be credible in the fight against deforestation with a simple and solid implementation of the EU regulation on deforestation for standards and high-risk countries, while avoiding administrative burdens for low or zero-risk countries, particularly for EU producers ;
  • To protect our agriculture against unfair competition, not only when it comes to consumer safety, but also in terms of EU environmental standards, with full reciprocity on production norms ;
  • And, of course, to shape a new vision for EU agriculture and food, matching a real ambition for the “Made in Europe”. 

Christophe Hansen’s hearing: beyond the strategic dialogue ?

November 4th will be a defining moment for the future of the European agricultural policy, during the European Parliament’s hearing of the designated Commissioner Christophe Hansen. Will he be able to chart his own political course or will he strictly follow in the footsteps of the strategic dialogue? This is the main question that MEPs will ask themselves at the end of the hearing to determine if a strong commissioner is taking the helm of European agriculture in this period of turmoil.

The commissioner candidate knows the intricacies of the European Parliament and its political dynamics perfectly. He has had the opportunity to work in Parliament as a parliamentary assistant at the beginning of his career, and then as a Member of the European Parliament. He has been heavily involved in trade issues – Brexit in particular – and deforestation, for which he was the rapporteur.

Members of the European Parliament’s Committee on Agriculture will be tasked with assessing the candidate’s competence for the assigned portfolio, as well as his adherence to Union values and his communication skills. The Commissioner has already had the opportunity to provide initial policy orientations in his responses to the written questions sent to him by the MEPs.

The hearing will begin with a 15-minute opening statement, followed by questions from all political groups, with the candidate having twice as much time for his or her reply as the time given for the question.

During the hearing, undoubtedly, many topics will be addressed — the future of the CAP, and direct payments in particular ; the challenge of Ukraine’s accession for European agriculture ; the candidate’s approach to reforming the food value chain, combating unfair trading practices and improving farmers’ income ; as well as his stance on trade, particularly when it comes to the on going talks with Mercosur.

Beyond these important topics, it is clear that the question of the strategic dialogue and the follow-up to this exercise, in which Parliament was not involved, will capture the MEPs’ attention. The Commissioner-designate will have the difficult task of following in the footsteps of the European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, who has placed the implementation of the strategic dialogue at the heart of her mission letter, while at the same time distancing himself from the specific recommendations of this report to assert his autonomy and his own political identity, essential for acquiring his stature as a European commissioner.

It is primarily in this exercise of balance and subtle dosage that his performance will be evaluated and will allow him to gather the political support he needs, not only to win the approval of the rapporteurs representing 2/3 of the committee’s votes, but also to begin his mandate and build his own strategic vision for the next five years in agriculture.

This political capacity will be all the more important and necessary as the majority that supported Ursula von der Leyen for a second term at the head of the European Commission will not be sufficient to obtain confirmation at the first hearing. If he intends to be confirmed without going through a second hearing and a majority vote, the Commissioner-designate will need to convince beyond the EPP, S&D, Renew, and Greens groups, as these only provide him with 31 votes out of the 33 necessary. He will therefore also need the support of the ECR group.

BUDGET 2028-34: EC INITIAL IDEAS RAISE QUESTIONS

In preparing the financial perspectives for the period 2028-2034, the European Commission is indulging in its favourite exercise: on the one hand, creating margins without any new financial margin, and on the other, trying to force the hand of the Member States on the financing of the European budget while retaining its role as principal.

Traditionally, the Commission primarily sounded out the capitals on acceptable cuts to the budgets of the main European policies and the acceptability of a slightly increased total European budget. In this first-round exercise, the CAP was put forward as a target (proposed to be cut by up to 30% in 2018 for instance).

In the current context of budgetary frugality, the Commission is trying a different route, ultimately drawing on the proposal for (administrative) reform of the CAP that it made in 2018.

It proposes grouping the 530 European programmes (representing a total budget of more than 12 trillion euros) into a single large European fund, called Pillar I. Alongside this pillar, two others would exist: one aimed at the financing of the services (thus allowing negotiations on the Commission’s operating budget to be decoupled a little more from discussions on the funding of European policies) and a third relating to enlargement and major investments of collective European interest, including defence (a pillar for which money has yet to be found).

Pillar I would therefore bring together all the major European policies. The Member States would be asked to draw up national strategic plans, setting out their priorities and their wishes as regards the mobilisation of the money allocated to them under the various policies.

The creation of such a fund undoubtedly implies a certain degree of fungibility of budgets previously allocated to one policy or another. We can assume that both the CAP and cohesion policy – whose budgets are always a source of envy in the absence of other truly common policies – would no longer see their funding protected over the programming period. Funding would be set at the beginning of the period according to national priorities and would no doubt be adjusted along the way, particularly if disbursements turned out to be lower than expected.

Under this scheme, transfers of funding to the Member States for the various policies would be conditional on respect for the rule of law and the implementation of priority measures defined at European level. The Member States would then be able to activate the measures provided for in the various policies, which would act as toolboxes that the Member States could activate or not.

In the case of the CAP, the Commission illustrates its point with two examples that raise questions about the detailed knowledge of agricultural issues on the part of a side of the European Commission. As a condition of Member States’ access to CAP money, it imagines “promoting organic farming”. An original example, when it is clear that the objective put forward by the Farm to Fork of 25% of land in organic farming corresponds neither to the expectations of the markets, nor to the imperatives of food sovereignty, nor to those of sustainability in Europe. As for the CAP’s ‘investment’ chapter, the Commission takes the example of direct payments. While these payments are certainly vital for farmers’ incomes at the moment, is this the most relevant example when we are aiming for investments to resolutely win the dual performance challenge: getting European agriculture back on the road to profitability while pursuing the path of greater sustainability? Not to mention the arrival of Ukraine.

This suggestion to overhaul the European budget and the way it operates raises a number of questions that the European Parliament raised when it considered the Commission’s 2018 CAP proposal, before reformatting it to give it a minimum common meaning.

This scheme would leave it up to the Member States to implement the bulk of European policies in accordance with their national priorities at the time, with the exception of a few ‘gateway’ measures to funding, a condition which the European Council (which must act unanimously on financial matters) would no doubt seriously water down.

As with the 2018 CAP proposal, we are now in a situation where all European policies under Pillar I are to be renationalised across the board. At the end of the day, Europe will only remain common to Pillar III (enlargement, major European investment plans).

So what of the single market?

What would be the economic efficiency of such a renationalised system, with the temptation for some to concentrate funding on a few sectors in order to subsidise them more so that they can gain an advantage over their European competitors? The money used in this way would not lead to European growth, but to more fractures and, in the end, a waste of the taxes paid by Europeans.

This idea of a large common pot is no doubt also related to the Commission President’s leitmotiv over the last few weeks (at least with regard to the CAP) of having a more targeted budget and more targeted measures. If the aim is to have more effective measures, everyone can agree. But if it’s a rhetorical device to get people to accept a lower budget by explaining that, despite everything, everything will be fine with more targeting, then doubts are permitted. At this stage, doubts exist about the European executive’s intentions with regard to agriculture and its funding.

Just one figure: if the CAP budget for the period 2028-2034 were to be maintained in current euros, this would mean that Europe is opting for a CAP whose economic value in 2034 (if inflation becomes low again) will be only 46% of the 2020 figure. Faced with the challenges of sovereignty, the loss of competitiveness over the last 2 decades, and enlargement to include Ukraine…

What’s true for milk must also be true for meat!

Following our assessment of the Court of Justice statement on Meat Denominations, Farm Europe launches a Call for Action to European Institutions.

Since 1987, milk and milk products have been protected by European legislation to ensure clear information for consumers and to prevent the ambiguous marketing use of these terms by alternative products and imitations. 

Questioned on the validity of the French initiative to ban the use of meat names to designate a product containing vegetable proteins, the European Court of Justice has just concluded that a Member State may not enact national measures regulating or prohibiting the use of names other than legal names.

Faced with the surge of ultra-processed alternative products on the shelves, this legal interpretation by the Court of Justice now puts the European institutions to the sword: it is above all up to them to take up the issue. It’s up to them to protect consumers, ensure transparency in the names used in the meat sector and put an end to the double standards for meat and milk that have gone on for far too long. 

The Court has open ways for Member States to take new initiatives within a clearer legal framework. But it is above all up to Europe to preserve its internal market and protect consumers. 

Today, when it comes to meat, there are very precise rules on what, for example, the French “steak haché” or “escalope hachée” must contain at least 99% meat and less than 1% salt! It is a lightly processed product, with mainly one ingredient. 

With the Court’s approach, meat substitutes and imitations – including ultra-processed ones – could legally use these names without any requirement as to the natural character of the product. 

This opinion clearly raises the issue of discrimination between meat and meat substitutes and imitations, and of effective consumer protection. We therefore call on European decision-makers to intervene as quickly as possible and put order on the shelves and in the internal market! 

Join the call scanning the QR Code here !

Background 

On the basis of Regulation (EU) Noo 1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on the provision of food information to consumers, the Court of Justice holds that a Member State may not lay down national measures regulating or prohibiting the use of designations, other than legal names, consisting of terms from the butchery, charcuterie and fishmongery sectors to describe, market or promote foodstuffs containing plant proteins instead of proteins of animal origin.

This decision excludes these sectors from the provisions that the co-legislators deemed necessary for dairy products as early as 1987 (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1898/87 of 2 July 1987), when imitation and substitute products began to be placed on the market. It also discriminates against the meat sector in terms of consumer protection regulations. 

Legislation to protect consumers from being misled by various everyday consumer products using meat is drastic. Only minced meats meeting the definition in point 1.13 of Annex I to EC Regulation 853/2004 are allowed to use the designations steak or minced steak (beef), minced grill, minced escalope (veal, pork). Minced meat is defined in point 1.13 of Annex I to EC Regulation 853/2004 as boneless meat that has been minced into fragments and contains less than 1% salt. To qualify as 100% minced meat from (species), even the simple addition of salt is not sufficient. 

Meat products are defined in point 7.1 of Annex I to EC Reg. 853/2004 as “processed products resulting from the processing of meat or from the processing of products so processed that the characteristics of the fresh meat can be discerned from the cut surface at the heart”. “Moulded minced meat may be called: steak or minced steak (beef), minced grill, minced escalope (veal, pork)”. 

Can it be considered legitimate for only minced meats that meet a strict definition to be able to use the name minced steak, while substitutes and imitations that are often ultra-processed could unconditionally benefit from the possibility of using this name or others such as sausage, ham or hot dogs[1] ? 

So that European consumers can benefit from the same level of information, transparency and safety, it is up to the European institutions to take up the issue of meat names. They did so inconclusively during the 2020 discussions on the Common Market Organisation as part of the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, for the butchery and charcuterie sectors.  However, they must take the initiative again to finally guarantee that the law applying to consumer information is brought into line with that already applying to the milk and dairy products sector and with the consumer protection provisions of Regulation 853/2004, which tightly regulates meat products.


[1] For example, the average composition of vegetarian hot dogs is as follows: water, rapeseed oil, table salt, starch, pea protein, potato protein, citrus fibre, thickener: E 407a, E 461, acidifier E 330, natural flavour, spices, dextrose, spice extracts, colouring E 160a, red radish concentrate, beechwoodsmoke

Agriculture Commissioner : all ingredients for a new positive impetus 

The structure of the new European Commission represents a promising step forward to open a new chapter of European policy in the field of agriculture and food. The reorganisation of the portfolio will potentially give to the future Commissioner the necessary room for maneuver to provide a consistent and coherent policy framework, overcoming the fragmented approach of the previous mandate which generated unnecessary polarisation and led to massive demonstrations of farmers in 17 Member States.

Commissioner-designate Christophe Hansen will have to work closely with Executive President Raffaele Fitto, in charge of Cohesion and Reforms. In his mission letter, Mr Fitto is tasked with guiding the work of the Commission’s college “notably to strengthen the competitiveness, the resilience and sustainability of the food and farming sector, to ensure that (the EU) supports farmers who need it most, promote positive environmental and social outcomes and support the right to enabling conditions”.  

To a certain extent, it is regrettable that the Commissioner-Designated for agriculture and food doesn’t hold a higher rank in the European Commission’s protocol and lacks authority on concrete food related issues. This does not fully reflect the title and strategic importance of his portfolio. However, this is offset by both the Executive Vice President position and the fact that Mr Christophe Hansen brings all the skills to succeed in his new position. As a highly respected former MEP, with influence extending well beyond his EPP political group, he is well-positioned to lead the economic and environmental aspects of his portfolio.

The mission letter given by President-elect von der Leyen to Mr Hansen is general on many points, leaving a wide room for maneuver to the future Commissioner. He will have to deliver on the simplification agenda and to strengthen the competitiveness, resilience and sustainability of the sector. Ensuring that the “future Common Agricultural policy is fit for purpose” will be one of his main tasks together with finding ways to leverage private funding. Climate risk preparedness and developing tools for crisis management are underlined. 

A major challenge will be his ability to demonstrate autonomy and distance himself from the conclusions of the strategic dialogue which is put forward as a baseline to the Commissioner-designated. He will need to shape and implement his own vision, integrating also the recommendations of the Draghi’s report and urgent competitivity needs of the sector. This is likely to be a key focus and potential point of contentious during the hearings, in particular considering yesterday’s reactions of the European Parliament to this report

Tensions are also expected concerning the trade agenda. As negotiators work to finalize a deal with Mercosur, the statements from the Commissioner-designate regarding the fight against deforestation and, more broadly, the reciprocity of standards in the EU’s trade strategy will be closely watched by decision-makers in the European Parliament. The mission letter clearly emphasizes that the Commissioner for Agriculture and Food will collaborate closely with the Trade Commissioner to ensure reciprocity and a level playing field at the international level. 

Lukewarm reactions to the Strategic Dialogue report in the Parliament 

Mr Dario Nardella, MEP, S&D ComAGRI Coordinator. © European Union 2024 – Source : EP

On 16 September, the European Parliament held a plenary session to discuss the Strategic Dialogue on Agriculture and its final document. Commissioner Mairead McGuinness, representing the European Commission, presented the outcomes of the dialogue, emphasizing that it was a productive initiative that brought together all relevant stakeholders, helping to bridge the divide between agriculture and environmental concerns that has emerged in recent years. However, McGuinness clarified that the final document from the strategic dialogue is not a formal proposal from the Commission, which has instead committed to publishing the Vision on the Future of Agriculture within the first 100 days of the Von der Leyen II mandate.

Numerous MEPs participated in the debate, including those from committees other than agriculture. While most acknowledged the positive aspects of the document and agreed on the importance of consulting all involved actors, several voiced significant criticismsCristina Maestre (ES, S&D) and Céline Imart (FR, EPP) both pointed to the document’s insufficient focus on competitiveness, stressing that agricultural profitability and productivity must be central to future policies.

S&D COMAGRI coordinator Dario Nardella (IT) also underscored the importance of competitiveness in his remarks, connecting the issue to the Draghi report, and highlighting the need for innovation and resources to ensure a just transition within the agricultural sector. Similarly, Herbert Dorfmann (IT, EPP AGRI coordinator) and Veronika Vrecionova (ECR, Chair of COMAGRI) stressed the European Parliament’s crucial role in shaping the next CAP reform, emphasizing that the Strategic Dialogue serves as a first base for further discussion.

Several MEPs, including Carlo Fidanza (IT, ECR COMAGRI cordinator) and Céline Imart(FR, EPP), criticized the document for merely reflecting the goals of the Farm to Fork strategy, without delivering the anticipated paradigm shift in response to recent farmer protests. Benoit Cassart (BE, Renew) focused his intervention on the livestock sector and the need for mirror clauses in international trade agreements.

Finally, some MEPs expressed support for many elements of the document, particularly regarding the essential ecological transition in agriculture. Notably, Maria Noichl (DE, S&D), Camilla Laureti (IT, S&D), and Thomas Waitz (AT, Green coordinator in COMAGRI) highlighted the importance of addressing environmental concerns in shaping the future of the agricultural sector.

Building a Strategic Roadmap for Agriculture at a Crossroads

European agriculture is facing a triple performance challenge:

  • Regaining economic competitiveness, which has declined for over two decades, and addressing the crisis of new farm business;
  • Achieving an ecological transition that benefits both agriculture and European society as a whole;
  • Addressing the social challenge, providing a balanced, high-quality diet for all Europeans, but also enhancing the value of agricultural occupations and the strong link between farming activities and the dynamics of rural areas.

Attempting to tackle these challenges only partially while neglecting the others will inevitably lead the European Union to a dead end.

In this respect, the Draghi report is very clear, backed up by in-depth analyses:

  • The European Union will not be able to achieve a successful transition of its economy and remain a major world player if it does not at the same time address its competitiveness, and if this does not become a priority. This also applies to the agricultural economy.
  • The Draghi report stresses the need to significantly increase investment in the economy in order to boost competitiveness and meet the challenges of climate change. This also applies to agriculture.
  • The Draghi report calls for a genuine simplification of regulations to reduce costs and remove obstacles to economic development. This also applies to agriculture.

These aspects emerge as the main weaknesses of the conclusions of the Strategic Dialogue launched by the European Commission in response to farmers’ protests:

  • None of the three key findings of the Draghi report are really developed into proposals for effective action. The conclusions do not provide any quantified analysis of the situation of agriculture or of European sovereignty in its various dimensions (economic, environmental, social, bio-economy).
  • Although the discussions taking place within the Strategic Dialogue were supposed to renew the dialogue between the various parties involved, in the end it mainly concerns the people selected intuitu personae and falls back on the shortcomings of the Farm to Fork strategy.
  • The conclusions push for a reorientation of CAP resources towards greater environmental ambitions, without seriously addressing the economic ambition that is nonetheless essential to this transition.
  • They call for a fund to be set up outside the CAP, the creation of which is subject to debate at a time when the European priorities – defence in particular – still lack adequate financing. Instead, we suggest maintaining the ambition of an integrated CAP, which would be able to meet all the challenges in a coherent and simple way for farmers.
  • While the report calls for more innovation, it does not specify the means to make it a reality in agriculture. On the other hand, it stresses the need to deal more effectively with climate and market risks and crises, and takes up the European Parliament’s 2019 proposal to overhaul the agricultural crisis reserve to turn it into a reinsurance tool for climate insurance and mutual funds for managing such risks.

The previous Commission’s proposal to implement the Green Deal in the agricultural sector focused above all on achieving environmental objectives by imposing standards and constraints, without managing to combine this approach with the pursuit of profitability in agriculture or real incentives.

This imbalance is compounded by a CAP whose resources are in substantial decline: as a result of inflation, the economic value of CAP subsidies has fallen by 30% in 20 years, and by 18% over the period 2021-2027, while the promise of a move upmarket on European markets never became reality. Price remains the main factor in consumer purchasing decisions, and the current economic crisis is unlikely to reverse this trend in the medium term.

Despite these considerations, the objective to reinforce European sovereignty through its agriculture remains an imperative.

This will only be possible if European policies are rooted in reality and prioritise concrete means of progress over prescriptive costs, and if they embody a genuine strategic vision of the real opportunities that this sector has to contribute to the transition of the European economy as a whole.

The EU’s agricultural sovereignty depends on its ability to supply 20 to 25% more biomass by 2050, without which the ecological transition of our economy will not be possible or will be dependent on imports. The European Union would simply be exchanging dependence on fossil fuels for other forms of dependence as is currently the case with the explosion in imports of bio-sourced energies in the absence of any proactive encouragement to produce them in Europe.

Concerning sovereignty in all its dimensions (production, economy, food and nutrition, environment, bio-economy):

  • The European Union remains a leading producer, thanks to the dynamism of Eastern EU countries, which has so far offset the downturn in many EU-15 countries;
  • European consumers have access to quality food, but are spending an ever smaller portion of their income on it;
  • progress on environmental issues (carbon, biodiversity, water, reduction of inputs) was taking place before the Green Deal was put on the table, albeit with differences between countries. It needs to be pursued and achieved through an EU-wide dynamic.
  • On the other hand, the European agriculture has three major weaknesses:
    • Profitability in the agricultural sector has been collapsing for two decades, undermining the ability to invest and plan for the future;
    • The bio-economy is developing but heavily reliant on imports;
    • The EU’s ability to meet global market demand is diminishing, posing a geostrategic risk for both the EU and third-country importers, particularly in Africa and North Africa.

Agriculture should be central to Europe’s priorities in food security, health, environment, energy transition and trade. The EU’s ability to make sovereign decisions about its future depends on maintaining a vision rooted in its shared European culture.

In this context, all European policies must be aligned with the EU’s agricultural policy. The European Commissioner for Agriculture must have the authority not only to oversee but also to co-decide on all matters related to agriculture and agri-food.

In this respect, the key issues to be negotiated between 2025 and 2027 include:

The multi-annual budget and the CAP budget in particular, which should at the very least be re-indexed to inflation;

  • Reforming the CAP to ensure that triple-performance agriculture continues to grow, and that efforts to improve the environment are genuinely rewarded by ensuring consistency between environmental measures and consumer claims;
  • Establish a robust European risk and crisis management strategy through a crisis reserve commensurate with the issues at stake and a truly common approach at European level to the challenges of farm resilience;
  • Revamping environmental initiatives (input management, well-being) as part of a systematic approach combining economic and environmental performance;
  • Developing an incentive-based approach to climate/agricultural carbon policy (sequestration and reduction of emissions, incentive-based mechanisms rather than an initial polluter-pays principle that hinder all progress). ETS must fully recognise the specific characteristics of the agricultural sector by excluding agriculture from the arrangements for polluting industries, and as the Draghi report emphasises, must not exacerbate the costs arising from the difference in environmental ambition with our main competitors;
  • Advancing innovative tools, particularly NGTs;
  • Aligning the taxonomy, an essential element for investment, with the green section of the CAP and rejecting an ideological approach to the CAP;
  • Safeguarding progress on the reciprocity of international trade standards, in particular in regards to the legislation on deforestation. For this, a very limited adjustment should be made to the simplified procedure so that data collection is limited to the origin of the country when the product comes from a low-risk area, to avoid data collection and disproportionate costs.
  • Moving forward decisively in the bioeconomy, exploiting the potential of biorefineries (European sovereignty in the bioeconomy) and bioenergy, but also of all the opportunities that agriculture offers to decarbonise the rest of the economy (construction, textiles, chemicals, energy, etc.). These new demands can be a driving force for the sector’s economic health and its positive contribution to the environmental challenges of the EU economy as a whole, in addition to providing quality food.

Ultimately, the Next European Commission must discard the notion that transitions are inherently bad news for agriculture, and start working seriously on a positive strategy for its agriculture. This will be the only possibility to reinforce the sector’s attractiveness, while also responding to the growing need for agricultural raw materials with a lower environmental impact.

STROHSCHNEIDER REPORT: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE FARM TO FORK A NEW DIRECTION

The Strategic Dialogue group launched by the European Commission has delivered its recommendations after more than six months of work.

Farm Europe welcomed the launch of this initiative, providing an opportunity to address pressing issues and shape a vision for the future of a sector critical to the European Union.

However, the current recommendations of the strategic dialogue group align with previous Commission efforts, highlighting:

  • A largely understated economic section, aside from acknowledging food chain imbalances and suggesting a review of the crisis reserve without detailing its size or risk management integration. It calls for public-private financing and banking involvement, with a focus on training, research, and innovation, but overlooks the need for farm investments. Economic aid should target small farms, young farmers, and areas with natural constraints.
  • A call for significantly enhancing the CAP’s environmental dimension and associated funding distribution.
  • Carbon issues and a potential ETS for agriculture are deferred for future discussion, while European competitiveness remains largely unaddressed.
  • A call for reducing meat consumption in the EU via fiscal tools and financial incentives, with plans for extensification, emission reductions in livestock, and sector downsizing.
  • Observing inconsistencies between European environmental and trade policies, with a hopeful call for future improvements.
  • A suggestion to institutionalize this strategic dialogue group as an advisory board to assess policy coherence, though greater clarity is needed on its role versus the responsibilities of co-legislators and the European Commission’s regulatory authority.

In conclusion, after six months of work, questions remain about how the EU plans to:

  • Leverage its agriculture to facilitate a successful economic transition (which requires over 20% more biomass),
  • Ensure food sovereignty,
  • Guide agriculture toward a balance of economic profitability, sustainability, and social performance for EU territories benefit.

Beyond a reaffirmed commitment to new genomic techniques, do the Strategic Dialogue’s recommendations mark the beginning of a new European chapter for a revitalized triple-performance agriculture? Do they address the urgent concerns raised by farmers across the EU?

The emphasis on resource targeting conveniently skirts the issue of resource allocation size.

The group’s conclusions align with the outgoing Commission’s Farm to Fork approach, leaning toward greater flexibility that approaches renationalizing the CAP.

The critical question remains unanswered: how to construct a policy that prepares for the future rather than preserving the past, without pitting sectors against one another. A successful approach requires sector-specific strategies, moving away from prescriptive constraints that lead to degrowth toward incentives that promote investment and deep modernization across European sectors.

BIODIESEL IMPORTS : ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES WILL NOT STOP FRAUD

Farm Europe welcome the imposition of anti-dumping duties to biodiesel imports from China, recently decided by the European Commission following a complaint by the EBB. Biodiesel imports from China have more than doubled since 2020 to reach close to 2 million tonnes, severely undercutting European prices and harming European producers. We encourage the Commission not to exclude any type of biodiesel from the application of the final duties in order not to create loopholes in the application of the measure.

These anti-dumping duties, albeit welcome, will however not curb fraudulent imports. What is at stake here is the fraudulent labelling of biodiesel as an advanced sustainable biofuel derived from raw materials listed in Annex IX of the Renewable Energy Directive, which benefit from double counting towards the targets established in the Regulation. Those raw materials include UCO (Utilized cooking oils), and some derivatives from palm-oil production like palm-oil mill effluent. But very likely the real raw material used is palm-oil coming from any origin including recently deforested areas. 

The economic benefit to fraudsters is high. Unfortunately, there are no easy chemical tests that could be used by customs to expose the fraud, so it strives unchecked. In the end the EU is not importing sustainable biodiesel, on the contrary it is giving a boost to unsustainable practices including deforestation.

The negative consequences for our domestic industries have been harsh. Plants have shut down, new investments scrapped. 

We therefore urge the Commission to thoroughly address the problem of irregular imports of biodiesel by seriously tackling the missing link: fraud.

The Commission should strengthen the certification of advanced sustainable biofuels by enacting an obligatory ex-ante accreditation of the factories willing to export to the EU. Those factories should be physically inspected, rather than just accepting paper certificates as today. Refusal to accept physical inspections should disqualify those products from being certified. The same practice should apply in case of suspicious practices after the certification took place. The factories or blending terminal need to be physically inspected and the involved companies need to disclose all relevant documents to the inspector. As long as the investigation lasts or in case of a refusal to access the sites or documents, the certificate and related PoS (Proof of Sustainability documents) need to be suspended, at the minimum the eligibility for double counting must be suspended.

The Commission should also suspend the benefit of double counting for the most fraud exposed raw materials to remove the economic incentive; and tide-up the customs codes applicable to improve controls. Voluntary schemes should be suspended vis-à-vis China as long as fraud cannot be excluded and the effective equivalence of control with EU cannot be certified. In addition, the setting up of the working group agreed with Transport ministers on the 30th May to take concrete actions to fight fraud should be launched without further delays. As a matter of principle, all imports should be subject to controls at least equivalent to those imposed on EU similar feedstocks and related products. 

The problem with Chinese imports of biodiesel has two sides: one has been taken care of, the other side begs urgent action. Failure to do so would compromise the outcome.