POLITICAL NOTE A sugar beet sector ready to meet its challenges

Summary

The European Union produces around 50% of the beet sugar consumed worldwide, making it the world’s largest producer of beet sugar. However, beet sugar accounts for only 20% of world sugar production; the rest is produced from sugar cane. The EU is the third largest sugar producer in the world.

Sugar beets are grown mainly in northern Europe, where climate and soil are best suited. The most productive regions are northern France, Germany, Poland, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Belgium. The EU also has a refining sector for imported raw cane sugar.

In order to support the European producers and processors, the sugar sector was initially subject to production quotas and minimum prices. However, the quota system ended on the 1st of October in 2017 which was immediately accompanied by a boom in domestic production. It is in this entirely new context that the European Union’s beet sector is taking place.

The world sugar market is characterized by the presence of extremely competitive competitors, like Brazil and Thailand. The 2017 world production reached an historical level of 190 Mt (for a world consumption of 180 Mt), which led to a 50% price collapse since 2017. The currently very low prices exposure of the world sugar market is plunging the European beet sector into crisis.

The Brexit, the Mercosur agreements, the ban on neonicotinoids, the societal pressure on sugar consumption constitute so many additional threats on the EU sugar beet sector. This while a reform of the Common Agricultural Policy is in incubation.

However, there are levers of action that could be employed positively to sustain production in the most competitive areas of the sector. The digitization of agriculture, genetic improvement work, the promotion of the “EU-origin” biofuel sector and a strengthened single market all have benefits to be brought.

Faced with many challenges, and to activate the existing levers of action, the EU sugar beet sector must be able to rely on a CAP that supports producers in the most competitive areas to meet the challenges of global competition and which supports producers in less competitive areas towards a reconversion.

 

Table of contents

Introduction. 1

I- EU Beets sector: characteristics and challenges. 1

A The EU beetroot sector. 1

a/ General data. 1

b / Importance of the sector for the sugar, livestock and ethanol sectors. 1

B External challenges. 2

a/ A market under pressure. 2

b/ The EU-Mercosur Agreement 2

c/ The Brexit 3

C Internal challenges. 3

a / Facing greater volatility. 3

b / The bargaining power of planters in the sector. 4

c / Availability of plant protection products. 4

d/ Divergence of markets. 5

e/ Decrease in domestic consumption. 5

f/ Current reform of the CAP.. 6

II-Succeed in the heart of a fierce competition. 7

A Market expectations. 7

a/ To remain a leader in the world. 7

b/ Do not lose weight on the EU market 7

B The levers of action.. 7

a/ The balance of power within the sector. 7

b/ The digitalization of agriculture. 7

c/ Phytosanitary treatments. 8

d/ Genetic improvement 8

f/ Community coherence. 9

III- Define a winning strategy adapted to the context 9

A In areas reputed historically as competitive. 10

a/ 1st pillar recommendation. 10

b/ 2nd pillar recommendation. 10

B In areas reputed historically as uncompetitive. 11

a / 1st pillar recommendation. 11

b/ 2nd pillar recommendation. 11

C In both types of zones. 12

a / Recommendation related to the single CMO.. 12

b / 1st pillar recommendation. 12

c / Non-pillar recommendation. 12

D What kind of CAP for the EU Beet sector?.. 14

 

Introduction

I- EU Beets sector: characteristics and challenges

A The EU beetroot sector

a/ General data

State of play in 2017

With more than 140 million tones, the European Union is the world’s largest sugar beet producer ahead of Russia and the United States of America. France, Germany and Poland are the leading producers in the EU.

1.68 million hectares are devoted to this crop, with an average yield of 85 tones per hectare. To obtain sugar, bioethanol and pulps, this production is totally transformed on the territory of the EU.

Trends 2000 – 2016

 The production has experienced a non-linear drop of almost 20% between 2000 and 2016. Surfaces decreased; mainly between 2000 and 2008 with a decrease of 38.5% then the sole stabilized around 1.5 million hectares between 2008 and 2016. This is explained by the EU reform in 2006, following the WTO injunctions, which limited export volumes and reduced quotas in parallel with the gradual opening up of the internal market to imports from Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and the granting of reduced duty quotas to Brazil. This reform also included a European restructuring plan financed by the levy of contributions on the EU sugar industry itself.

During the same period, average yields increased from 55 t/ha to 75 t/ha, an increase of 34.6%.

 Zoom on the last 3 years

The production has increased from 102 to 141 million tones since 2015 (+ 38%), and cultivated areas from 1.42 to 1.68 million hectares (+18%). The end of the quota system, which was decided in 2016 and officially entered into force in October 2017, explains this sudden growth. Yields are also up over the period.

b / Importance of the sector for the sugar, livestock and ethanol sectors

The markets for sugar beet are numerous. The most important of these is sugar production, for which the EU ranks first in the world (and the world’s third largest producer of sugar, mingled cane and sugar beet, behind Brazil and India).

The annual European production in 2016-17 has notably enabled the production of:

– 16.7 million tones of white sugar (of which 250 000 tones from sugar cane of the French overseas departments), equivalent to 93% of the 17.9 million tones consumed,

– 5 million tones of dehydrated pulp to feed livestock, 2% of the 267 million tones of composed feed consumed by livestock in the EU,

– 1.6 million tones of sugar syrups for ethanol production; this corresponds to 11 million tones of beet, i.e. 45% of the biomass used to produce EU ethanol in 2017

– and 0.8 million tones of sugar syrups for the chemical industry.

The end of the quotas, with the lifting of the export quotas, also allows the sector to contribute to the Union’s trade surplus, estimated at around 1 billion euros for the only product represented by sugar.

B External challenges

a/ A market under pressure

In 2006, the Common Market Organization was strongly reformed to adapt to the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). This resulted in a reduction of the quotas of 30%. At the same time, the Community market opened up to imports from the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and the African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) zone. Surplus, the sugar sector became deficit: 20% of the sugar consumed in the Union was then imported.

Since the 1st of October 2017, following the 2013 CAP reform, the system of production quotas and guaranteed minimum prices for sugar beet has been abolished. The liberalization of the sugar market is reflected, in particular, by the possibility for sugar manufacturers to export freely to third countries without being constrained by a ceiling imposed by the WTO. If the global market is growing, the competition is extremely severe with world prices currently very low.

On import, the EU remains one of the most open markets, with free access for sugar from LDCs and ACP countries and duty-free or reduced tariff quotas for a large number of countries, including South and Central America (including Brazil), the Balkans and Eastern Europe.

b/ The EU-Mercosur Agreement

Brazil is the world’s largest sugar exporter with 27.6 million tones in 2016-17. It is also the world’s second largest producer of alcohol and ethanol with 289.5 million hectoliters in 2016 (24% of world production). Today, while sugar beet production quotas have been abolished in the EU, which is therefore in a surplus situation, any additional sugar and ethanol volume negotiated under the Mercosur agreements would disturb immediately and profoundly the European market in a depressed world market context. At the current stage of a negotiation, there is a mention of an opening of the EU market to 100,000 tons of sugar to be refined further, which would be added to the 900,000 tons[1] already negotiated with reduced custom duties. There are 140,000 farmers and 30,000 employees dependent in the sector that risk being impacted by such agreements.

To this would be added a quota of 600,000 tons of ethanol. While this production is financially and legally subsidized by Brazil, however this quota would compete with the European production of bioethanol, valuable to farmers to support their income in the current context of dropping sugar prices. There are also the environmental benefits of the European bioethanol industry, in terms of reducing CO2 emissions – on the order of 66% on average in Europe compared to gasoline – and nitrogen oxide (NO) – from the order of 30% compared to gasoline -, which are denigrated by such forecasts of imports.

The modes of production of sugarcane (authorization of GM cane, application of maturing glyphosate) also seem to contradict the objectives of the Union on its own territory.

Finally, the volatility of the Brazilian currency is an additional risk. The Real has lost 30% of its value since February 2017: in 20 months, the Brazilian exporter has gained 30% competitiveness. Predicting the economic consequences of an agreement in this context is completely hazardous.

c/ The Brexit

So far, the trade balance of sugar and ethanol between the EU27 and the United Kingdom is in deficit for the latter. For sugar, exports to the EU27 amount to € 324 million in 2017, while imports from the EU amount to € 968 million. The possibility claimed by the United Kingdom, even in the framework of a negotiated Brexit to conclude free trade agreements with third countries would change the situation, opening up the British market largely to South American imports for example, and substantially reducing European market shares in the UK. Not to mention triangular trade risks in the event of a total lack of control of the rules of origin or the risk of imports into the UK of non-EU sugar for the UK market and the export to the EU of sugar produced in the UK. The reflection is the same for ethanol.

A hard Brexit and the introduction of tariff barriers between the EU and the United Kingdom would still have a more negative impact due to an almost total loss, in this case, of British market.

C Internal challenges

a / Facing greater volatility

The end of quotas is accompanied by greater price volatility in the European market, which is in line with world prices. However, the world sugar market is one of the most volatile, ranging from a factor of 1 to 3.5. Unadapted to this volatility, the risk is that the beetroot adjusts its surface drastically in times of depressed prices, thus jeopardizing its processing plant. Because the beet processing industry is a heavy industry, which is not able to handle such fluctuations in volumes.

b / The bargaining power of planters in the sector

Beet is a non-storable product, whose transport costs make illusory an average supply for a factory beyond forty kilometers. The planter and the manufacturer are thus forced to agree on the terms of purchase of the beets. Under the quota period, the minimum beet price was associated with a value-sharing between the planter and the manufacturer negotiated at the national level.

The end of the quotas has returned any form of price negotiation within companies with the only possibility of eventually agreeing value sharing clauses. Farmers find themselves isolated and with very weak bargaining power.

c / Availability of plant protection products

Like any other crop, sugar beets require protection against pests and the cultivation of weeds. EU farmers are now facing a scarcity of approved substances, an increase in pressure due to climate change. They face the challenge of finding effective alternatives quickly.

With regard to insecticides, the current challenge for farmers is the neonicotinoid class, which has been booming since the discovery of imidacloprid in 1985. The latter makes it possible to protect beetroot from viral jaundice, a disease spread by aphids that can halve root yields. These insecticides have taken the place of organochlorines and organophosphoruses compounds such as DDT and have become the most widely used insecticides in the world. Employed mainly in seed coating, prophylactically, they make it possible to avoid diffusion linked to aerial spreading. But they are accused in particular of being the cause of a significant mortality among pollinating insects. In February 2018, in its conclusions, EFSA confirmed that there was no risk in the case of beet crops because they do not bloom during the production cycle. However, it indicated a potential risk to the next crop without supporting it.

On the 27th of April 2018, the majority of European Union states voted to ban three neonicotinoids (clothianidin, imidacloprid and thiamethoxam) from 2019 for all field crops in the EU with the only exception is greenhouse use. A derogation for sugar beet growers, which is harvested before flowering, may be proposed by the Member States.

In the case of France, the impact on sugar beet yields of the neonicotinoid ban has been estimated at 12% on average, but up to 50%. Beet growers find themselves in a technical impasse: in the absence of a non-chemical alternative and in the presence of chemical alternatives that pose a greater risk for the auxiliary fauna.

With regard to the herbicides used for the cultivation of beet, the current challenge of EU farmers is linked to the debates on glyphosate and, in France, to the announced ban on glyphosate after 2022. While the license to exploit the molecule (discovered in the 1950s) came to an end in December 2017, Member States voted in November for a five-year extension. The question of the toxicity of glyphosate, the most widely used herbicide in the world because of its high efficiency and low cost, remains a subject of debate. Today, a ban would push European farmers to use more expensive and sometimes more dangerous herbicides with more labor for weeding through tillage. The extra cost would be real. Its average utilization for Belgium is 1.81 kg per hectare of UAA; for the Netherlands 1.56 kg against 1.10 for France or 1.00 for Germany. For comparison, the extra cost has been estimated for French agriculture at 2 billion euros per year.

d/ Divergence of markets

Beet is the 7th sector of production that benefits the most from coupled aid. 11 of the 22 European Union countries producing beet have decided to set up coupled aid for sugar beet. The 2017 envelope is 177 million and covers nearly 516,000 hectares, or nearly 30% of European areas. For this sector, coupled aid is paid in the form of an annual aid per hectare and not in proportion to the quantities produced.

Overall, coupled aid applies in regions where yields are lower than in the main beet growing regions of Europe.

Poland accounts for almost 45% of the overall budget for aid coupled with beet and 40% of the areas concerned.

Coupled aid to the beet culture is criticized both outside and inside the EU. A study published by the University of Wageningen in February 2018, commissioned and financed by the German Inter-professional Association for Sugar, concludes that the beet-coupled aid has had an impact on the market by causing a 1.3% rise in the production of sugar and a 4.5% decrease in beet prices. The coupled aid would also strengthen the interest price of beet compared to other alternative crops (rapeseed, wheat) and therefore the propensity to produce beet outside the market.

e/ Decrease in domestic consumption

In the world, sugar consumption has been steadily increasing for many years. But in recent years, this trend is no longer widespread. Consumer growth only concerns the markets of emerging countries, particularly in Asia and Africa. Elsewhere, as in the United States or Europe, the trend is stagnation or even a slight decrease in consumption. This is due to a change in food consumption habit, with sugar now being seen as a factor in obesity.

Faced with these new expectations of consumers, the food industry has already begun to modify its formulations, offering more and more low-sugar products to reduce caloric intake.[2]

The slowdown in sugar consumption per inhabitant could become widespread around the world in the next fifteen years, according to a Rabobank report published in August 2017.

f/ Current reform of the CAP

In the current context of the beetroot sector crisis, the Commission’s budget and CAP reform proposals presented by the Commission on the 1st of June highlight the threats to the Beetroot sector. They would cumulatively result in an average decline in European farmers’ income of between 16 and 20%.

On one hand, the impact of the 12% fall in the CAP budget (constant euros) would lead to a fall in agricultural incomes of more than 8% on average in the Community, with particularly strong negative effects for the large sectors where direct payments account for a large share of income. For the beet sector, the Commission’s impact assessment estimates a 15% income drop in the case of option 3a (the best performer in purely economic terms).

Such a strategy would inevitably provoke the exit of many farmers with the abandonment of territories, as well as a race to expand farms. It would slow down investment capacity and generational renewal, despite the tools available for young farmers that could not offset the decline in revenue announced elsewhere.

As for the new implementation method proposed in the reform of the European Commission, such an evolution – which opens a way to a renationalization with a major transfer of responsibility for the first pillar to the Member States – would severely put in competition the regulatory frameworks of the Member States with of course advantages in terms of competitiveness for the less-favored in environmental matters. This development would also be a shift from the CAP towards a program mainly managed in a bilateral relationship between national agricultural administrations and the services of the European Commission to the detriment of the direct relationship between EU co-legislators and beneficiaries, the farmers.

II-Succeed in the heart of a fierce competition  

A Market expectations

a/ To remain a leader in the world

The European Union specializes in the production of white sugar from beet or cane and refined. About 8% of 2016-17 production has been exported; it will be 15% in 2017-18, with more than 3 Mt of exported sugar. But a number of countries, including trading partners around the Mediterranean, have invested and are currently investing in raw sugar refining sites, particularly from South America. No longer being forced to export by the quota system EU production will however face competition, in particular from Brazil and Thailand internationally. The EU sugar beet sector therefore has no choice but to gain competitiveness in order to compete in international markets.

b/ Do not lose weight on the EU market

At present, beet sugar produced in the EU is mainly consumed (around 85% of production), alongside significant volumes imported from emerging or developing countries and refined in the EU, particularly in the United Kingdom. Here again, in this internal market, the challenge of increasing competitiveness is crucial, especially since the agreements with Mercosur and Brexit may lead to increased pressure from outside competition.

B The levers of action

a/ The balance of power within the sector

Beet is a non-storable and barely transportable production. The planter must know how the price of his beet is calculated by the one to whom he delivers it. An obligation of result in the price negotiation process between a company and the planters who deliver it should be guaranteed.

b/ The digitalization of agriculture

In order to gain in competitiveness and sustainability with an increase in yields accompanied by a reduction in their operating costs, EU beet growers have a privileged solution: the digitization of agriculture.

The digitization of agriculture is a means to optimize the use of treatments carried out on crops. The aim is to use digital technologies and geolocation to better characterize the soils of the farm to take into account intragroup heterogeneity and thus bring “the right dose of inputs – water, fertilizers, phytosanitary products – in the right place and at the right time”. Among the inputs, phytosanitary treatments represent a fundamental issue both economically and environmentally. It is therefore an absolutely central position to achieve the dual performance objective of farms.

Studies, conducted in a network of farms on wheat and maize, are already showing tangible and promising results in terms of benefits per hectare (from 80 to 200 euros/ha) and reduction of inputs (from 30 to 70%) (Leader Farms, InVivo). In Greece, an experiment carried out on 9 pilot sites – 3 devoted to arboriculture and 2 to arable crops – estimated that the average savings achievable for the phytosanitary products could reach 63%.

c/ Phytosanitary treatments

As part of the culture of beet, to further increase the performance of the farm, another recourse can be associated with the digitization of agriculture: biocontrol.

Aphid infestations, the pest carrying the viral jaundice of beetroot, can be partially prevented with their impacts limited by the use of aphid predators. Auxiliaries are favored by landscaping that provides them with habitat – grassy paths, hedges, groves – close to the crops where the parasites, which they will feed on, are.

These two strategies are not exclusive and can be combined with profit to minimize the recourse of phytosanitary treatments. This certainly brings complexity for the farmer, but also the satisfaction of reducing his production costs as well as the impact of his production on the environment.

d/ Genetic improvement

Since 2000, average beet yields in the EU have increased by 35%. If we estimate that half of it is for the climate change[3], it is also the result of an important work of genetic improvement by the varietal selection, which in particular allowed to obtain resistant or tolerant varieties to bio-aggressors (rhizomania, nematodes, rhizoctonia …). The AKER program initiated in 2012 is an example of an approach aimed at improving the performance of beetroot in terms of productivity and resistance to biotic and abiotic stress.

In terms of the methods available to carry out the improvement work, the possibility of using new breeding techniques in the EU remains a subject of question to which the Commission and the co-legislators must have the courage to harness following the reading of the current regulation made by the Court of Justice of the EU in late July.

e/ The RED II Directive

The bioethanol sector in the EU is certainly a support lever for the beet sector. 7% of production in 2016-17 – 9.8 Mt out of a total of 141 Mt – was used to produce ethanol, and accounted for 45% of the biomass used for this purpose.

In the framework of the revision of the renewable energy directive known as “RED2”, the recent discussions in the Trilogue part led (in the context of pressure from the Commission to eliminate the 1st generation biofuels sector) to guarantee the production of biofuels of “EU” origin at the 2020 level + 1%, or maximum 7% of the share of renewable energies in the transport energy mix.

Even if a status quo has been achieved after bitter exchanges, it would be coherent that the contribution of the European ethanol sector (like that of the rapeseed biodiesel sector) is more recognized in the decarbonisation of the transport sector and that a margin of progress in the objectives of incorporation is envisaged. Debates on the value of EU-origin biofuels for reducing emissions and developing agriculture need to be objectified, and a broad consensus on the benefits of ethanol produced in the EU from an environmental view – compared to fossil fuel or agricultural biomass sources of “imported deforestation” – but also economic, by reducing the EU’s energy trade deficit.

f/ Community coherence

Community coherence in farmer support tools and related environmental objectives is essential. On one hand, it would make it possible to avoid a competition, which would turn to the advantage of the less attentive as for the respect of the environment. On the other hand, it would prevent the concentration of aid on targeted sectors in order to compete with those of other Member States.

III- Define a winning strategy adapted to the context

European agriculture faces common challenges that can only be solved effectively if Europe is coherent and solidary, especially with regard to environmental issues.

The excessive level of subsidiarity and flexibility, the fragmentation of the policy framework, as well as reduced levels of ambition with regard to the CAP budget are all elements that could transform the EU agricultural market into a battlefield. This one would see 27 different agricultural strategies to be measured between it or even to face each other.

With the adoption of the European Parliament’s report on the Future of the Common Agricultural Policy on the 16th of May 2018, MEPs opted for a balanced approach calling for a “reasonable level of flexibility within a strong common framework of European rules, basic standards, intervention tools, controls and financial allocations agreed at a European level by the co-legislators to guarantee a level of playing field for farmers”. They stressed the need to secure the direct relationship between the EU co-legislators and the beneficiaries – farmers – and not to transfer most of the management of the first pillar to the Member States.

The winning strategy for the EU Beetroot sector needs to keep this base solid at Community level, within the first pillar, while retaining the necessary flexibility for adjustments at the local level.

This winning Community strategy, driven by the CAP reform, should be the ambition to take all European agriculture towards double performance over the next 7 years.

The Commission considers that in the EU beet sector “it is not excluded that production will continue to concentrate in the most productive regions and that, if some producers succeed in securing new markets – inside and outside the EU – others will further reduce their production.”[4] Given the wide variation in sugar beet yields in the EU[5], it seems appropriate to adopt a differentiated strategic approach, which provides the appropriate support for producers in historically competitive and historically uncompetitive areas.

Recommendations are presented below based on the different challenges with aiming to embody the dual performance in the different types of zones and in the pillars of the CAP.

A In areas reputed historically as competitive

To determine these areas, the choice fell on those where average beet yields over the 2011-2015 period were greater than 70 t/ha.

The pedoclimatic conditions, the logistical equipment as well as the varietal improvement works and sugar yields make it possible to envisage the sustainability of the sugar beet sectors of these areas in the new sugar market, inaugurated by the end of quotas and guaranteed minimum prices. Furthermore, the fact that these areas achieve these high performances – in terms of sugar beet and sugar yields – while the majority of them is being located in Member States, who do not use coupled payments constitute an additional assurance of their resilience capacity – and therefore of their durability – in the new market framework.

a/ 1st pillar recommendation

Recommendation n°1

The promotion of digitized agriculture in the first pillar should be a priority of EU agricultural policy by including a lump-sum incentive for the transition to dual performance in the Eco-Scheme. This way it is favored to achieve double performance and therefore meet the following three challenges: the export competition in the globalized market by the obtained competitiveness gains, environmental sustainability and the regulatory pressure on phytosanitary products by optimizing the inputs.

b/ 2nd pillar recommendation

Recommendation n°2

1- The allocation of Income Stabilization Tools within the second pillar must be ready to face the challenge of export competition in the globalized market and the exposure to the current very volatiles prices of this market.

2- A European Crisis Management Fund in agriculture, financed by an adequately equipped multi-year crisis reserve, must be carried out and take over the IST tools when risks become deep crises (see related Farm Europe note).

 Recommendation n°3

Prioritize in the mobilization of AECM, investment and training tools – within the second pillar – as farmers making the transition to double performance are a prerequisite for a broad expansion of digital agriculture as such a technological revolution can occur only with human accompaniment at the height of the changes.

Recommendation n°4

The establishment of investments in research and development for the improvement of beet varieties in the second pillar is a complementary measure to face the external challenges and the decreasing availability of plant protection products.

B In areas reputed historically as uncompetitive

To determine these areas, the choice was made on those where average beet yields over the 2011-2015 period were less than or equal to 60 t/ha.

Given the magnitude and speed of change imposed by the new sugar market framework, inaugurated by the end of quotas and guaranteed minimum prices with world prices falling by 50% since 2017, the probability of adaptation needs provoked by the crisis is severe to the point of jeopardizing many farms that it can not be ignored. This could lead to the bankruptcy of industrialists and force many producers to abandon this production and to convert to other currently more profitable ones, such as cereals or rapeseed.

a / 1st pillar recommendation

Recommendation n°5

Take steps to integrated agricultural sector strategies that can mobilize 15% of the 1st pillar CAP and allow to break out of the acquis reasoning regarding the coupled payments of beetroots. The economic efficiency would suggest mobilizing these funds for more relevant actions within the sector or even for the revitalization of reconversion channels.

b/ 2nd pillar recommendation

Recommendation n°6

Support for the reconversion of beet growers in historically uncompetitive areas should be included among the tools of the second pillar so that the concerned Member States can accompany the reconversion which current market developments impose.

C In both types of zones

a / Recommendation related to the single CMO

Recommendation n ° 7

The particularities of beet, a non-storable and barely product transported, must be taken into account within the framework of the Common Market Organization. The negotiation between a sugar company and the planters who deliver it must have an obligation of result.

b / 1st pillar recommendation

Recommendation n°8

The guarantee of a minimum of 60% of the first pillar funds allocated in each Member State to the financing of basic decoupled aids is a necessary measure given the importance of these aid in farm income in the face of external challenges and the declining sugar beet income. Otherwise, the rotation in beets risks falling very sharply in favor of a reallocation to other crops.

c / Non-pillar recommendation

Recommendation n°9

Maintaining the CAP budget allocation at the current level of the EU-27 is an essential measure, with the digitalization of agriculture and an adequate management of risks and crises, to participate in the construction of a strong, competitive European beet sector that effectively addresses the challenges of sustainability.

Summary table

The table below summarizes the challenges facing the sector, and the recommendations of Farm Europe consecutively for areas deemed historically competitive, then for areas deemed historically uncompetitive and finally the recommendations concerning the two types of areas.

Challenges Recommendations in historically competitive zones
– External challenges (globalized market, Mercosur agreement, Brexit)

-Availability of phytopharmaceuticals

-Environmental sustainability

1- Promote digitized agriculture in the first pillar by including a lump-sum incentive for the transition to dual performance through the Eco-Scheme
– External challenges (globalized market, Mercosur agreement, Brexit)

– Higher volatility

 

2.1- Financially endow Income Stabilization Tools in Pillar 2

2.2- Establish a European crisis management fund in agriculture

– External challenges (globalized market, Mercosur agreement, Brexit)

-Availability of phytopharmaceuticals

-Environmental sustainability

3- Prioritize the mobilization of MAEC, investment and training tools in Pillar 2 for farmers making the transition to double performance
– External challenges (globalized market, Mercosur agreement, Brexit)

-Availability of phytopharmaceuticals

4- Put in place investments in research and development for the improvement of beet varieties within Pillar 2
Challenges Recommendations in historically uncompetitive zone
– Market differences 5- Take steps to integrated agricultural sector strategies that can mobilize 15% of the 1st pillar CAP and allow to break out of the acquis reasoning regarding the coupled payments of beetroots.
– External challenges (globalized market, Mercosur agreement, Brexit)

 

6-Financially support the conversion of beet producers to other crops
Challenges Recommendations for both type of zones
 – Bargaining power of planters in the sector 7-  Adopt an obligation of result in the sugar factories-planter business negotiation
– External challenges (globalized market, Mercosur agreement, Brexit)

 

8- Guarantee a minimum envelope of 60% of the 1st pillar for basic decoupled aids
– External challenges (globalized market, Mercosur agreement, Brexit)

 

9- Maintain the CAP budget allocation at the current EU-27 level (constant prices)

D What kind of CAP for the EU Beet sector?

Today, the European Union needs a truly common CAP to maintain a strong Beetroot sector in areas where current competitiveness is realistically sustainable to be able to cope with current economic and environmental challenges.

It will first of all consolidate a balanced contractualization within the sugar beet sector. It will then be necessary to provide the sector with risk management tools adapted to the new economic and production context. Then, the digital revolution (represented by a progressive generalization of digitized agriculture) and the current internal and external challenges require a strong common base that promotes investment in the necessary equipment.

It is also through a strong common base that farmers’ incomes can be supported throughout the EU, guaranteeing cohesion between sectors, preserving basic aids in the first pillar that will provide the economic resilience needed to enable the digital revolution.

The CAP must still ensure a reasonable level of subsidiarity allowing the Member States to adapt the training of farmers to the use of digital farming tools or the work of improvement of variety in their particular contexts and, above all of, to adopt the necessary financial support measures to support the conversion of beet growers from less competitive areas to one or other crops.

Protecting farmers’ incomes and maintaining a truly common CAP comes back to the current context of the reform which proposes a renationalization of the CAP to preserve the balance of these two pillars, where one representing 70% of the aid is developed at Community level and the other representing 30% of the aid allows the consideration of local specificities in the Member States.

 

[1]  These 900 000 tones represent all the quotas negotiated by the EU with reduced customs duties, and not only those negotiated with Mercosur countries.

[2] One gram of sugar always contains 4 kilocalories.

[3] Global warming is increasing photosynthesis by increasing average spring temperatures and increasing CO2 levels in the atmosphere. This results in earlier planting, an increase in the biomass produced and sugar stored by the beets.

[4] European Commission – Fact Sheet, The end of sugar production quotas in the European Union, 29 September 2017

[5] Average beet yields over the 2011-2015 period range from 37 to 90 t / ha according to the Member States.

A NEED OF BALANCED, COMMON APPROACH TACKLING UTPs

Discussions about the need to rebalance the food chain relationship are not new at the European level. All the institutions have participated in several attempts urged by different stakeholders, but in the end no concrete action was taken until this year.

In 2013, seven European Associations motivated by the former Commissioner Verheugen launched the Supply Chain Initiative (SCI) as a voluntary, private-led action in order to increase fairness in commercial relations along the food supply chain.

Since then, some advances have been achieved in promoting cultural changes and improving business ethics, but a set of important shortcomings have also been highlighted in the analysis of its effective application. Weakness in governance, limitations in transparency, no enforcement measures or penalties, a lack of effective deterrents against UTP and not allowing individuals to make anonymous complaints by potential victims, no own–initiative investigations by an independent body and under-representation of SMEs and farmers are the most important ones. [1]

The primary concerns on the issue were born at the MS level, and 20 of them have been – in one way or another – actively looking for remedies. If we summarize what is going on in the different Member States, several distinctions can be made:

  • There are some MS with specific measures for the food chain (i.e. Spain, UK, Italy…), and others refer directly to horizontal legislation (Germany, France,.. ).
  • Four main types of models coexist: regulated in detail (UK, Spain,Italy..), self-regulated (Belgium), mixed model (Spain, UK) , horizontal regulation and countries with no specific UTP´s regulation (Denmark, Sweden, Luxembourg,..).
  • When there is a regulatory framework and control authorities, they can be either the Ministry of Finance (France), Competition Authorities (Germany), Food Safety and Economy (Portugal) or Agriculture (Spain).[2]

Nevertheless, it is crystal clear that despite the efforts made, self-regulation or voluntary approaches are not enough to solve the present imbalances in the food chain, and disparities between national systems in place do not help to keep a level-playing field and ensure the proper functioning of the Internal market, while at the same time the fragmented nature of the markets expose supply chain operators to different conditions, regulatory uncertainty and inefficiencies.

Taking into account these facts, Commissioner Hogan instigated in 2016 the Agricultural Markets Task Force (AMTF), which examined the position of the farmer in the supply chain, and proposed a number of recommendations on different issues, amongst them trading practices in agricultural markets and contractualisation.

The Report was deeply debated in the Agri Council, whose Conclusions of December 2016 on “Strengthening Farmers´ Position in the Food Supply Chain and Tackling Unfair Trading Practices” made clear that imbalances in the bargaining positions often lead to unfair trading practices (UTPs), as well as to the need for a level-playing field for all actors in the chain.

The AMTF was not the only initiative around the issue of how to improve the functioning of the European food chain. The European Parliament has also been very active, and its last positioning was adopted in June 2016 with the adoption of a new Resolution on “Unfair Trading Practices in the Food Supply Chain”, in which it openly pledges for a framework legislation at EU level in order to tackle UTPs. This pledge was renewed at many occasions in various EP’s resolutions (2016 and 20117 Annual EU Competition policy reports), while an amendment setting a mandatory deadline for proposing a legislation to the Commission was defended by the Parliament in the framework of the Omnibus regulation negociation.

Along the same line, the European Economic and Social Committee supported the European Parliament´s Resolution in its Opinion adopted at the plenary in October 2016 (“A Fairer Agro-Food Supply Chain”) and highlighted the need for a framework legislation at the European level as well as to take swift action to prevent UTP´s.

In this context, the Commission came in 2018 with a legislative proposal to to address UTPs and rebalance the relationship between the different links of the food chain.

NEED OF A SET OF CONCRETE MEASURES.

If Europe wants a strong and balanced food chain, able to share all the value added generated across it under fair conditions, able to reinforce the position of producers as the most vulnerable link, and generate wealth up to the consumer, a minimum set of issues has to be tackled.

These core issues are the following:

  1. A set of guiding principles for the commercial relationships in the food chain. There are three kind of relations in the food chain: 1) producer – industry, 2) producer – retail , 3) industry – retail. For all cases, the relation shall be governed by the principles of balance and fair reciprocity between parties, freedom to enter into agreements, goodwill, mutual interest, equitable sharing of risks and responsibilities, cooperation, transparency and respect of free market competition.
  2. Identification of the unfair practices to be relegated from commercial practice.There is a vast literature about UTPs , and in general terms they can be described as all kind of practices imposed to the supplier that do not respect fairness in the contractual relation, passing on inefficiencies or risks without any compensation.          Under this broad description we should include:
    • Unilateral or retroactive changes to the agreed terms (concerning volumes, quality standards, prices),
    • Unforeseen commercial payments,
    • Charges of fictitious services,
    • Transfer of charges in promotions to the supplier with no negotiation and participation of the buyer,
    • Imposing unconditional return of unsold merchandise,
    • Non-compliance with payment delays as established in Directive 2011/7/EU,
    • Sudden and unjustified cancellation of a contract,
    • Non-transparent, discriminatory electronic auctions.
    • No request for upfront payments to secure or retain contracts.
  3. Written contracts. Modern commercial relations imply taking into account a set of complex issues – quality, quantity, price, discounts, logistics and transportation, terms of delivery,…- that cannot be left to uncertainty. Moreover, clear conditions mean secure and stable relationships, as well as less legal controversies. We propose as a general rule the need for written contracts along the chain, with a minimum set of criteria, conditions that should be compulsory when requested by the supplier. In the case of agri producers, Producers’ Organizations could play a relevant role in this issue and negotiate on their behalf while Interbranch Organizations could set standard written contracts.
  4. Effective enforcement of rules. Experience shows us the shortcomings and limits of voluntary, non-binding models of enforcement. The most effective way is the supervision and control by an independent authority, granted with public powers, in order to ensure the effective application of the proposed set of rules.
  5. Fear factor avoidance. Enforcement should be possible either through independent authorities’ own initiative, or by operators and their organizations. It is crucial in this sense to establish an effective complaints lodge system that secures anonymity .
  6. Sanctions and name-and-shame. Non-compliance with the proposed set of rules should be subject to sanctions, with dissuasive character, and include “Name and shame” provisions.

All these proposals should be part of a common European framework.

This should be complemented at the national level by the effective participation of stakeholders through codes of conduct / voluntary agreements, as a way to better implement a comprehensive system.

COMMISSION’S PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECTIVE ON UNFAIR TRADING PRACTICES IN BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS IN THE FOOD SUPPLY CHAIN.

(from committee on agriculture and rural development draft report on the proposal for a directive of the european parliament and of the council on unfair trading practices in business-to-business relationships in the food supply chain
(com(2018)0173 – c8-0139/2018 – 2018/0082(cod)) rapporteur: paolo de castro 2018/0082(cod))

« The absence, so far, of a common UTP framework stands in contrast to other areas which the CAP governs, and which have direct relevance for operators, such as competition rules, state aid rules and marketing standards. In these areas, the common market organisation (Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013) lays down common rules relevant to the market conditions operators face in the EU so as to contribute to economic and social cohesion, as well as to a level playing field in the single market.

The present proposal for a Directive aims at reducing the occurrence of UTPs in the food supply chain by introducing a minimum common standard of protection across the EU that consists of a short list of specific prohibited UTPs. The protection covers suppliers in the food supply chain insofar as they sell food products to buyers who are not small and medium-sized. This scope aims at contributing to a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, an objective of the CAP under Article 39 TFEU.

Article 43 TFEU, being the principal CAP legal basis, serves as the Commission proposal’s unique legal basis. The measures foreseen in the proposal concern UTPs occurring in the agricultural and food supply chain in relation to the trade of products originating with agricultural producers. It should be noted that, according to Article 38(2) and (3) TFEU, the CAP primarily covers the agricultural products listed in Annex 1 to the TFEU. However, the European Court of Justice has explicitly confirmed that food products not listed in Annex I TFEU (Annex I products are deemed “agricultural products” under the Treaty) can also be covered by acts adopted under Article 43 TFEU if this contributes to the achievement of one or more of the CAP objectives and agricultural products are principally covered.1

Moreover, an approach which protects agricultural producers and their associations (cooperatives and other producer organisations) must also take into account indirect negative effects they may suffer through UTPs occurring downstream in the food supply chain, i.e. by operators who are not farmers but whose weak bargaining position in the downstream chain makes them vulnerable to UTPs. Protection against UTPs applying to downstream suppliers prevents unintended consequences for farmers due to trade being diverted to their investor- owned competitors – for example at the processing stage – which would not enjoy protection (e.g. less legal risk for buyers to be confronted with UTP accusations).

Furthermore, the Commission points out that the proposed measures are complementary to measures existing in Member States and the code of conduct of the SCI.

EP RAPPORTEUR’S POSITION AND AMENDMENTS PROPOSED

The rapporteur supports the Commission proposal as a long expected legislative instrument to defend agricultural producers’ bargaining position in the agricultural and food supply chain; an instrument which can finally complement the measures introduced via Regulation (EU) 2017/2393, the so-called Omnibus Regulation, aiming at reinforcing the negotiating prerogatives of farmers in the EU. It should be reminded that the belief in the necessity of such an instrument was backed up by the conclusions of the Agricultural Markets Task Force issued in November 2016, and it was shared by Parliament in its resolution adopted on 7 June 2016, as well as by the EU Agriculture Ministers who adopted unanimous conclusions in this respect at their Informal Council meeting of 12-13 December 2016 in Bratislava.

The rapporteur underlines that completing the legislative procedure on the UTPs proposal before the end of the present parliamentary term, thus making this new legislation a concrete “deliverable” for European farmers, is both an important and realistic objective for this Parliament. On the side of the other co-legislator, the Austrian Presidency has clearly indicated its intention to give top priority to the UTPs proposal, as indicated in a letter of 4 June 2018 by the Austrian Minister for Sustainability and Tourism, Elisabeth Köstinger, to the Chair of the AGRI Committee. The letter indicated the UTPs proposal as one of the main priorities for the Austrian Presidency and reminded that both Parliament and the Council had asked repeatedly for legislation to protect farmers who are the weakest link in the supply chain, before concluding that “the time has come to harmonise twenty different national regulations and to set minimum standards for all Member States” so as to “solve the problems of farmers treated unfairly by other, more powerful partners in the supply chain”.

Amendments proposed by the rapporteur

While widely supporting the proposal, the rapporteur proposes nevertheless a number of amendments to improve its efficiency. These are the following:

  • ?Extension of the scope to suppliers in the food supply chain which are not SMEs, in order to include farmers’ organizations and avoid possible trade diversions away from SMEs;
  • ?Extension of the scope to all agricultural products, i.e. not only to food products, in order to include the horticultural sector, feed industry, and other agricultural sectors not falling under food production;
  • ?Extension of the “buyer’s” definition to include those operators that, though established outside the EU, buy and sell products in the EU market. The aim is to avoid that a buyer can escape the provisions of the Directive by simply moving its place of establishment outside the EU;
  • ?Again as regards the definition of the “buyer”, the provision of related services should be included into the scope, together with processing, distribution or retail of agricultural and food products;
  • ?Inclusion of a definition of “unfair trading practice” (in the sense of an overarching principle), along the lines of the definition given by the Council Conclusions of 12 December 2016, which is reflected in recital 1 of the proposed Directive;
  • ?Inclusion of a definition of “economic dependence” as a power relationship between a supplier and a buyer;
  • ?Introduction of a payment term for non-perishable products at 60 days from the receipt of the invoice, as also provided for in Directive 2011/7/EU on late payment;
  • ?Exemption from the provisions on payment terms for all contributions from farmers to their producer organisations and cooperatives, as well as for agreements of inter- branch organisations where those agreements concern quality products;
  • ?Definition of the notion of “short notice” (when a buyer cancels orders of perishable food products) with a fixed time-limit (60 days);
  • ?Improvement of the introductory sentence in paragraph 2 of Article 3 (so-called “grey UTPs”) through including the concept of “economic dependence” to take into consideration the imbalance in market power between actors, that can be used and abused by some buyers to impose unilaterally their terms to weaker suppliers;
  • ?Introduction of the possibility for Member States to prohibit any other unfair trading practice (i.e. going beyond the prohibitions of Article 3), based on the definition of “unfair trading practice” added into Article 2;
  • ?Inclusion of mandatory written contracts upon request of a supplier, as laid down – through the “Omnibus Regulation”- in Article 168 of the Single CMO, and of the possibility for Member States to encourage an increased contractualization between different actors in the supply chain;
  • ?Inclusion of the possibility for complainants to lodge a complaint to foreign authorities through their own national authorities;
  • ?Extension to representative associations of the right to lodge a complaint on behalf of one or more of their members;
  • ?Inclusion of the obligation for the enforcement authority to start an investigation within 60 days from the date on which the complaint has been lodged, and to conclude it within 6 months. In duly justified cases, the 6 months can be extended by another 6 months (thus, the whole investigation has to be concluded within 14 months from the complaint); 
         ? Inclusion of the obligation for the enforcement authority, in case an infringement has been established, to require the buyer to terminate the prohibited trading practice;
  • ?Introduction of the possibility for Member States to promote the use of mediation or an alternative dispute resolution mechanism;

? Introduction of the obligation for Member States to include in their annual report to the Commission of an evaluation on the effectiveness of the implemented measures in order to ban UTPs ».

[1]EP Resolution of 7 June 2016 on unfair trading practices in the food supply chain.

[2]more detailed information in the study commissioned by the Spanish Agency for Food Information and Control (AICA) ,” Informe sobre la aplicacion de la regulacion de practicas comerciales en los paises UE” 2016. www.aica.gob.es

Financial impact of Brexit on the CAP budget of the EU Member States

The financial impact of Brexit can be explained in other words, and from the point of view of the contributions that the United Kingdom made to the CAP budget, by the challenge of absorbing:

– the loss of the UK’s net annual contributions, which is, for the EU budget,  almost €7 billion(€6.6 billion/year on average 2010-2016), and specifically 2,7 billion euros for the CAP;

– The decline in the European Union’s own resources linked to the shrinking of the EU market (less customs duties on lower imports), i.e. €2.8 billion annual average over the period 2010-2016; this fall is irrespective of what could be expected in the forthcoming post-Brexit trade agreement between the EU27 and the UK, and the UK’s possible contribution to EU market access. This contribution could compensate as a whole or partly for the smaller amount of EU own resources.

At this stage of discussions between the EU and the UK on post-Brexit relations, the actual net cost of UK departure from the EU budget is therefore at least €6.6 billion and €9,4 bn at most.

The EU’s own resources which finance 12.4% of the EU budget over the period considered, might face a decrease of €2.8 billion, which might in turn generate a funding shortfall for the CAP of €1.15 billion to be added to the € 2.7 billion mentioned above.

Through the voice of its Commissioner for Budget and Human Resources, the European Commission proposed, under the Financial Perspective 2021-2028:

– that 50% of the cost of Brexit is borne by an effort of major European policies (cohesion and CAP essentially)

– that 20% of the financing needs of the new European priorities (i.e. around €2.5 billion/year) are also financed by margins generated by the so-called major European traditional policies, i.e. some €1.2 billion that would then be earmarked on the annual CAP budget for these new challenges.

Without going into the debate about the acceptability (or not) of a reduction of the CAP budget in view of the economic and territorial challenges that the EU has to address with the leverage of this policy, Farm Europe with this analysis, endeavours to estimate, in an EU27, the cost of the different options mentioned hereafter for each MS, by integrating its contribution to the CAP budget and the financial returns received under the CAP.

In a nutshell, 3 scenarios are analysed in each of the three cases presented here below:

-Brexit net cost for the EU budget of €6.6 bn and for the CAP of €2.7 bn;

– the net cost of Brexit for the EU budget of €6.6 bn (and for the CAP of €2.7 bn) and the financing of the new EU priorities through an additional reduction of €1.2bn in the CAP budget, i.e. a total CAP reduction of €3.9 bn

– “maximum” Brexit cost (loss of own resources linked to the UK market and no compensation in a Brexit post-trade agreement), a loss of €9.4 bn for the EU budget, an uncovered requirement of €3.85 bn under the CAP (€2.7 bn as the end of the contribution of the UK to the CAP + €1.15 bn CAP share of the reduction of own resources) and a financing by the CAP of the new EU priorities for €1.2 bn/year, which amounts to a total of €5.05 bn linked to the CAP.

With regard to the CAP budget of the Member States, for each of the above mentioned three cases, in order to cope with the current challenges, the 3 scenarios presented in this document are:

  • Scenario 1:increasing national contributions to maintain the same level of CAP aid received by Member States;
  • Scenario 2:decreasing CAP expenditure to compensate for 50% of the net deficit due to withdrawal of the UK from the CAP budget (i.e. Case 1: €1.35 bn for the UK net contribution to the CAP budget; Case 2: €1.35 bn plus €1.2 bn to finance the new EU priorities and; Case 3: €1.35 bn + €1.2 bn + €0.575 bn for the decrease in own resources;
  • Scenario 3:to decrease CAP expenditure by the total cost linked to the withdrawal of the UK from the CAP budget (i.e. Case 1: €2.7 bn, Case 2: €2.7 bn + €1.15 bn, Case 3: € 2.7 bn + €1.15 bn + €1.2 bn);

Please note that the calculated impacts are expressed in constant euros.

The relative cost for the MS will then have to be assessed in view of the expected growth rate of the EU economy and the inflation rate that can be projected, while the latest budgetary agreements have renewed the principle of aid under the first pillar of the CAP reduced by the rate of inflation as expressed in constant euros.

These scenarios are examined in terms of their consequences for each EU Member State (changes in national contributions to the EU budget and changes in CAP funds received by the MS).

The consequences can be summarized in, for each one of the scenarios:

– on the one hand, the envisaged increase or decrease in the national contribution to the CAP budget, which will be financed in proportion to the contribution of the MS to the EU budget;

– on the other hand, considering the end of the “special scheme”to finance part of the EU budget not paid by the UK and borne by the other 27 MS at present (the so-called “UK rebate”) with the “rebate on rebate”granted to certain MS – all contributions to the CAP budget are now provided by the MS according to the common definition of EU Budget funding allocation;

– lastly, the impact on CAP Budget expenditure (CAP aids received by farmers in each MS).

A last part of this note is aimed at shedding light on the impact of each of the simulations on the agricultural incomes of the various Member States.

 

I – United Kingdom’s position in the EU budget

1 – MS contributions to the EU budget: the net cost of Brexit (in €bn)

 

2 – Impact of the UK’s departure on the EU’s own resources

The table below shows the own resources collected in the EU28 and those collected in the UK over the period 2010-16. That is an average of 2.8 billion euros a year that has been collected via the UK.

 

II – Impact on the EU27 Member States’ contributions to the EU budget following the UK departure, in a pattern of lowering the EU budget equal to 100% of the tied loss: the impact of abandoning the specific “rebate on rebate”

In the context of a reduced budget equal to the full net cost of the UK departure, the cost for national budgets results from applying a new allocation key to fund the historic “rebate”, which will be no longer the “rebate on rebate” key but rather the usual allocation method of the MS to the EU budget.

Indeed, even without compensation by the 27 Member States of the EU for the net cost of Brexit, the distribution of allocations from the EU27 to a reduced EU budget would be modified. This change translates, logically, into a decrease in contributions for the majority of Member States, and an increase for the four MS that benefited from the “rebate on rebate”scheme.

The table below shows the impact, by Member State, in terms of its budgetary contribution to the CAP budget. The origin of the British rebate and therefore the existence of a specific scheme “rebate on rebate”being linked to the CAP, the full cost or benefit for the MS as a result of the end of the specific scheme is included in this study and fully born by the national contributions to the CAP budget.

 

III – Possible Brexit impacts on the CAP: CASE STUDIES

1 –Brexit total net cost of €6.6 bn, net cost for the CAP of €2.7 bn

A) Scenario 1: The CAP budget increases by 2.7 billion euros

Assuming a budget increase of €2.7 billion to fully offset the decline in the UK’s net contribution to the CAP budget, the cost for national budgets is the addition of the new allocation scheme to finance the “rebate” (no longer the “rebate on rebate” scheme but the normal allocation scheme of the MS to the budget cf. II) and the financing of the additional 2.7 billion by the GDP allocation key. CAP envelopes received by the 27 MS do not change from those currently allocated.

In this scenario, the CAP budget represents 38.6% of the EU budget.[1]

B) Scenario 2: The CAP budget decreases by 1.35 billion euros(50% of the UK’s net contribution to the CAP budget)

In the context of a budget decrease of €1.35 billion that is half of the UK’s net contribution to the CAP budget (according to the position put forward by the Commission), the cost for national budgets is the addition of the new allocation scheme to finance the “rebate” (no longer “the rebate on rebate” but by the usual allocation key of the MS to the budget), and national contributions to finance the other 50% of the UK net contribution to the CAP, which remains at their whole expense (€1.35 bn) and the decline in CAP aids received in the various MS due to the shrinking of the CAP budget of €1.35 billion.

In this scenario, the CAP budget represents 35.6% of the EU budget.

C) Scenario 3: The CAP budget decreases by 2.7 billion euros

In the context of a budget cut of €2.7 billion, thus the entire UK net contribution to the CAP budget, the cost for national budgets results from the addition of the new allocation criteria to finance the “rebate” (no longer “the rebate on rebate” but by the usual allocation key of the MS to the budget) and of the decrease of the CAP aids received in the different MS due to the reduction of the CAP budget of 2.7 billion.

In this scenario, the CAP budget represents 34.6% of the EU budget.

 

2 – Brexit total net cost on national contributions of €6.6 bn, Brexit net cost on national contributions to the CAP of €2.7 bn & CAP funding of new EU priorities of €1,2 bn (20% for new budget priorities) – i.e. a total of €3.9 bn in relation to the CAP

A) Scenario 4 : CAP budget increases by €3.9 billion(maintaining CAP aid)

Assuming a budget increase of €3.9 billion to the CAP budget, the cost for national budgets is the addition of the new allocation criteria to finance the “rebate” (no longer “the rebate on rebate” but by the usual allocation key of the MS to the budget cf. II), the financing of the additional 2.7 billion, by the GDP allocation key, and €1.2 bn of the CAP budget that the Commission wishes to use for new priorities. CAP envelopes received by the 27 MS do not change from those currently allocated.

In this scenario, the CAP budget represents 39.5% of the EU budget.

B) Scenario 5: The CAP budget decreases by 2.55 billion euros(€1.35 bn + €1.2 bn)

In the context of a budget decrease of €2.55 billion, half of the UK’s net contribution to the CAP budget (€1.35 bn) and funding from the CAP new EU priorities (€1.2 bn), the cost for national budgets is the addition of the new allocation key to finance the “rebate” (no longer “the rebate on rebate” but by the usual allocation key of the MS to the budget) and national contributions to finance 50% of the UK net contribution to the CAP, which remains at their expense (€1.35 bn) plus the drop in CAP aids received in the various MS due to the shrinking of the CAP budget by €2.55 billion.

In this scenario, the CAP budget represents 34.7% of the EU budget.

C) Scenario 6: The CAP budget decreases by € 3.9 billion

In the context of a budget decrease of €3.9 billion, thus 100% of the UK’s net contribution to the CAP budget (€2.7 bn) and funding from the CAP new EU priorities (€1.2 bn), the cost for national budgets is the addition of the new allocation key to finance the “rebate” (no longer “the rebate on rebate” but by the usual allocation key of the MS to the budget) and the decrease in CAP aid received in the different MS due to the shrinking of the CAP budget of €3.9 billion.

In this scenario, the CAP budget represents 33.7% of the EU budget.

 

3 – Brexit total net cost of €6.6 bn on national contributions, plus a decrease in EU own resources of €2.8 bn (contraction in the EU market without the UK), i.e. €9.4 bn in total. Maximum net Brexit cost for the CAP of €3.85 bn ( 2.7 bn linked to the CAP budget + 40% of the decline in own resources) + CAP funding of new EU priorities of € 1.2 bn, thus €5,05 bn at stake for the CAP.

A) Scenario 7: The CAP budget increases by €05 billion(€3.85 bn + €1.2 bn)

In the context of a budget increase of €5.05 billion to compensate in full for the decrease in net CAP contribution (€2.7 bn) and the share of own resources (€1.15 bn) collected via the UK for the budget of the CAP, as well as the €1.2 bn of the CAP budget that the Commission wishes to use for new priorities, the cost for national budgets is the addition of the new allocation key to finance the “rebate” (no longer “the rebate on rebate” but the normal contribution key of the MS to the budget cf. II) and the financing of the additional 5.05 billion euros, by the GDP allocation key. CAP envelopes received by the 27 MS do not change from those currently collected.

In this scenario, the CAP budget represents 40.4% of the EU budget.

B) Scenario 8: The CAP budget decreases by €125 billion(€1.35 bn + €0.575 bn + €1.2 bn)

The table below shows the consequences of Brexit for the Member States at the level of the CAP budget. In the context of a budget decrease of €3.125 billion, which results from half of the UK’s net contribution to the CAP budget (€1.35 bn), 50% of the decrease in the resources from the UK to the CAP budget (€0.575 bn) and CAP funding of the new EU priorities (€1.2 bn), the cost for national budgets is the addition of the new allocation key to finance the “rebate” (no longer by the “rebate on rebate” but by the normal contribution key of the MS to the budget), additional national contributions to finance 50% of the net contribution of the UK to the CAP budget, which remains at their expense (€1.35 bn) and 50% of the UK’s own resources collected missing, plus the drop in CAP aid received in various MS due to the shrinking of the CAP budget of €3.125 billion.

In this scenario, the CAP budget represents 34.2% of the EU budget.

C) Scenario 9: The CAP budget decreases by 5.05 billion euros

The table below shows the consequences of Brexit for the Member States at the level of the CAP budget. In the context of a budget decrease of €5.05 billion, caused by the net contribution of the UK to the CAP budget (€2.7 bn), the decrease in resources from the UK to the CAP budget (€1.15 bn) and CAP funding of the new EU priorities (€1.2 bn), the cost for national budgets is the addition of the new allocation key to finance the “rebate” (no longer by the “rebate on rebate” but by the normal allocation key of the MS to the budget) and the decrease of the CAP aids received in the different MS due to the tightening of the CAP budget of €5.05 billion.

In this scenario, the CAP budget represents 32.8% of the EU budget.

IV. Impacts on farms incomes of Brexit of the 3 different cases studied

1 –Brexit total net cost of €6.6 bn, net cost for the CAP of € 2.7 bn (Scenario 1 to 3)

This table presents the impact of the scenarios on the average farm net income per Member State, in the Case n°1. This is a low approximation of impact as only the share of direct payments has been taken into account – farm income at EU level would decrease between at least around 2 and 4%– with a constant policy framework.

2 –Brexit total net cost of €6.6 bn, Brexit net cost for the CAP of €2.7 bn and CAP funding of new EU priorities of €1.2 bn (Scenario 4 to 6)

This table presents the impact of the scenarios on the average farm net income per Member State in the Case n°2 – farm income at EU level would decrease between 3,5 to 5,2%.

3 – Brexit total net cost of €6.6 bn, plus a decrease in own resources of €2.8 bn (tightening of the EU budget without the UK), which is €9.4 bn in total. Maximum net Brexit cost for the CAP of €3.85 bn. CAP funding of new EU priorities of € 1.2 bn (Scenario 7 to 9)

This table presents the impact of the scenarios on the average farm net income per Member State in the Case n°3 – farm income at EU level would decrease by 4 to nearly 7%.

 

[1]This rate is the ratio between the average 2010-16 CAP budget, UK excluded, and the new average EU budget, i.e. EU average budget 2010-16 excluding UK + 12 billion for new aids.

NBTs: ECJ Advocate General’s preliminary conclusions

New plant-breeding techniques (NBTs): ECJ Advocate General’s preliminary conclusions

A first sound and promising basis on which to proceed

 

“Ever since humans have grown plants and raised animals for food, they have selected plants and animals with beneficial traits for further breeding. Such traits reflected naturally occurring genetic variations and resulted, for example, in an increased yield or resistance to diseases or environmental pressures”.

 EFSA (European Food Safety Authority)

 

“Targeted genome modification techniques could have revolutionary applications in agriculture. They consist in introducing very precise genetic modifications which make it possible to accelerate the selection speed. They represent a fundamental departure from the “old” GMOs, insofar they could occur naturally and are virtually undetectable”.

French Parliamentary Office for evaluation of scientific and technological options (OPECST)

 

January 18th 2018, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) Advocate General  issued preliminary conclusions on whether some of the new genetic engineering techniques fall within the scope of the European legislation on GMOs (Case C-528/16).

It is true that this is only a first opinion on the long-standing issue, whose final conclusions, and the related framework, are expected to be presented by the ECJ by summer 2018, however it has to be underlined what this outcome may entail for the future of plant improvements at European level.

On this issue, it is absolutely necessary to focus first and foremost on facts, namely scientific arguments.

First of all, what the Advocate General Mr. Michal Bobek did today, was to provide a legal interpretation as a response to France enquiry in 2016, which asked the ECJ to specify whether a type of herbicide-resistant rapeseed obtained through gene-editing should undergo the approval process for GMOs, and so if plants resulting from the new techniques will be covered by the EU GMO legislation – Article 2(2) of GMO Directive 2001/18/EC. To be even more precise, French Council of the State posed to the ECJ four interlocutory questions (available here) on the scope of the EU’s GMO legislation and specifically, (i) if classical and/or newer site-directed mutagenesis plant breeding techniques produce GMOs and (ii) if EU Member States retain any discretion in transposing these EU Directives to their national laws.

“Directive 2001/18/EC regulates the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms (‘GMOs’) and their placing on the market within the Union. In particular, the organisms covered by that directive must be authorized after an environmental risk assessment. They are also subject to traceability, labelling and monitoring obligations”.

“Article 3(1), read in conjunction with Annex I B, states that the GMO Directive shall not apply to organisms obtained through certain techniques of genetic modification, such as mutagenesis (‘the mutagenesis exemption’)[1]”.

The Advocate General’s opinion attempts to make clear if and to what extent organisms developed through conventional and innovative plant breeding techniques (specifically mutagenesis), are to be regulated either through the same framework as conventional plant breeding or as genetically modified organisms (GMOs). It is necessary to specify that under the current EU legislative framework, organisms developed through traditional mutagenesis breeding techniques are regulated as conventional and are therefore exempt from the EU’s main GMO regulation, Directive 2001/18/EC.

“In my view, provided that they meet the substantive conditions of Article 2(2) of the GMO Directive, organisms obtained by mutagenesis are GMOs within the meaning of the GMO Directive (a). However, as long as the process of mutagenesis does not involve the use of recombinant nucleic acid molecules or GMOs other than those produced by one or more of the techniques listed in Annex I B, those organisms are exempt from the obligations laid down by the GMO Directive by virtue of Article 3(1) of the GMO Directive, read in conjunction with its Annex I B (b)”. – Advocate General on the scope of the GMO Directive and of the mutagenesis exemption.

Furthermore, he also specified that: “Like the Commission, I am of the opinion, that there is only one relevant distinction that should be made in order to clarify the scope of the mutagenesis exemption: the caveat set out in Annex I B, namely whether the mutagenesis technique involves ‘the use of recombinant nucleic acid molecules or [GMOs] other than those produced by … mutagenesis [or] cell fusion … of plant cells of organisms which can exchange genetic material through traditional breeding methods’ (‘the Annex I B caveat’)(1). No further distinctions should — or even could — be made judicially”.

Having in mind that this legal advice is not binding but that it is usually followed by European Court of Justice (ECJ) panel of judges, what it states in short is that crops obtained by the plant breeding technique of mutagenesis do not fall under laws restricting the use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) however, and this is a point which has to be thoroughly analyzed, the Advocate General pointed out that  the Directive 2001/18 does not preclude Member States from adopting measures governing mutagenesis provided that, in so doing, they respect the overarching obligations arising from EU law.

“Against this background, I am of the opinion that Member States have the competence to regulate organisms obtained through mutagenesis provided that they comply with their overall EU law obligations, whether of secondary law origins or the rules of primary law, such as Articles 34 and 36 TFEU”.

For a more precise explanation here below an extract from the Advocate General’s conclusion:

(1) Provided that they meet the substantive criteria of Article 2(2) of Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms and repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC, organisms obtained by mutagenesis are genetically modified organisms within the meaning of that directive;

The exemption laid down in Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/18, read in conjunction with its Annex I B covers all organisms obtained by any technique of mutagenesis, irrespective of their use at the date of the adoption of that directive, on the condition that they do not involve the use of recombinant nucleic acid molecules or genetically modified organisms other than those produced by one or more of the methods listed in Annex I B.

(2)      Council Directive 2002/53/EC of 13 June 2002 on the common catalogue of varieties of agricultural plant species is to be interpreted as exempting varieties obtained by mutagenesis from the specific obligations laid down therein for the inclusion of genetically modified varieties in the common catalogue of agricultural plant species.

(3)      Directive 2001/18 does not preclude Member States from adopting measures governing mutagenesis provided that, in so doing, they respect the overarching obligations arising from EU law.

As clarified by a USDA-FAS Report on January 16th on the expected legal opinion for New Breeding Techniques in the EU, “Advocates General are assigned to most cases before the ECJ to serve as an advisor to the court on how the case should be resolved. Their opinions are given considerable weight, and often are followed by the court, but are non-binding in all cases”. Furthermore, USDA Rapporteur found that by reviewing ECJ case law, what appears is that the majority of ECJ judgements complement the opinions of the advocate general.

In order to provide a brief background on the issue but without going back to the far past, last year, on April 28, 2017 the SAM-HLG (Scientific Advice Mechanism -High Level Group) released its explanatory Note in response to the request, formulated in the Scoping Paper (adopted by the HLG on 25 November 2016), by the European Commission, to provide an up-to-date overview and a comprehensive scientific comparison on new techniques in agricultural biotechnology, including their potential agri applications in both fields of synthetic biology and gene drives, considering the key characteristics of each of these new techniques.

Among the others, the Note highlighted that “all breeding techniques applicable in agriculture (conventional breeding techniques, CBT; established techniques of genetic modification, ETGM; and new breeding techniques, NBT) make use of genetic diversity and change whether naturally occurring or resulting from human intervention, in order to select or generate plants, animals or microorganisms that exhibit preferred characteristics” and that “the NBT of genome editing offer not only the ability to target insertions (resulting in comparatively fewer unintended effects on the expression of other genes or their disruption) but also the ability to make small, precise and specific changes, such as point mutations, which can also be observed in nature”. 

This independent explanatory note, as also specified in the Scoping Paper, does not take a position; it does not cover legal issues and it does not make policy recommendations to policymakers. It is another piece to the puzzle.

[1]Mutagenesis involves an alteration of the genome of a living species. Unlike Transgenesis, which is a genetic engineering technique that consists in inserting one or more genes from other species into the genome of another species, it does not, in principle, entail the insertion of foreign DNA into a living organism. Techniques of mutagenesis have evolved over time as the result of scientific progress in biotechnology” Source: Case C-528/16 – OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL BOBEK, 18 January 2018(1)

 

What should the EU’s Plant Protein Strategy do?

A review of existing CAP measures for protein, oil protein and oilseed crops and market trends What lessons? What next?

Policy Briefing, October 2017.

In the European Union, the goal of ‘protein independence’, or rather the EU’s heavy reliance on plant protein imports ‒ mainly in the form of soybean meal ‒ which are used to feed livestock, is a recurring theme.

Over the last three decades, the EU has made independence a strategic priority at every major policy review: the Blair House negotiations, the CAP reforms of 1992, 2000, 2003, 2008, & 2013, and in the European Strategy for Biofuels from agricultural sources. This has given varying degrees of satisfaction and has had varying degrees of success.

Commissioner Hogan has decided to revisit this goal. And the context is a busy one: the CAP’s greening measures are being modified, there is a proposal to revise the REDII Directive, the business outlook in the agricultural sector is manifestly depressed and preparatory discussions are underway for the post 2020 EU budget, including the CAP. It is therefore a good time to consider the lessons from the measures that have already been implemented, and to use them to outline what an effective growth plan might look like.

Over the last 30 years, European support has come in three main forms:
– voluntary coupled support (VCS) for protein and oil-protein bearing crops, with Member States (MS) having been asked to decide on the adoption of this type of voluntary support measure in 2003, 2008 and 2013;

– biofuels targets in the EU transport sector’s energy mix;
– the requirement, introduced by the CAP in 2013, which obliges farmers to put 5 % of arable land into Ecological Focus Areas (EFAs) and to be able to grow nitrogen-fixing plants and catch crops in them.

In light of the objectives of increasing both the ‘area under cultivation’ (AUC) and the quantity of protein and oilseed crops produced in the EU, this study analyses the impact of these three principle policy measures in two main Parts.

Part 1 outlines the current situation for protein and oil-protein bearing crops:
– section 1 analyses of how the CAP and the incentives for these crops have changed over time;
– section 2 attempts to identify the extent to which there is a correlation between

CAP incentives and trends in the AUC/quantity metrics for protein and oil- protein bearing crops.

Part 2 analyses the changes in EU oilseed production and the extent to which these are attributable to the EU’s biofuels policy.

This analysis shows the positive outcome of the 2013 reforms, which doubled the production of protein and oil-protein crops, principally through the introduction of greening and Ecological Focus Areas (EFA) but also by retaining the discretionary option for MS to allocate coupled support to these crops.

I- Protein and oil-protein crops (peas, broad beans & field beans, and soya beans)

1) Changes in the CAP and incentives for protein-bearing crops

– 1999: Agenda 2000

Following the Berlin Agreement, the “Agenda 2000” CAP reform package was adopted. Among its key provisions were the principle of eco-conditionality for direct support schemes, and common regulations for field crops (cereals, oilseeds and protein-bearing crops).

In 1999 and 2000, a direct support payment was created based on: a single all-crop rate of 63 euros/t and the historic yields of specific production zones. A protein- bearing crop premium was also introduced. The payment for protein-bearing crops was initially set at 78.5 euros/t, and reduced in 2000-2001 to 72.5 euros/t, which amounts to a premium of 9.5 euros/t for protein-bearing crops.

– 2003: The Luxembourg Agreement

A new CAP reform, part of the mid-term review, initiated the decoupling of support with a 75% reduction in the amount of coupled support and the shift to a “single farm payment” scheme. In addition to this single payment scheme, based on hectarage, a premium of 55.57 euros/ha was introduced for protein-bearing crops.

– 2008: The CAP Health Check

2007-2013 saw the opening of a fresh programming round for the CAP. In 2010, 6 MS made use of article 68 (possibility for MS to use Pillar 1 funds for specific objectives, drawn from the country’s Pillar 1 decoupled support budget) to support protein-bearing crops: Finland, France, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and Spain (source: EC-DG Agri 2010).

Member State (MS)

Details

Finland

6.5 M euros for protein and oilseed crops in 2011; 83 000 ha or approx. 78 euros/ha

France

80 M euros in 2010-2011; peas, field beans, lupins: 100 euros/ha in 2010 and 140 euros/ha in 2011

Poland

21.6 M for 2010-2011; 163 euros/ha in 2012

Spain

1 M euros/year in 2010 and 2011

Table 1: amount of CAP article 68 support for protein-bearing crops in 2008 (Sources: European Parliament, The Environmental Role of Protein Crops in the New Common Agricultural Policy, 2013)

– 2013: CAP reform

The 2013 CAP reform gave MS a discretionary option to reallocate 13 % of their Pillar 1 direct support budget to voluntary coupled support (VCS) measures. This 13% could be raised to 15% if the MS decided to devote 2% or more of their VCS budget to the production of protein crops (including soya).

On the 1st August 2014 MS notified the European Commission of their VCS measures for protein-bearing crops. 11% of this VCS support was allocated to protein-bearing crops ‒ within a quantitative limit of 4.3 million hectares and an annual total budget at EU level of 441 million euros (or 102 euros per hectare on average). The figures mean that the protein-bearing crop sector has been the fourth most supported sector in terms of VCS support, lagging behind the livestock rearing sector. VCS measures came into force in 2015 and will run until (end) 20201.

1 Source: Commission Information Note, 30 July 2015.

The 16 MS that opted to support protein-bearing crops through VCS were:

Member States

Details (amounts in millions of euros)

Bulgaria

16 M euros

Czech Republic

17 M euros

Greece

7 M euros

Spain

45 M euros (209 euros/ha)

Finland

6 M euros

France

146 M euros (187 euros/ha)

Hungary

27 M euros

Croatia

4 M euros

Ireland

3 M euros

Italy

36 M euros

Lithuania

14 M euros

Luxembourg

Latvia

4 M euros

Poland

68 M euros (266 euros/ha)

Romania

49 M euros

Slovenia

3 M euros

Table 2: VCS for protein-bearing crops, entry into force in 20152.

With the 2013 reform, which included the objective of increasing the EU’s independence in Protein-Rich Materials, soya production became eligible for voluntary coupled support (VCS). In 2015, in the MS that adopted VCS for these crops, their rate fluctuated between 96 and 419 euros/ha.

The 9 MS that did so (amount in euros/ha) were: Bulgaria: 156; Croatia: 260; Czech Republic: -; France: 100 with a limit of 12.5 ha per farm; Hungary: 150-200; Italy: 96; Poland: -; Romania: 325; and Slovenia: 419.

Moreover, the 2013 CAP reform linked 30% of Pillar 1’s direct payments to greening measures, which included creating Ecological Focus Areas (EFA) on at least 5 % of each farm’s arable land. This obligation has been largely fulfilled by the EU’s farmers: 15%, or 8 million hectares, of arable land was put into EFAs by 2016. Nearly 40% of total EFA land area has been planted with nitrogen-fixing crops. With respect to soya, out of the 12 MS that produce it, 10 made it eligible for planting in EFAs.

2 Source: Commission Information Note, 30 July 2015.

2) Trends in area under cultivation (AUC) and production quantities in the EU

– High-protein peas


Screen Shot 2018-01-08 at 15.53.37

Figure 1: Trends in production and AUC for high-protein pea crops from 2000 to 2016 (source: Eurostat database)

Due to successive falls in yields, the production of high-protein peas in the EU fell progressively from 2000 to 2003. However, the AUC remained stable at around 750,000 ha.

With the accession of 10 additional countries to the EU in 2004, production picked up again. This spike would only be a temporary reprieve, however, as the falling trend for AUC/quantity produced returned in 2005 and continued until 2009. The low yield problem (and thereby mediocre profitability compared to the alternative field crops available) persisted, and the AUC fell markedly year on year, despite the coupled support of 55.57 euros/ha. Up to and including 2009, European high-protein pea production seemed to be fighting a losing battle with AUC collapsing from 851 290 ha in 2004 to 411 930 ha in 2008, in other words a reduction of 51.61%.

Between 2009 and 2011, the AUC began to grow again, only to fall back in 2012 and 2013. It is possible to posit a correlation between the end of the fall in production and ‒ and even a modest recovery ‒ with the application of the new article 68 introduced following the 2008 CAP Health Check, however, this measure was unable to prevent fresh falls in the AUC in 2012 and 2013.

Since 2014 the trend has reversed and high-protein pea production has enjoyed continued growth both in terms of quantity and AUC. 2015 and 2016 saw strong growth with, respectively, 2,076 million tonnes and 744 260 hectares and 2,329 million tonnes and 911 690 hectares ‒ in other words the highest levels since 2000. Between 2013 and 2015 production increased by 60.83% and AUC by 60.70%. Between 2013 and 2016 production increased by 80.49% and AUC by 96.85%.

This growth occurred after the 2013 reform. There are two types of support for protein crops: on the one hand, voluntary coupled support, and on the other hand, the discretionary option of planting protein crops in the EFA.

Now, by examining the situation for high-protein peas in Germany, where voluntary coupled support has not been applied to protein crops, we get an interesting perspective on which support has driven this growth.


Screen Shot 2018-01-08 at 15.56.46

Figure 2: Trends in production and AUC for high-protein pea crops in Germany from 2000 to 2017 (Source: Eurostat database).

In Germany, the AUC and quantities of production for high-protein peas fell each year from 2000 to 2008. From 2008 to 2014 both metrics stagnated. However, in 2014 and 2015 they increased significantly (+78.23% for production and +89.68% for AUC). Growth between 2013 and 2016 was 124.09% for quantity and 130.87% for AUC.

What we see here is that in Germany, as in the whole of the EU (and without prejudice to (any potential) differential impact of voluntary coupled support in the MS that have deployed it), by opening up the EFA to protein crops the ‘greening’ measure has clearly been the main driver of the return to rising AUC & quantity of production for high-protein peas.

– Broad Beans & Field Beans

Screen Shot 2018-01-08 at 15.58.16

Figure 3: Trends in production and AUC for broad beans and field beans from 2000 to 2016 (source: Eurostat database)

The trend for broad beans & field bean crops mirrored that of high-protein peas over the 2000-2013 period. Despite the different measures implemented between 2000 and 2013, production struggled to grow and the small rise in 2009-2010 petered out quickly.

Having said this, as for high-protein peas, from 2014 to 2017, broad bean and field bean crops have grown both in terms of AUC and production quantity ‒ and experienced extremely high growth in 2014 and 2015. In 2016 production levels stabilised at the 2015 level, and 2017 has seen a fresh increase in AUC. Through 2014 and 2015 production grew by 55 % and AUC by 61 %.

As for high-protein peas, the hypothesis of causality between the increase in EU broad bean and field bean production from 2014 to 2017 and the support introduced by the 2013 reform, appears a convincing one.


Screen Shot 2018-01-08 at 15.59.28

Figure 4: Trends in production and AUC for broad beans and field beans from 2000 to 2017 in Germany (source: Eurostat database)

As for high-protein peas, the trends observed in Germany from 2014 to 2017 tend to show a very positive impact from the EFA greening measure for nitrogen-fixing crops (including protein-rich varieties). This can be seen clearly in Figure 4, which shows a constant increase in both quantities produced and AUC from 2014 onwards, whereas levels had previously been stable. In percentage terms, from 2013 to 2016, growth was 157.45% for quantity of production, and 135.15% for AUC. And, as for protein peas, this increase was especially pronounced between 2014 and 2015 (+52.05% for quantity of production and +83.41% for AUC).

The measure promoting nitrogen-fixing crops in EFA has therefore clearly encouraged the growing of broad bean and field bean crops in the EU.

– Soybean Production


Screen Shot 2018-01-08 at 16.01.50

Figure 5: Trends in production and AUC for soybean from 2000 to 2016 (source: Eurostat database)

The graph shows fluctuations in the AUC and quantities produced for soybean crops in the EU up to and including 2013. With the exception of 2007-2009 (a noticeable dip) production held up, but was hardly buoyant.

In 2015 and 2016 both metrics showed a significant increase, reaching a new level substantially above the previous average, including 2013. In 2015 production increased by 112.34% and AUC by 103.21% relative to the previous average up to and including 2013.

Even if the 2016 levels are slightly lower than in 2015, a clear correlation between MS implementing the 2013 CAP reform (entry into force in 2015) and the positive progression in soybean production is apparent. In implementing the 2013 reforms, the EU’s main soybean producing countries chose to encourage production with coupled support and by choosing to plant soybean crops in their EFA. However, conclusions about the relative weight of these two measures in the strong soybean growth figures since 2014 cannot be drawn at this point.

In summary:

During the 2000-2013 period, the reformed CAP’s new measures and policy adjustments were unable to turn around what had been a negative or stagnating trend. Only the improvement for high-protein peas from 2009 to 2011 could be interpreted as a ‒ temporary ‒ impact of the measures adopted following the 2008 Health Check.

However, in the wake of the 2013 reforms, the increasing AUC and production quantities for high-protein peas, broad and field beans and soybeans, appears highly correlated with the double decision to require 5% of arable land to be put into EFA and to allow nitrogen-fixing crops in them. This double decision had the positive outcome of enabling EU protein and soybean production to jump to a new level ‒ and has also led to (the EU) having not just 5% of arable land in EFA, as regulations require, but 15 %.

In the absence of coupled support and therefore with the double EFA measure as the sole incentive, Germany has experienced similar growth to that described here for the EU as a whole. However, we cannot rule out there being a correlation between coupled support and the newly positive trends in protein crop production in the other MS on the basis of the German case alone.

There is, however, an important question mark now hanging over the immediate future: will the Commission’s recent total ban on the use of pesticides for nitrogen-fixing crops grown in the EFA bring to a halt or even reverse the positive progression of EU protein crop production? By opting for a blanket ban rather than require ‘reasonable use’, has the Commission carefully assessed the risks, which may be the end of production of this type of crop in the EFA as farmers weigh up the opportunity costs between:

  • –  the cost of sowing and growing their crops without the ability to control damage from pest invasions;
  • –  and the option of reducing EFA area to the regulatory minimum, or even of not growing crops in them at all (thus opening the door to additional protein crop imports into the EU and undermining both European and global food security)?There is another under-explored area where progress could be made: improving crop technology and achieving more stable yields ‒ even in a context of climate/weather variability. This can be achieved through research to help farmers optimise crop management, combined with substantial investment in variety research. Seed companies abandoned variety research for protein crops because in the EU their production had either been stagnant or in the worst cases were falling, so they have not been seen as attractive business prospects.The conditions for investment in improved varieties will return when the outlook for production is positive and levels reach a critical threshold to become credible markets. These basic conditions have been emerging during the 2014-2017 period but the positive outlook could easily be broken. The (policy) goal is not so much to invest public money in variety research but to create the conditions in which it can take place. The EU can do this via the CAP, but also by taking, as it will have to, responsible positions, for example, on the subject of new variety selection technologies.

    On the question of the CAP, the changes affecting the conditions for greening measures discussed above raise the question of what the CAP is seeking to achieve: is it a policy that seeks to achieve results and which empowers farmers, as business entrepreneurs who are able to take decisions ‒ and allocate resources effectively ‒ or a policy that dictates the agronomic approach that farmers should follow in order to respond to what ‘public opinion’ is thought to want?

II- Rapeseed oil crops

1) The EU’s biofuels policy

In the 1990s the EU launched a policy to stimulate biofuel production. The aim was to reduce energy dependence on imported fossil fuels and to strengthen the resilience of the agricultural sector. Objectives for a biofuels contribution to energy use in the transport sector were set: in 2003, an objective of 2% was set, then in 2009, an objective of 5% by 2010 and 10% by 2020 was set. Following the 2003 Biofuels Directive, and the reform of the CAP taking place in parallel, a financial subsidy for energy crops of 45 euros per hectare was introduced and this ran until the CAP Health Check in 2008. A biofuels industry was thus born, was favourably received in general and benefited from EU regulatory and financial incentives.

Following the 2007 food riots and intense lobbying by certain organisations, the public perception of biofuels changed, that is, for conventional biofuels, even though the arguments made were false and have since been formally discredited by institutions such as the FAO, by the science community and by the Commission itself (DG Agri, JRC). The goals were nonetheless revised downwards, with the objective of a 7% contribution by 2020 set in 2015, and MS were encouraged to redirect their subsidies to so-called ‘advanced’ biofuels.

2) Rapeseed: AUC and production trends

Rapeseed is the most used agricultural product in biodiesel production in the EU. It is ahead of palm oil (which is imported) and far ahead of soybean and sunflower oils (the share of the latter remaining limited throughout the period in question).


Screen Shot 2018-01-08 at 16.03.26

Figure 6: Trends in production and AUC for rapeseed from 2000 to 2016 (source: Eurostat database)

Figure 6 shows a clear jump in the quantity of rapeseed produced from 2004 to 2009 (+35% compared to the average of previous years). In 2004 the AUC increased by a smaller percentage (9%) but from 2003 to 2007 it increased by 57%, and has remained relatively stable since.

Screen Shot 2018-01-08 at 12.46.23

Figure 7: Supply of rapeseed oil to the food and biofuel markets (Source: calculations by FEDIOL, using Oil World Annual data 2000-2011)

Figure 7 shows that the increased production of rapeseed oil in 2004 was driven by its use as an energy source, so, we can say that in the EU, the increase in AUC for rapeseed is directly correlated with the progression of rapeseed-based biodiesel.

The financial support measures for energy crops adopted in 2003 before being abandoned in 2008 therefore seem to have, in parallel with tax incentives introduced in different MS, successfully spurred rapeseed production.

The production of biodiesel from EU oilseed crops has generated the production of high-protein oilseed meal as a co-product, reducing the EU’s dependence on imported soybean meal. The emergence of these new energy markets for European oilseeds (especially rapeseed) in fact sustains an additional annual production of 9.3 MT of European rapeseed meal, reducing imports on which the EU depends.

Biodiesel production in the EU was, initially, almost exclusively rapeseed-based. And in 2008 rapeseed’s contribution to biodiesel was still 72% although it has subsequently lost market share to competition from imports of palm oil ‒ and this has occurred despite the serious questions about the environmental and economic record of biodiesels made from imported palm oil (see our report « producing fuel and feeds – a matter of security and sustainability for europe» http://www.farm- europe.eu/travaux/poducing-fuel-and-feeds-a-matter-of-security-and-sustainability-for- europe/ ).

In summary:

Rapeseed meal production has doubled since 2004. 9.3 million tons of rapeseed meal are directly attributable to biodiesel production in the EU. Rapeseed oil is used to produce biodiesel, and the high-protein co-product of this process is available to EU farmers as an animal feed.

This greater availability of plant protein within the EU market directly reduces the quantity of primary agricultural produce for use in animal feed imported into the EU. Setting this in context, Europe is structurally deficient in protein and imports 70 % of its protein crops and meal from third countries. A recent report of the European Parliament has estimated the EU’s ‘protein gap’ at 20 million tonnes[24].

In light of this, both the European Parliament and Member States, “Calls on the Commission swiftly to submit to Parliament and to the Council a report on the possibilities and options for increasing domestic protein crop production in the EU by means of new policy instruments (also taking into account the use of oil seeds and their by-products and the potential extent for substituting imports), the potential effect on farmers’ revenues, the contribution it would make to climate change mitigation, the effect on biodiversity and soil fertility, and the potential for reducing the necessary external input of mineral fertilisers and pesticides”.

The increase in the production of rapeseed and sunflower meal (the seed is made up of approx. 60 % protein-rich meal and 40 % oil) has given the EU a minimum of independence. Imports of soybean meal have reduced, especially compared to the peak import levels of 2007.

While the use of rapeseed oil in food consumption has been stable for several decades, the emergence of a growing European supply in protein-rich meal has only been possible by developing alternative commercial uses for the oil.

It is therefore clear that the production of biofuels from European plant and cereal oils is essential if (and is today the only option offering sufficient scale) the EU is to improve and secure a domestic (EU grown) supply of plant protein that can be used as an animal feed, thereby limiting imports.

Biofuels based on palm oil – even those based on imported used cooking oil – do not make sense for the EU, both in environmental and economic terms. It should be noted that this report does not deal with the subject of the sustainable use of palm oil in the EU food industry, which is one that would benefit from greater clarity.

The question that arises today is therefore that of the appropriateness of the EU’s REDII proposal which is currently on the table and which would eliminate much of the production of conventional biofuel, with no justification.

The absence of a strategic EU vision raises questions. Are we still applying terms such as ‘growth’, ‘profitability’ and ‘competitiveness’ to our food production system and to our agriculture, or have we replaced them with the term ‘decline’?

Do we want to grow forests rather than crops across the entire EU and limit agriculture to, at best, the domestic supply of food, using imports to meet a host of EU citizens’ other needs, such as green chemistry and green energy, to name just a few?

Do we want to use EU agriculture as a driver for the green economy or do politicians in fact have other economic priorities, such as, for example, protecting the position of fossil fuels and encouraging biofuels based on used cooking oil (palm)?

If it is the latter then we will need to prepare for a constantly increasing CAP budget. Not only this, we will also be completely abandoning the goal of a market-oriented agriculture, with dependence on imports in its place. Such an approach would also generate additional fluctuations in the world’s agricultural markets.

If, on the other hand, the objective is to be serious and have genuine ambition for our agriculture and our related ‘green growth’ industries; then it needs to be recognized that conventional biofuels, made from EU grown primary agricultural materials, have a key role to play in the development of the EU’s food system.

The Commission’s REDII proposal3, currently being debated in the European Parliament and in the Council, would lead, in the short term, to a drastic reduction of the European production of oilseed-based biodiesel.

3 A new Renewable Energy Directive for the period after 2020.

In practice, the consequences of this would be:

– greater consumption of fossil fuel energy and imported biofuels, which have questionable environmental records (2nd generation European biofuels are emerging more slowly than the somewhat pious hope evident in Commission statements);

– but also a greater quantity of imported plant protein due to the fact that the proposal sounds the death knell for the annual 9.3 million tons of rapeseed meal produced to supply the biodiesel industry.

***

The present analysis of changes in (plant-based protein) policy has discussed the relative effectiveness of the different initiatives implemented by the EU following the European Commission’s decision to initiate a debate on the content of a new Protein Strategy, the aim of which is to reduce Europe’s dependence on imports of soybean and soybean meal from the Americas.

Since 2000, the EU has launched more than half a dozen initiatives to increase protein and oil-protein crop production. Analysis of market trends over the 2000-2016 period clearly shows that two approaches in particular have been effective in boosting production in a significant way:

  • –  first, expanding the biofuels industry, which today offers the best route to a Protein Strategy with sufficient scale and ability to reduce Europe’s dependence on soybean imports.
  • –  second, and more recently, the CAP’s 2013 greening initiative, and in particular the authorisation of nitrogen-fixing crops in Ecological Focus Areas, which led to the doubling, at least, of the quantities of peas, broad beans and field beans and soybeans, that are produced in Europe.It is surprising to see that these two pillars of European policy, which have unquestionably given tangible results, are today being undermined by the European Commission itself.By banning the use of pesticides in the Ecological Focus Areas the Commission risks undermining the progress made since 2013. Moreover, in their current proposals for revising the Directive on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (REDII), the Commission completely omits any reference to the benefits of having an agriculture-based biofuels industry, which it now risks crippling, despite the fact that this industry contributes both to more sustainable transport and to the resilience of the EU’s agricultural sector overall.

Looking to the future, any ambitious Protein Strategy should include:

– the ability of the biofuels industry to play its role to the full; and, in a complementary manner,

– continuing to green the CAP in an intelligent, pragmatic and proactive way ‒ putting ideology to one side ‒ and reconciling business and environmental approaches. It is clear that nitrogen-fixing crops have a key role to play in such a strategy.

 

UNLOCKING THE POTENTIAL OF THE EU FOOD SUPPLY CHAIN. A BALANCED, COMMON APPROACH TACKLING UTPs

October 2017

1. INTRODUCTION

2016 has been quite productive in terms of debates around the Food Supply Chain at the European level. The issue has been triggered by the Agricultural Markets Task Force (AMTF) instigated by Commissioner Hogan, which examined the position of the farmer in the supply chain, and proposed a number of recommendations on different issues, amongst them trading practices in agricultural markets and contractualisation.

The Report has been deeply debated in the Agri Council, whose Conclusions of December 2016 on “Strengthening Farmers ́ Position in the Food Supply Chain and Tackling Unfair Trading Practices” made clear that imbalances in the bargaining positions often lead to unfair trading practices (UTPs), as well as to the need for a level-playing field for all actors in the chain.

The AMTF was not the only initiative around the issue of how to improve the functioning of the European food chain. The European Parliament has also been very active, and its last positioning was adopted in June 2016 with the adoption of a new Resolution on “Unfair Trading Practices in the Food Supply Chain”, in which it openly pledges for a framework legislation at EU level in order to tackle UTPs .

Along the same line, the European Economic and Social Committee supported the European Parliament ́s Resolution in its Opinion adopted at the plenary in October 2016 (“A Fairer Agro-Food Supply Chain”) and highlighted the need for a framework legislation at the European level as well as to take swift action to prevent UTP ́s .

In this context, the Commission is expected to come back with an initiative in the next months and give an answer both to operators and institutions on how to rebalance the relationship between the different links of the food chain and unlock its whole potential under clear, and common rules.

This paper is the contribution of Farm Europe to this debate, whose objective is fully shared if we want to improve in the long run the structure of this value added chain which is number one in the European economy.

2. WHY DO WE NEED A NEW FRAMEWORK? WHAT HAVE WE REACHED?

Discussions about the need to rebalance the food chain relationship are not new at the European level. All the institutions have participated in several attempts urged by different stakeholders, but in the end no concrete action has been taken.

On the contrary, in 2013, seven European Associations motivated by the former Commissioner Verheugen launched the Supply Chain Initiative (SCI) as a voluntary, private-led action in order to increase fairness in commercial relations along the food supply chain.

Since then, some advances have been achieved in promoting cultural changes and improving business ethics, but a set of important shortcomings have also been highlighted in the analysis of its effective application. Weakness in governance, limitations in transparency, no enforcement measures or penalties, a lack of effective deterrents against UTP and not allowing individuals to make anonymous complaints by potential victims, no own–initiative investigations by an independent body and under-representation of SMEs and farmers are the most important ones. 1

1 EP Resolution of 7 June 2016 on unfair trading practices in the food supply chain.

On the other hand, a fresh look to what is happening at the national level can give us a better idea of the framework in which the European debate is taking place. It is very clear that the primary concerns on the issue were born at the MS level, and all of them have been – in one way or another – actively looking for remedies. If we summarize what is going on in the different Member States, several distinctions can be made:

  •   There are some MS with specific measures for the food chain (i.e. Spain, UK, Italy…), and others refer directly to horizontal legislation (Germany, France,.. ).
  •  Four main types of models coexist: regulated in detail (UK, Spain, Italy..), self-regulated (Belgium), mixed model (Spain, UK) , horizontal regulation and countries with no specific UTP ́s regulation (Denmark, Sweden, Luxembourg,..).
  •  When there is a regulatory framework and control authorities, they can be either the Ministry of Finance (France), Competition Authorities (Germany), Food Safety and Economy (Portugal) or Agriculture (Spain).2

Nevertheless, considering facts and circumstances, we can reach the conclusion that despite the efforts made, self-regulation or voluntary approaches are not enough to solve the present imbalances in the food chain, and what is most worrying, disparities between national systems in place do not help to keep a level-playing field and ensure the proper functioning of the Internal market, while at the same time the fragmented nature of the markets expose supply chain operators to different conditions, regulatory uncertainty and inefficiencies.

3. A SET OF CONCRETE PROPOSALS.

If Europe wants a strong and balanced food chain, able to share all the value added generated across it under fair conditions, able to reinforce the position of producers as the most vulnerable link, and generate wealth up to the consumer, the Commission has to put forward a common framework with a minimum set of issues .

2 more detailed information in the study commissioned by the Spanish Agency for Food Information and Control (AICA) ,” Informe sobre la aplicacion de la regulacion de practicas comerciales en los paises UE” 2016. www.aica.gob.es

These core issues should be the following:

a) A set of guiding principles for the commercial relationships in the food chain.

There are three kind of relations in the food chain: 1) producer – industry, 2) producer – retail , 3) industry – retail.

For all cases, the relation shall be governed by the principles of balance and fair reciprocity between parties, freedom to enter into agreements, goodwill, mutual interest, equitable sharing of risks and responsibilities, cooperation, transparency and respect of free market competition.

Identification of the unfair practices to be relegated from commercial practice. There is a vast literature about UTPs , and in general terms they can be described as all kind of practices imposed to the supplier that do not respect fairness in the contractual relation, passing on inefficiencies or risks without any compensation.

Under this broad description we should include:

Unilateral or retroactive changes to the agreed terms (concerning volumes, quality standards, prices),

Unforeseen commercial payments, Charges of fictitious services,

Transfer of charges in promotions to the supplier with no negotiation and participation of the buyer,

Imposing unconditional return of unsold merchandise,

Non-compliance with payment delays as established in Directive 2011/7/EU,

Sudden and unjustified cancellation of a contract, Non-transparent, discriminatory electronic auctions.

No request for upfront payments to secure or retain contracts .

b) Identification of the unfair practices to be relegated from commercial practice. There is a vast literature about UTPs , and in general terms they can be described as all kind of practices imposed to the supplier that do not respect fairness in the contractual relation, passing on inefficiencies or risks without any compensation.

Under this broad description we should include:

  • Unilateral or retroactive changes to the agreed terms (concerning volumes, quality standards, prices),
  • Unforeseen commercial payments, Charges of fictitious services,
  • Transfer of charges in promotions to the supplier with no negotiation and participation of the buyer,
  • Imposing unconditional return of unsold merchandise,
  • Non-compliance with payment delays as established in Directive 2011/7/EU,
  • Sudden and unjustified cancellation of a contract, Non-transparent, discriminatory electronic auctions.
  • No request for upfront payments to secure or retain contracts .

c) Written contracts. Modern commercial relations imply taking into account a set of complex issues – quality, quantity, price, discounts, logistics and transportation, terms of delivery,…- that cannot be left to uncertainty. Moreover, clear conditions mean secure and stable relationships, as well as less legal controversies. We propose as a general rule the need for written contracts along the chain, with a minimum set of criteria, conditions that should be compulsory when requested by the supplier. In the case of agri producers, Producers’ Organizations and Interbranch Organizations could play a relevant role in this issue and negotiate on their behalf.

d)  Effective enforcement of rules. Experience shows us the shortcomings and limits of voluntary, non-binding models of enforcement. The most effective way is the supervision and control by an independent authority, granted with public powers, in order to ensure the effective application of the proposed set of rules.

e)  Fear factor avoidance. Enforcement should be possible either through independent authorities’ own initiative, or by operators and their organizations. It is crucial in this sense to establish an effective complaints lodge system that secures anonymity.

f) Sanctions and name-and-shame . Non-compliance with the proposed set of rules should be subject to sanctions, with dissuasive character, and include “Name and shame” provisions.

All these proposals should be part of a coherent, common European framework that needs to be covered under a legal umbrella.

Of course Member States should be able to have the maximum of flexibility to effectively apply this general framework, because in the end, what is important is the final outcome. On the other hand, changes of attitude and habits do not come from one day to another, so time and awareness are also part of the process.

Finally, this entire model should be complemented at the national level by the effective participation of stakeholders through codes of conduct / voluntary agreements, as a way to better implement a comprehensive system. In this sense, the work that has been already done at EU and national level must be useful to draw a baseline, as the set of principles agreed under the Supply Chain Initiative might be a first base of discussion.

AGRICULTURE AS A PROVIDER OF NON-FOOD PRODUCTS

October 2017.

The fact that agriculture is a provider of non-food products is not new. Agriculture, including animal rearing and forestry, has traditionally been a source of fibres, fuel, construction and other materials like hides and skins.

What is new is the scale and the range of products originating in basic agricultural raw materials, creating new important outlays for farmers and for the agri-industrial sector at large.

This paper aims at providing an overview of this promising area, and at underlining its significance for the economy of the sector.

Other than the traditional uses of agricultural, forestry and livestock raw materials that remain significant, new uses have developed at great speed in the last decades.

To name a few of the more illustrative examples: the large scale use of feedstock and biomass to produce biofuels, the use of oilseeds to produce oleo-chemical products, the expansion on the use of starch in a wide range of products including polymers for biodegradable plastics, or the expansion on the use of fibres in the textile and automotive industry.

Fuel, fibres, starch, oils, solvents, dyes, resins, proteins, speciality chemicals and pharmaceuticals, are today to various degrees of biological, agriculture origin.

These products present significant advantages as compared to similar products from other origins, as for instance fossil fuels:

-they benefit the environment by reducing greenhouse gases -they cut waste and pollution

-they produce social benefits by stimulating rural communities through establishment of local industries and providing new markets for farmers

-they improve the economic competitiveness of the agri-industry through development of new markets and products

This bio-economy is also a large provider of employment outside the primary agricultural sector: in the EU non-food bio-based products account for 2.7 million jobs, which is a figure that by itself shows how relevant the bio-economy is nowadays.

STARCH, OLEO-CHEMICALS AND FIBRES

Plants can synthesise an immense range of compounds. As ‘cell factories’ they contain structures which can be used by the physical, chemical and biochemical sciences to produce useful materials as fibres, starch, oils, solvents, dyes, resins, proteins, speciality chemicals and pharmaceuticals.

Some non-food crop uses such as textiles are widely known. Others may be less familiar such as plastics made from starch-based polymers. There are implications for consumer behaviour – for example in choice of ‘green’ products, and co-operating with waste disposal strategies to realise the benefits of biodegradable materials.

Many industrial applications of crop materials are already in use. For example it has been estimated that 15% of global oleo chemical production from plants enters non-food markets. About half of the 9m tonnes of starch produced in the EU from maize, wheat and potatoes is used for non-food purposes. In recent years there has been a strong increase in interest in particular applications, such as the use of natural fibres in building construction and as a replacement for fibreglass in composite materials for example in vehicle manufacture. Some of these are bulk applications while others are of particular interest to small and medium-sized enterprises seeking highly innovative specialised markets.

To give an idea of the significance of these new outlays to farmers, who are the producers of the raw materials, just to produce starch and oleo-chemicals more than 1.2 million ha were planted in the EU. This is an area similar to the whole utilised agriculture land in Belgium, by far and large not a marginal figure.

By the same token, the share of green, renewable and biodegradable products is far from negligible in the EU. The lead example comes from surfactants, where the share of renewable products in total consumption is over 50%. There is also a growing market for renewable lubricants, solvents and polymers.

Physical, chemical and genetic sciences can combine to produce new applications. Research in this promising field is a must, and the European Commission should be encouraged to dedicate adequate resources to the development of new non-food uses of agriculture production.

BIOFUELS

One of the most striking examples of non-food uses of agriculture raw material is biofuel, in particular the use of rapeseed to produce biodiesel and of maize, wheat and sugar to produce bioethanol.

In 2014, 13 million tonnes of biofuels were produced in Europe. Biodiesel made up 72% of this total, while bioethanol reached 28%.

Biodiesel

Biodiesel is a renewable fuel that can be produced from domestically cultivated and processed oilseeds (rapeseed mainly, sunflower seeds and soybeans). Today, biodiesel produced in the EU derives first from rapeseed, accounting for 55% of total production in 2014, and 49% in 2015.

Rapeseed used for the production of biodiesel is cultivated within the EU as a break- crop, which means basically that the agricultural product is grown after a sequence of cereal cultivation and plays a vital role in diversifying production, preventing plant diseases, managing weed and pest levels, restoring essential soil nutrient and nitrogen balance, and improving soil structure.

The introduction of alternative species (break-crops) into the cropping sequence boosts yield and reduce the need of inputs for the following crops. Indeed, rapeseed cultivation reduces the need for fertilisers, contributing in this way to the GHG reduction target.

However, its share in the feedstock mix has considerably decreased compared to the nearly 100% in the early stage and even around 60% in 2012. This is mostly due to higher use of imported palm oil linked to new plants using HVO (hydrogenated vegetable oil).

Use of palm oil for biodiesel in Europe has grown to over 3 million tons per annum contributing to the expansion of palm oil deforestation in Sumatra and Indonesia,

undermining valuable efforts engaged in the food sector to focus on certified palm oil production and fight against the expansion of unsustainable production.

Recycled vegetable oil/used cooking oil (UCO), is also being produced locally, but with a growing part being imported (UCO was the third most important biodiesel feedstock in 2015).

Contradictions around the use of UCO as an advanced biofuel arise in part because collectable UCO volumes in Europe amount to just a couple of litres per person per year or less than 1% of the amount of diesel fuel consumed per person on Europe’s roads.

Hence UCO imports will make up the majority of supply in any market in which UCO biodiesel is a growing biofuel. This is significant because UCO outside the EU is generally not a waste and is used for both feed and fuel. Its preferential use in Europe as a non-feed “waste” is thus highly questionable and appears to contradict the Waste Framework Directive’s instruction never to create waste if that is avoidable.

Bioethanol

In Europe, maize is the main feedstock used to produce renewable ethanol (5.4 million tonnes) followed by wheat and sugar, with almost all from European origin. As a practical matter, the EU ethanol industry no longer imports its feedstock from outside Europe.

In addition to that the EU’s ethanol bio refineries are the most advanced in the world in terms of co-products, producing an expanding array of high value bio economy products every year. Whereas in 2009 the most advanced ethanol bio refineries in Europe produced only animal feed and ethanol, today they produce ethanol, animal feed, vegetable oil, nutraceutical products, various products for human food, bio-electricity, fertilizer and other products.

The EU legal framework

The European Commission has made a proposal in the context of a revised RED (Renewable Energy Directive) that would phase out to a large extent the production of conventional or first-generation biofuels, produced from feedstock.

Nevertheless, facts are very clear: EU sourced biofuels have no negative impacts on food availability and prices. On the contrary, they have a positive impact on agricultural land, environment and transport decarbonisation.

1) Not only European sourced biofuels have not displaced any food and feed production…

Since 2008 EU biofuels production increased by 68% while global food prices dropped by 20%.

If one looks more closely to the relationship between the production of conventional biofuels in the EU and the availability of food and feed, the facts are that the EU production of the main feedstocks used for producing biofuels (rapeseed, wheat, maize and sugar) has either increased or remained stable (by quotas in the case of sugar), due to productivity gains.

European sourced biofuels have not displaced food and feed production, and have had no real impact on prices. On the contrary biofuels have helped in limiting the adverse effects of the food markets U-turn, offering some economic stability to struggling EU farmers, without adverse effects on food or feed availability. It is estimated that the production of crop-based biofuels in the EU generates at least 6.6 billion euros of direct revenue for EU farmers.

In addition, the bioethanol industry is said to have created 70 000 direct and indirect jobs since the EU introduced its biofuels policy, while the biodiesel sector has generated 220 000 direct and indirect jobs in the EU biodiesel production chain.

2) But they improve European and global food security…

There is another very important positive impact of biofuels production in the EU – the production of protein feed as a by-product.

Europe is still dependent for 70% of soybean meal imports to meet its growing livestock demand. The EU biofuels industry processing rapeseed and cereals now produces approximately 13 million tonnes annually of high protein meals that otherwise would be imported from the Americas.

It should be noted that less imports from the Americas mean more feed and food availability from these regions, to the benefit of consumers all over the world, thus contributing to increased global food security.

3) EU biofuels produced from EU feedstock provide immediate and efficient answer to transport decarbonisation…

Moving on to the crucial issue of the climate benefits of biofuels as compared to the use of fossil fuels, the fact is that transport is responsible for 25% of GHG emissions in Europe. This sector is at the heart of the climate challenge and biofuels are an alternative to fossil fuels.

Biofuels in the EU must conform to strict sustainability criteria to ensure that their production and use do not cause any harm to the environment. These criteria include a minimum rate of direct greenhouse gas emission savings (35% in comparison to fossil fuels in 2009, and rising to 50% in 2018) and restrictions on the types of land that may be converted to production of biofuels feedstock crops. Currently biofuels produced in the EU from EU feedstock achieve even better results.

In spite of the climate and economic benefits of conventional biofuels production, and the lack of negative impacts on the availability of food and feed, the Commission is proposing to limit its use to a maximum of 3.8% of the total energy consumption in the EU by 2030. Worth recalling that today the EU has a target of 7% use of biofuels in the transport sector.

4) The Commission is proposing to scale down the production of conventional biofuels, without any facts or analysis that would support its proposals.

Its proposal put at stake as well the emergence of second generation biofuels which development needs support of a strong conventional biofuels sector.

To make it even more unacceptable, the Commission seems to ignore that today the EU is a net importer of biofuels. Well informed decisions to promote balanced and locally sourced biofuels in the EU will mean that for every additional production of locally sourced biofuels, there would be a corresponding decrease of imports of biofuels produced in third countries with uncertain sustainability practices. There will be a decrease in feedstocks produced in third countries to be exported to the EU to produce biofuels and a decrease of feed meals imported into the EU from third countries. Moreover, those third countries could use the freed-up land resources for afforestation and food security purposes.

Amongst the imported biofuels, palm oil comes first. As a result of the 2012 Commission’s proposal on “crop-based biofuels”, the EU has been locked into strong levels of increasing imports into Europe.

The one consensus element, arising from all the scientific data, is the negative impact of unsustainable palm oil, especially in the context of deforestation of highly diverse and carbon rich ecosystems. Use of palm oil for biodiesel in Europe has grown thus contributing to the expansion of palm oil deforestation in Sumatra and Indonesia.

RED II should adequately respond to these concerns in the use of palm-oil based biofuels in the EU, instead of curtailing the production of sustainable EU based biofuels.

EU sourced biofuels cogenerating proteins are to be promoted if the objective is truly to fight climate change while improving food security and job creation.

Indeed, it his high time to get back to facts and confront populist positions that attempt to equate conventional biofuels to hunger and deprivation. On the contrary, conventional biofuels are a source of job creation and increased incomes, improving food security.

The debate on the current Commission proposals should make the targets for the use of renewable energy in transport more ambitious, not erase them. In addition to that, the sustainability criteria for feedstock originating biofuels should promote those that deliver protein feed, replacing imports, and freeing-up land in third countries for food and feed production or environmental improvement, on top of their emissions savings.

That would benefit the environment, create jobs and growth, diminish EU dependency on imports of protein feed and oil, and improve food security overall.

CONCLUSION

Agriculture, including forestry and animal rearing, has always been a provider of non- food products, a source of fibres, fuel, construction and other materials like hides and skins.

What is new is the scale and the range of products originating in basic agriculture raw materials, creating new important outlays for farmers and for the agri-industrial sector at large, and the speed at which they have developed in recent times.

The bio-economy brings 2.7 million jobs to the EU, outside those employed in the farming sector providing the raw materials for non-food uses.

These products present significant advantages as compared to similar products from other origins, as for instance fossil fuels, as they benefit the environment by reducing greenhouse gases, cut waste and pollution, produce social benefits by stimulating rural communities through establishment of local industries and providing new markets for farmers, and improve the economic competitiveness of the agri-industry through development of new markets and products.

Agriculture land has been used in the EU to a significant extent to generate non-food products, be it biofuels, starch, oleo-chemicals or fibres, without reducing the availability of food or feed, nor having a negative impact on consumer prices. The starch and oleo- chemicals production alone mobilize over 1.2 million ha, whilst at the same time food and feed production have increased as a result of productivity gains.

Non-food production contributes positively to farmers revenues, creates jobs in less- favoured rural areas, and increases the competitiveness of the agri-industry sector. Non-food production is a well-diversified sub-sector, with a promising future.

Public policies should encourage the development of the bio-economy, through applied research and other means. Public policies should in particular be based on facts and extend and strengthen existing mandates for biofuels, and thus contribute to decarbonisation of transport fuels.

Biofuels: surmounting populism for a fact-based policy

October 2017

The European Commission has made a proposal in the context of a revised RED (Renewable Energy Directive) that would phase out to a large extent the production of conventional or first-generation biofuels, produced from EU feedstock.

Why are conventional biofuels being targeted for quasi-extinction? Are they not valuable in reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and therefore mitigating climate change, as some claim? Are they a burden to feeding the European consumer and the world at large, as goes by the “accepted wisdom” of many NGOs?

Let’s first have a hard look at facts, then contrast those facts with the current Commission proposals, and conclude by putting forward what should be done in the best interest of the EU.

It is crucial that the European Institutions do not bow under pressure of populistic, un- verified, and factually wrong positions in the current debate.

The best interest of the EU is to promote policies that mitigate climate change and promote growth and jobs, and that do not undermine the availability of food to European and world consumers. It is well worth going against “accepted wisdom” if that “wisdom” is little more than baseless claims and statements that taint the value of biofuels.

THE FACTS

1) European sourced biofuels have not displaced any food and feed production

The public perception of biofuels changed dramatically in 2007, from a positive view on products that helped mitigate climate change and could replace favourably fossil fuels, to a largely negative view on products that compete with the production of food and therefore increase food prices.

Yet today it is clear that the oil price spike, which impacted the prices of all commodities, was the driving cause of food price peaks in 2007/2008, and that biofuels had a very limited impact.

It is the lead world organization for food that says so. FAO’s HLPE (2013)26 study determined that many factors caused the steep rise in food prices, such as: the impact of high oil prices on agricultural fuel and input costs, rising food demand, combined with a shift to animal protein diets in the large emerging economies, the influence of China ́s cereal stock management, weather events in major exporting countries, a slowdown in agricultural productivity growth, and speculation. In addition, the impact of biofuels on commodity prices may be considered as too low to quantify, as determined recently by the World Bank’s leading expert on the issue.

For those that like ad contrario arguments, the current feed and food price situations provides a good example, and further validates the assessment that biofuels do not play a significant role in food prices.

As a matter of fact biofuels production has kept growing since 2007/2008, and agriculture prices have fallen over since 2010. Since 2008 EU biofuels production increased by 68% while global food prices dropped by 20%.

If one looks more closely to the relationship between the production of conventional biofuels in the EU and the availability of food and feed, the facts are that food and feed production has gone up as the production of biofuels.

The EU production of the main feedstocks used for producing biofuels (rapeseed, wheat, maize and sugar) has either increased (doubling in the case of rapeseed) or remained stable (by quotas in the case of sugar), due in particular to productivity gains.

In this context, European sourced biofuels have not displaced food and feed production, and have had no real impact on prices. On the contrary biofuels have helped in limiting the adverse effects of the food markets U-turn, offering some economic stability to struggling EU farmers, not only without adverse effects on food or feed availability, but with a very important positive impact of biofuels production in the EU – the production of high quality protein feed as a by-product.

2) European sourced biofuels improve European and global food security

Europe is still dependent for 70% of soybean meal imports to meet its growing livestock demand.

Soybean meal imports declined, especially from the 2007 peak level, as a result of increased vegetable protein meal production within the EU which allowed to reduce imports each year of nearly 13 million tons of rich protein meal, reducing the EU deficiency by one third.

Indeed, The development of the output of rapeseed and sunflower meal (protein meal accounts for about 60% of the seed and oil 40%) has ensured with an extra production of 10 Mt a minimum of self-sufficiency.

While food consumption of rapeseed oil has been steady for decades, the development of an increasing European supply of protein meal has been made possible by finding alternative outlets for oil, i.e the production of biofuels.

In 2015 EU bioethanol companies produced 5 million tonnes of high protein animal feed. That is enough protein to feed 3.5 million dairy cows, or 17% of the EU dairy herd.

The EU biofuels industry processing rapeseed and cereals now produces approximately 13 million tons annually of high protein meals that otherwise would be imported from the Americas.

It is an evidence therefore that feed meal production and biofuels production from European vegetable oils and cereals are key (and today the only realistic option) for improving and securing the availability of higher volumes of vegetable protein produced locally and used as animal feed source, limiting imports.

It should be noted that less imports from the Americas mean more feed and food availability from these regions, to the benefit of consumers all over the world thus contributing to increased global food security.

What appears quite clearly from the facts is that production of biofuels from EU agriculture origin complements food demand: the increased production had no impact on the availability of cereals, oilseeds or sugar for human or animal feed consumption but instead the production of biofuels is vital for the production of proteins for animal feed and, thus, has a positive impact on European and global food security.

Let us now move on to the climate benefits of biofuels as compared to the use of fossil fuels.

3) EU biofuels produced from EU feedstock provide immediate and efficient answer to transport emission.

Transport is responsible for 25% of GHG emissions in Europe. This sector is at the heart of the climate challenge. Biofuels are an alternative to fossil fuels. In this context, the share of biodiesel and bioethanol is expected to grow in the energy mix, as their role as an alternative to fossil fuels is of paramount importance.

The EC’s 2016 Strategy on Low Emissions Mobility envisages biofuels comprising 35% of transport energy in 2050, twice the level of renewable electricity. The data shows that biofuels will continue to make up over 90% (around 28.9 MTOE) of renewable energy demand in 2020, with the remaining 3.1 Mt being met by renewable electricity.

Biofuels and feedstock production in the EU must conform to strict sustainability criteria to ensure that their production and use do not cause any harm to the environment or negative social effects. Accordingly, the Renewable Energy Directive, which was adopted in 2009, sets out biofuels sustainability criteria for all biofuels consumed in the EU.

These criteria include a minimum rate of direct GHG emission savings (rising to 50% in 2018 in comparison to fossil fuels) and restrictions on the types of land that may be converted to production of biofuels feedstock crops. The latter criterion covers direct land use changes only. Specifically, biofuels cannot be grown in areas converted from land with previously high carbon stock such as wetlands or forests and also they cannot be produced from raw materials obtained from land with high biodiversity such as primary forests or highly biodiverse grasslands.

The revised Fuel Quality Directive (FQD), adopted at the same time as the RED, includes identical sustainability criteria and targets a reduction in lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions from transport fuels consumed in the EU by 6% by 2020.

It is very important to note that actual GHG saving values currently being certified and calculated with RED methodology are exceeding by far both the typical and the default values published in the RED.

The EU produced ethanol reached for example on average 68 % of GHG reduction in 2016.

4) Biofuels have a clear economic value as well.

They help reducing EU oil imports dependency. As regards biodiesel alone, in 2010 its energy share in diesel for road transport was 5% in the EU. This helps greatly to reduce EU dependence on imported crude oil for its energy supply. In France, for instance, more than 98% of oil is imported. This represents almost half of the trade deficit of the country. In producing about 2 million tons of biodiesel each year, France is saving 1.5 billion euros per year.

Regarding bioethanol, in 2014 European renewable ethanol displaced 4.8% of Europe’s petrol volumes, saving €1.5 billion of the EU oil bill. Increased ethanol use, via a shift to E10 fuel, would further strengthen the benefits of ethanol use, and reduce oil use by 50 million barrels, and thereby saving €4bn for the European economy based on 2014 oil prices. The improvement in biofuels production can thus respond to one of the main struggles that EU countries face, by satisfying domestic energy demand.

In addition to the previous point, production of biofuel feedstock crops benefits European farm incomes, assuring long term demand stability at the higher end of price ranges for farmers selling to nearby refineries. It is estimated that the production of crop-based biofuels in the EU generates at least 6.6 billion euros of direct revenue for EU farmers.

Specifically, as explained by the EP in a recent report, “the EU’s biofuels policy supports jobs, especially in rural areas”. It reported that the EU biofuel sector has generated more than 220 000 direct and indirect jobs in the EU biodiesel production chain. Not negligible figures when unemployment is still so high.

It is worth reminding that limiting the contribution of conventional biofuels would represent a real economic damage for farmers and a loss of jobs and wealth for the regions where refineries are present.

THE COMMISSION LATEST PROPOSALS : Get back to facts and confront populism.

EU sourced biofuels cogenerating proteins are to be promoted if the objective is truly to fight climate change while improving food security and job creation.

In spite of the climate and economic benefits of conventional biofuels production, and the lack of negative impacts on the availability of food and feed, the Commission is proposing to halve it markets by limiting its use to a maximum of 3.8% of the total

energy consumption in the EU by 2030. Worth recalling that today the EU has a target of 7% use of biofuels in the transport sector for 2020.

The Commission is thus proposing to scale down the production of conventional biofuels, without any facts or analysis that would support its proposals.

To make it even more unacceptable, the Commission seems to ignore that today the EU is a net importer of biofuels. Well informed decisions to promote balanced and locally sourced biofuels in the EU will mean that for every additional production of locally sourced biofuels, there would be a corresponding decrease in farming biofuels in third countries with uncertain sustainability practices. There will be a decrease in feedstocks produced in third countries to be exported to the EU to produce biofuels and a decrease of feed meals imported into the EU from third countries. Moreover, those third countries could use the freed-up land resources for afforestation and food security purposes.

Amongst the imported feedstock for biofuels, palm oil comes first. As a result of the 2012 Commission’s proposal on “crop-based biofuels”, the EU has been locked into strong levels of increasing imports into Europe.

The one consensus element, arising from all the scientific data, is the negative impact of unsustainable palm oil, especially in the context of deforestation of highly diverse and carbon rich ecosystems contributing to the expansion of palm oil deforestation in Sumatra and Indonesia. Use of palm oil for biodiesel in Europe has grown to over 3 million tonnes per annum, undermining valuable efforts engaged in the food sector to focus on certified palm oil production and fight against the expansion of unsustainable production (world palm oil capacity increased from 45Mtpa to over 60Mtpa in the five year period to 2016, with EU production of palm biodiesel accounting for nearly a fifth of this growth). This issue should be tackled, including via a proper trade coherent action, but the Commission is mute at this respect. RED II should adequately respond to the concerns in the use of palm-oil based biofuels in the EU.

Furthermore, specific provisions in the ILUC (Indirect Land Use Change) Directive has led to the highly questionable choice of imported Used Cooking Oil (UCO) which is generally not a waste outside the EU but instead is used for both feed and fuel, over domestic UCO or rapeseed.

Waste-based fossil fuel is also advantaged in the Commission proposals, over emissions saving biofuels. It should not be included in the obligation to incorporate a minimum share of renewable energy imposed by Member States on fuel suppliers, nor should it be counted in the EU target.

The European Parliament Rapporteur on the Commission proposals, whilst recognizing the advantages of a specific EU target for renewable energy in the transport sector, and

proposing to increase the current 10% to 12%, also dramatically scales down without any valid justification the contribution of conventional biofuels to no more than 3%.

It his high time to get back to facts and confront populist positions that attempt to equate conventional biofuels to hunger and deprivation. On the contrary conventional biofuels are a source of job creation and increased incomes, improving food security.

If “accepted wisdom” is little more than baseless opinion, it should be confronted without hesitation. The last thing one expects from the European Institutions is that they cave-in to widespread false beliefs. They should be in the front line to confront them.

The debate on the current Commission proposals should make it more ambitious the targets for the use of renewable energy in transport.

In addition to that the sustainability criteria for feedstock originating biofuels should

promote those that deliver protein feed, replacing imports of grains, and freeing- up land in third countries for food and feed production or environmental improvement, on top of their emissions savings.

That would benefit the environment, create jobs and growth, diminish EU dependency on imports of protein feed and oil, and improve food security overall.

Financial Omnibus: Time has come to be effective in helping farmers to cope with climate risks

October 2017

If we look back on the last decades, no single year has passed without emergency measures being raised and discussed at Council level, with the aim to help farmers to cope with drought, floods, or frost. Climate risks are permanent concerns for European producers, even with additional stress caused by the uncertainty of potential public support.

Until now these risks are being mainly managed in the «traditional» way: emergency meetings triggered by farmers’ mobilization; search for budget margins at regional, national and European level to help producers to stay in business. Depending on the budgetary constraints, media attention and political priorities, farmers can get a support from the society to overcome climate risks.

Strengthening the CAP toolbox

The Omnibus package offers the possibility to improve the EU regulation in order to develop further the risk management tools, going beyond the first pillar direct support which is and should remain the first layer of public support – the first safety net.This Basic Income Support is not strong enough to cover the growing consequences of climate change and guarantee the resilience of the EU farming sector.

Strengthening the risk management tool box offers the possibility to move away from a case by case uncertain coverage of climate risks to a more pragmatic, reliable system offering a clear economic safety net for farmers, with stable guarantees in case of a natural disasters.

Climate insurances have proven to be an efficient and complementary tool at global level. Therefore, we believe that time has come for the European Union to make tracks!

The low level of insurance coverage in Europe is the consequence of the lack of attractiveness of the EU schemes.

At the moment, the Common Agricultural Policy allows a 65% co-financing of premium insurances as long as they are triggered only in case of damages of at least 30% losses.

Agronomic conditions within the European Union make this scheme not attractive for farmers, given that losses higher than 30% are very rare, and that 20% losses – taking into account the low level of profitability of most EU farms – are already a real risk.

The situation in Third Countries (i.e. USA, etc.) or in the most advanced European Member States (Spain for instance, where farmers enjoy a national scheme, which is authorized under the State Aid rules by the European Commission) shows that coherent thresholds in line with real risks allows a wide development of insurance coverage, even at 60 to 80% coverage for certain crops.

Is it costly for the CAP?

The arable crop area in the European Union represents 74 million hectares for a total capital to be insured of about 76,5 billion euros.

For vineyards, the area represents 3 million hectares for a total capital to be insured of about 20,3 billion euros.

When it comes to pastures, they represent 70,5 million hectares for a capital to be insured of a bit less than 46 billion euros.

Thus, when it comes to climate insurances this aspect could be developed, the premium that would be co-financed if 100% of arable crop, vineyards and pastures areas were covered by crop insurances, would represent a bit more than ,2 billion euros per year, meaning a 4,7 billion euros cost for the CAP in case of a 100% coverage which would be totally hypothetical, and would never happen at the end of the day.

A more credible objective would be to cover maximum 60 to 70% of arable crops areas – 40% would already be an optimistic aim! For pasture, a coverage of 50% would certainly be a maximum. While, when it comes to vineyards, 70 to 80% coverage would represent a maximum as well.

Under these conditions, if all Member States decided to trigger these voluntary schemes in the second pillar, voluntary as well for farmers, the level of co- financing for a new enhanced scheme working in full swing, would be at 2,8 billion euros per year, meaning a maximum of 5% of the budget of the CAP (or 7% of the first pillar budget).

This amount would be divided as follow between the different sectors:

  • –  1,2 billion EUR for arable crops
  • –  0,7 billion EUR for vineyards
  • –  0,9 billion EUR for pastures.

    Is the WTO argument valid?

    The EU commitments within the WTO framework are far from being a barrier to the improvements of the EU risk management toolbox. This argument is only based on political objectives.

    If subsidies to crop insurance premium are included in the WTO green box when the trigger is at 30% or more and a 70% maximum compensation of losses, a co- financing public support with a threshold at 20% is undoubtedly possible as long as the EU can notify it in the framework of the « de minimis clause » (not the EU de minimis rules concerning State Aid). The EU margins in this de minimis clause are well beyond the 2,8 billion EUR that might be notified to the WTO if the insurances systems was improved.

    Beyond the amount – small when compared to the overall CAP budget – the strategic dimension of such a move at EU level, and the fact that the competitors of the European Union do not value such arguments to go forward, makes the WTO argument basically not valid. The economic ambition and challenge ahead, should go over any reluctance linked with WTO, especially considering the move of the European Commission itself which proposed to improve the triggering of the Income Stabilisation Tool at 20%.

Double performance of EU agri-food sectors A key condition : Empowering farmers to increase economic stability

Policy Briefing

Double performance of EU agri-food sectors

A key condition :
Empowering farmers to increase economic stability

October 2017

For more than two decades the credo of policy-makers (the Commission more than anyone, Council and European Parliament) has been to promote a closer connection between farmers and market change, or, in the terms of the now traditional expression a “market-oriented farming”.

Yet, beyond the rhetoric and wishful thinking, the question that has refused to go away since 2008 is this: has the CAP itself adapted to the markets? with the way they function, with their ups and downs… in such a way that every industry segment in the European agricultural and agri-food sector is not only fully embedded in but also proactive in its markets?

The economic premise adopted by decision-makers throughout the 2003-2013 period has been, as far as possible, to cut the link between public support and production, with the markets determining what farmers should do or produce, unencumbered by any external influences. In other words, the underlying logic of the reforms of 2003 and post-Health Check modifications was to put in place a form of fixed-rate annual income support based on hectarage but paid as if merely “settling an account”, job done! Moreover, safety nets have been pulled away and now offer only low rates of support when the market is in deep crisis (extremely low, even with no connection with markets reality for the beef and veal sector).

1

With its toolkit limited by its economic philosophy, the CAP has appeared to oscillate between two assumptions: on the one hand, that markets function perfectly, and, on the other, that European agriculture is still enough protected from worsening global volatility ‒ in reality the EU has opened its borders hoping for a greater penetration of global markets by EU agricultural and agri-food products, but without the public support to back up this strategy.

In seeking to link European agriculture and global markets, the EU’s diverse agricultural industries have, as a result, found themselves disarmed in the face of increasing market volatility, a volatility which has only worsened both in amplitude and frequency and that has become firmly established since 2007-2009 as a ‘inevitable’ fact of life in global agricultural and agri-food markets.

It is also a reality that, while direct support under the CAP’s Pillar 1 constitutes the EU’s core support for protecting farmers’ revenue, it has not be conceived and can’t be ask to cover risks that farmers face, such as:

  • –  A more unpredictable climate. Due to climate change, weather events are set to be more intense. Hailstones, drought, flooding… there is no longer a single year in which emergency support is not needed.
  • –  Increased price volatility. An imbalance of just a few percent between supply and demand in global markets can generate sudden and disproportionately high fluctuations in the prices that producers receive, even if the global market is only a small fraction of total sales for the products in question. This domino effect has been ravaging the European dairy sector since 2009.
  • –  More frequent animal/plant health incidents. Trade between countries and with third countries carries greater inherent risks, which are more difficult to manage, and sometimes new.
  • –  Serious market failure when major crises occur. Sudden falls in price caused by oversupply can lead, especially in the case of short- cycle production, to individual behaviour that is poles apart from a collective approach to resolving or mitigating crises, i.e. increasing one’s own production to offset reduced margins with volume. Such spirals in which individual economic agents “dig their own grave” while hoping that their neighbours will go under first, destroy value, and are ultimately costly to the public purse, which is called to the rescue as a last resort. But these spirals also hit the farmers with good prospects the hardest, i.e. those who have recently invested to improve their productivity, but who are bled dry before anyone else when a crisis strikes.

2

Depending on the market segment, between 10 and 40 % of European production is exported. Yet, there are some who have called for – often with demagoguery – the EU to become more inwardly-focused, with a more or less disguised return to the policies of the 70’s and of high guaranteed prices (the result of which would also be destructive isolationism and a U-turn in terms of creating value). And others have proposed turning farmers into civil servants, effectively revoking their right to private enterprise as they become mere instruments for a societal engineering strategy that forgets agriculture’s primary productive function. Both of these routes should be condemned with vigour and the proposals associated with them rejected. They would only lead to the impoverishment of agricultural industries and rural areas – the most vulnerable first – and of the European Union as a whole; or an over-administration leading to both out-of-control funding and a business development impasse.

The European Union needs to be more ambitious and have the courage to envision the agricultural sector as an industry, one made up of entrepreneurs who engage in business and who trade, and to state its economic importance for the EU.

The core support that ensures the development of the agricultural sector is the direct support from the CAP’s Pillar 1. The Union needs, as a first step, to reaffirm its legitimacy, and notably in relation to:

  • –  requirements made of farmers that are not remunerated by the market but which farmers are asked to comply with;
  • –  the costs of meeting European quality standards, desired by both the European legislator and the European consumer;
  • –  and the right of European farmers to a fair standard of living, in Europe, whereas it is still 40% lower on average than that of other industry sectors, a state of affairs that cannot be justified by invoking the variable economic standards of global competitors.

    In light of the different risks prevalent in agriculture, the European Union needs to change tack and adopt a governance approach that sees farmers as responsible entrepreneurs operating in an industry and market and which:

  • –  gives farmers a central role in the response to climate/weather hazards and market variability;
  • –  acknowledges the European Union’s responsibility to provide support that is tuned to the fundamental economic needs of the agricultural sector in times of acute crisis.

    Ahead of the European negotiations for the Commission’s Financial Omnibus proposal, the 2016 Global Food Forum looked at how the current CAP could be modified to ensure that European farmers are able, from 2018 onwards, to voluntarily construct more robust strategies to protect their businesses from climate/weather risks and market variability.

3

In this regard, the 2016 Global Food Forum identified three types of instrument ‒ possessing the right combination of economic efficiency and effectiveness ‒ that should be put in place for farmers from 2018 by the CAP:

  • –  An effective incentive to take out insurance against weather risks, via CAP co-financing (at 65%) of crop insurance premiums, with an index-based payout threshold set at a recorded loss of 20 %. As weather constitutes the most frequent, most unpredictable and most destructive risk in agriculture, it is no longer tenable to manage through ‘political headline grabbing’ allocations of emergency funds, hostage to the vagueries of budget availability. Crop insurance is widely used by our international competitors and has demonstrated its value. The EU needs to join the leading pack.
  • –  The option of saving collectively within sectoral mutual funds that provide margin insurance (sectoral income stabilisation tools – IST). These funds would provide payments if recorded margins were to fall in relation to index-based reference level by more than 20% and they would receive CAP co-financing (65%) at the time of saving i.e. at the time of contribution into the fund and not when a crisis strikes. These industry-specific IST could offer quick and efficient solutions when the industry-market in question is characterised by sudden fluctuations, such as is the case in dairy or sugar markets. Producers ‒‒ farmers ‒ absorb the full hit and are, moreover, unable to stock their produce, even temporarily, without losing its ‘fresh from the farm’ value.
  • –  For specific agricultural industries: the ability to set up more operable mutual funds to cover crop and livestock health risks based on the existing Pillar 2 risk management measures introduced with the 2013 reform, but with more streamlined administration (payment trigger thresholds, calculation of loss).

    The Forum also stressed the importance of making progress on individual precautionary savings plans (with their national tax component) and experimentation with margin insurance tools (over and above mutual funds).

    The negotiations for the agricultural part of the Omnibus financial regulation have borne fruit in this respect. While the Commission’s proposal opens the door to sectoral IST, the European Parliament has recognized the importance for European agriculture of this negotiation.

    MEPs have taken the measure of responsibility that is theirs, with the Financial Omnibus being the only credible legislative window of opportunity this side of 2020 to respond to a pressing industry need for a means of managing weather and market risks without waiting for the next crisis to strike.

4

The EP (leading), the Council and the Commission have approved what is a useful legislative framework and a first practical step towards giving the CAP a structured business-oriented dimension, where the 2013 reforms had merely put down a marker.

Modified by the financial Omnibus, the CAP is thus moving towards a business vision in which European farmers are more equipped to take their own decisions in the market, with:

  • –  core support in the form of direct support, with its legitimacy confirmed, and designed to enable farmers to develop their business and to plan on the basis of ‘normal’ market conditions and trends;
  • –  agricultural industries take responsibility for the management of weather and market volatility risks, which is made possible by putting in place functional CAP incentives for farmers who choose to take out protection (individually and collectively) against such risks;
  • –  But one line of action, which is necessary for the coherence and efficiency of the whole risk management tool kit, remains to be put in place: what public action should do in cases when the sheer scale of a crisis exceeds the level of risk protection economic agents are expected to provide?

    In exceptional crises, whether related to crop/livestock welfare, the weather or the market, a public bridging measure needs to be designed and deployed in such a way as to preserve the European Union’s agriculture as an industrial asset. It needs to complement the individual and group schemes taken out by farmers. Standard risk management schemes are simply not designed to deal with ‘exceptional risk’, that is, ‘extreme events’, and it would be unthinkable to leave farmers unprotected from them.

    To date, in agriculture as in other industries – automotive, steel, banks, to name just a few, the policy response in times of severe crisis has mainly been to pull a financial sticking plaster out of the hat to avoid the complete disappearance of a vital industry. Moreover, any debate about agriculture and food must also think through how to ensure food sovereignty ‒ once this is set up as a strategic goal.

    And the legitimate expectation we should have towards a European economic policy, which the CAP is, is that sticking plasters won’t do. At best, they have no development effect and at worst, they have adverse effects.

    When a serious crisis strikes, policy action needs to be:

  • –  rapid, implying real-time analysis and deployment of pre-existing

    resources;

  • –  consistent with private risk and hazard management so as to

    avoid overlapping/competing provision or individual or group windfall behaviours;

5

  • –  economically virtuous, by giving private agents an incentive to participate actively in the resolution of… or at the least the alleviation of, crises;
  • –  designed for EU-scale implementation, which is the only scale at which it is possible to maximise efficiency and respect the European single market – the national, regional and local levels are simply not equipped to intervene in the case, which concerns us here, of global crises.

    The frequency of crises (market, weather) striking agricultural industries is unlikely to abate in the future, and so the European Union is going to have to tackle them ‒ and they may be very deep crises.

    Another and probably inevitable reality for the coming years, after Heads of State and governments have completed negotiations for the post-2020 budget, will be the absence of annual financial margins in the CAP budget. It would seem perilous to rely on the European Union’s ability to find ‘fresh money’ to alleviate future crisis in the world of agriculture.

    It is also incumbent on policy-makers to have in place a permanent rapid crisis response facility, with finance secured from the outset and whose administration/use should be both straightforward and tailored to the type of crisis involved.

    Squaring the circle ?

    Backing up private sector crisis and hazard management, responding to market failures during crises, guiding agricultural industries towards virtuous behaviours and away from individualist behaviours that can deepen crises, these should be the CAP’s objectives, in other words, preventing difficult situations from turning into crises.

    To achieve these objectives, and over and above the current market management instruments ‒ either public intervention or private storage ‒ the creation of a European fund for the prevention of crises in agriculture would appear to offer the most functional instrument for the EU.

    The creation of this fund, and its initial capital allocation, should be the object of a decision by Heads of State and governments as part of discussions for the MFF, in 2018 and 2019, as should also be the annual allocation to this fund from the crisis reserve introduced by the CAP in 2013, which will go the make up a predetermined fund total.

    This fund, with an initial allocation drawn from the European budget and pre- determined annual allocations from the CAP budget, would be a permanent, multiannual fund and ring-fenced for specific uses set out in its Statutes. It could be run from and financially administered by, for example, the European Investment Bank (EIB).

6

To fulfill its role as an efficient European risk and hazard management instrument for agriculture, this fund would have two principal tasks:

  • –  the reinsurance of insurance instruments taken out voluntarily by agricultural industries in the European Union. Trigger-criteria for this reinsurance need to be determined carefully in order to provide a backup for these instruments without reducing the accountability of those who implement them to do so in an efficient manner;
  • –  the financing ad hoc measures that the European Commission would determine on the basis of power afforded to it by the 2013 CAP to tackle particularly serious crises. These could be, for example, measures of the kind implemented in 2015 for the voluntary reduction of milk production in the European Union. In this regard, whenever a crisis triggers the activation of individual and or collective risk and hazard management instruments, the Commission could be required to present an analysis to Member States and ad hoc consultation groups ‒ of the situation in the industries concerned, including measures that might be taken to avoid a crisis and irreversible damage.

    ***

    By adopting the new three-part support package described in this paper:

  • –  core business support (Pillar 1 support);
  • –  insurance schemes, taken out voluntarily by farmers, to reduce

    the impacts of weather and market risks on their farm businesses;

  • –  a European fund for the prevention of crises in agriculture to

    ensure the continued existence of European agricultural industries.

    the European Union will have chosen to:

  • –  no longer have to hurriedly decide on action in emergency

    conditions, with funds allocated to reduce political pressure but having no economic impact (for example, in resolving the 2015 milk crisis approx. 1 billion Euros were spent but this spending has had no proven impact);

  • –  recognise farmers’ entrepreneurial ability, to encourage them to plan for weather hazards and market imperfections;
  • –  to clearly refute the dream merchants’ belief that public support can correct any and all market imperfections;
  • –  concentrate its intervention where policy action is most meaningful, to protect when there is a serious crisis, thereby preserving the potential of EU agricultural to grow and encouraging its farmers and other stakeholders to plan for such growth.

    Such a system would also be consistent with the objective of facilitating and enabling the ecological transition of European agriculture; by seeing farmers as responsible entrepreneurs, encouraged to create added value ‒ while being protected in an effective way from extreme hazards, and empowered, as a result, to invest and plan for the future.

7